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Dedication: Robert Bernard Yegge
My friend, Robert B. Yegge, has been a splendid Dean
of the College of Law, University of Denver, for twelve years.
He is now leaving the academic world and reentering the
private practice of law. I note that occasion by observing that
to me Bob Yegge truly is a renaissance man, having myriad
interests and abilities. He is a consummate author, a mellow
wise man, a concerned humanitarian, an efficient administrator, a knowledgeable publicist, an effective fund-raiser, a scholarly legal educator, and a devoted and principled lawyer.
Throughout his deanship, he particularly reveled in intellectual challenge and innovation. The fine arts have been a lifelong obsession with him. Among the variety of arts and humanities organizations that he has served, he has been most deeply
involved with the Colorado Council on the Arts and Humanities, serving for more than ten years as its chairman. From afar,
it certainly has seemed to me that this delightful lawyer has
been always truly in love with life and its many mysteries.
The Law Center at the University of Denver is only one of
many institutions which has profited from his energy and ability, but to me it is the one which remains the largest in his
heart. When he became the dean of its law school, his plans for
it then are well set forth in a statement he later made:
A law center is a place where people learn and study the law
all of their lives. At the University of Denver, the Law Center
contains a College of Law to teach the fundamental principles of
law. It is a place conducive for research and experimentation to
keep our legal system operative and current and to strive toward
an understanding of the fabric of justice. It is a place for continuing the education of professionals, housing organizations interested in law and the administration of justice, and providing the
community a place to find respect for and comfort in the law. In
sum, it provides a showcase for demonstrating the contribution
which lawyers make to the well-being of today's society.

Twelve years later, the Denver Law Center has in the main
reached the initial goals set for it by Bob Yegge. Yet, throughout those twelve years of achievement, that hard-driving and
demanding leader established himself with fellow Denver faculty and students as a man of unbounded energy, keen insight,
high legal scholarship, and warm friendship. Truly, his acco-
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lades and honors as a law school dean defy specific enumeration. Twelve years ago, Bob Yegge, writing in the American Bar
Journal with foresight and remarkable anticipation, said:
Already, the importance of individual rights is a focus of
major legal attention, which has become even more specific in the
criminal area. In 1976, the specificity of similar legal concerns
promises to be more, rather than less, intense. Hence, the importance, availability and use of education in 1976 will significantly
affect the practice of law. With changes occurring incrementally,
lawyers will be more concerned with future developments-they
will become explorers, not merely archaeologists.
The implication of the crystal ball for legal education seems
too clear to elaborate. In summary, it means an admixture of
specialized training, an exposure to disciplines not heretofore
thought of as important to the lawyer-a liberal legal education
with chosen intensity of specialization; in other words, a legal
curriculum of the order, but not the substance, as at present
offered at the leading liberal arts colleges. Whether the law
schools will attempt all of these educational tasks will be left to
the unpredictable policy decisions of the leaders in legal education.

As a legal educator, Dean Yegge clearly is, and has been,
a leading participant in the explorer category-he is not, and
never has been, merely a legal archaeologist.
Throughout his decanal career, Bob Yegge has approached
the law with an unparalleled zest and continuous quest for
academic excellence. He has provided in the Denver College of
Law a calmness and sincere appreciation for law and lawyers
in all those who worked with him-and he has inculcated in
them well the dogma that legal education must be an admixture of specialized preparation.
The integration of law and the social sciences is one of the
issues that Dean Yegge has over the years pioneered in legal
education. He designed and directed the Social Science Methods in Legal Education Program at the College of Law for the
Law and Society Association and the Association of American
Law Schools since 1967. And he was the first President, serving
in that capacity from 1965 through 1972, of the Law and Society Association.
As a legal educator, Bob Yegge was a perfectionist. He set
often impossible standards for himself, and he was never really
satisfied with anything that he, or anyone else in the law
school, did. He was sometimes hard to work for or with-but

1977

DEDICATION

he, with those others he brought to Denver, made a national
reputation for the Denver Law Center. During his long tenure
as dean, he exhibited a thoroughgoing pragmatism yet a firm
and continuing commitment to the principle of academic excellence. It seems to me that he as dean displayed there in a
most unique way both imagination and perserverance.
As a lawyer, he has believed that a humble man who tried
his best could enlist the support of others and succeed, regardless of moments of adversity. He has been optimistic-trusting
in the inherent good of all men-and he has always been convinced that right would ultimately prevail. He carries with him
a love for the common man and a feeling that equality and
justice are abiding principles that a lawyer must strive to promote. He is compassionate and understanding, conscientious,
and fairminded. He, unlike many other people, has not been
locked to any single opinion or idea-reason always prevailed.
In the face of tremendous demands on his personal time, he
still on an almost daily basis has rendered far-reaching service
of state and national impact to the legal profession.
While he has had during the period that I have known him
well the greatest possible respect and admiration for the practicing bar, he has, nevertheless, led multiple efforts to improve
the structure of the legal profession, and the ways, means and
methods it traditionally has utilized to deliver its services. Indeed, he has not been hesitant when the organized bar was
unable or unwilling to correct abuses to point out what he felt
was a self-serving attitude of ignoring the public interest.
Perhaps it is fair, if it is ever fair for one person to be so
singled out, to assert that Bob Yegge in my opinion has been a
principle force in the present substantially enhanced use of
paraprofessionals by the practicing bar. Certainly, his writings
and his speeches demonstrate very clearly his early interest in
paralegals. More than ten years ago he wrote:
Almost every lawyer has a speciality. And, if we are honest with
ourselves, almost every lawyer has his incompetencies. Furthermore, there are subprofessionals, not lawyers, who can handle
certain legal-related problems with efficiency at least equal to
that of lawyers. The title insurance companies competently prepare title opinions in the form of title commitments; insurance
adjusters are experts at negotiation and settlement; professional
estate planners have in-depth knowledge of tax and legal rules
and regulations and sound advice. In fact, some of those subpro-
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fessional specialists have greater competence in their areas than
some general practitioners.

Bob Yegge's first book on the subject was called New Careers in Law, published in 1969, under a grant from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. That volume was followed with New Careers in Law II, a 1972 American Bar Association publication. Both were splendid-and each in turn contributed to the movement toward paralegals. To my own
knowledge he was an effective leader of the American Bar Association Special Committee on Legal Assistants from 1970
through 1976. His interest in paralegals led to his repeated
endeavors to assist in the creation of the new profession of
professional court manager. Indeed, I was his colleague in 1970
as a founding trustee of the Institute for Court Management;
while I have been long gone from the Institute for Court Management, he continues to so serve as one of its leaders. He was
the motivating force behind the Master of Science in Judicial
Administration Degree Program at the University of Denver
College of Law in 1971, the first of its kind in the nation. Legal
specialization, too, has always been an area of deep concern for
him. He has written extensively on the subject in a variety of
journals, chapters and books, and in his Dean's Reports.
Minority legal education is something that Bob Yegge believes to be of deep and profound importance. In 1967 he began
at the University of Denver College of Law the first minority
summer preparatory program (primarily for Chicanos), under
a grant from the Ford Foundation, which not surprisingly to me
turned out to be the model which precipitated the Council on
Legal Education Opportunity (the joint endeavor of the American Bar Association and Association of American Law
Schools), and the model of the training programs which CLEO
has since annually sponsored. He was a member of the Board
of Trustees of the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund from 1970 through 1976 and he served as its first
Vice Chairman from 1974 through 1976. In addition, he served
as Chairman of the Colorado Migrant Council from 1965
through 1970 and as Colorado Chairman of the Campaign for
the United Negro College Fund.
Continuing legal education is an item of professional business that Bob Yegge believes is most critical to the practicing
bar. Accordingly, he caused to be established as early as 1965
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a major continuing legal education program for the State of
Colorado under the auspices of the University of Denver College of Law. Further, he established at the Denver College of
Law several national continuing legal education programs,
such as the Transportation Law Institute for the Motor Carrier
Lawyers Association.
Verily, Bob Yegge has loved the law in all of its ramifications all of his professional life-perhaps, indeed, for all of his
life. I for one am convinced that Bob Yegge gave to the College
of Law of the University of Denver even more than he received.
In pursuing his destiny over the past twelve years as a law
school dean, Bob Yegge can stand as an example of dedication
for the many who know him well. On balance, he has been one
of the truly innovative legal administrators of this sturdy and
robust land of mountains and plains. It is indeed rare for any
one man to have combined in him the charm, intellect, ability,
personality, integrity, and academic courage with which he is
endowed. With all of his achievements as a law professor, law
dean, and practicing lawyer, he still is a compassionate, warm,
and lovable human being.
Dean Robert B. Yegge had a long and illustrious tenure at
the University of Denver. He obviously continues to cherish its
College of Law and all of its people. Without a scintilla of
doubt, he is a devoted servant and a noble son of Colorado. It
is a singular honor for me to participate in honoring a man who
has performed professionally in such an exemplary way.
Chesterfield Smith
Former President
American Bar Association
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A Tribute
Robert Bernard Yegge steps to stage-front-center. Behind him is the backdrop containing hundreds of items. Let us
examine just a few of them, placed there since as a Phi Beta
Kappa he graduated magna cum laude from Princeton in 1956:
a Masters in Sociology and a J.D.; Professor at and Dean of
the University of Denver College of Law, 1966-1977; Assistant
to the President of the Denver Post for the past six years; since
1967, Director, Social Science Methods in Legal Education
Institute; on the Executive Committee, National Council for
Arts and Education; Managing Trustee of the Denver Center
for the Arts, 1972-1976; seventy other positions not dissimilar
in stature to the preceding six; dozens of prestigious awards;
memberships in more than a score of outstanding clubs and
professional associations; author of eighteen books and monographs and fourteen chapters in books and symposia contributions; two dozen book reviews; and almost countless major addresses.
From the backdrop you see the man-a person of high
intelligence, a hard worker, a doer, an individual who has enacted several lifetimes of accomplishment, a person dedicated
to the high input of sociology in legal education and the legal
profession, and one who has attracted nationwide attention to
his law school.
One more thing needs to be mentioned: he is a warmhearted, compassionate person-a real friend to a very great
many.
James K. Groves, Justice
The Supreme Court of Colorado
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RICHARD D.

CHAMBERS

LAMM

Governor

November 16, 1977

Ved P. Nanda, Director
International Legal Studies Program
University of Denver
College of Law
Denver, Colorado 80204
Dear Ved:
It is hard to overstate the impact of Bob Yegge on
The University of Denver, The City and County of Denver, and
The State of Colorado.
Bob Yegge has worked long and hard, unselfishly and
unreservedly to make his community a better - fairer - more
just place. His skills in leadership are superb.
All of Colorado owes him a great debt of gratitude.
Sincerely,

Lamm
Governor
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MYRES S. McDOUGAL
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking
JOHN N. HAZARD*
This is the second annual Myres S. McDougal DistinguishedLecture in InternationalLaw and Policy presented at the University
of Denver College of Law in the Spring of 1977. Sponsored by the
International Legal Studies Program, the InternationalLaw Society, the DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, and
the Student Bar Association, the lecture series presents eminent
jurists and scholars addressingsignificant issues of international
law and policy.

Soviet authors are turning their attention increasingly to
the tactics of international lawmaking. Long gone are the days
when international law was pushed toward the "museum of
antiquities"' as of no concern to a working class society. Trotsky's expectation that the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs
would soon become an anachronism, as fraternal relations between governing working class parties replaced the competitive
relations of bourgeois states,' makes odd reading today in both
East and West. Nation states are everywhere recognized as
* Nash Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., 1930, Yale;
LL.B., 1934, Harvard; Cert., 1937, Moscow Juridical Institute; J.S.D., 1939, University
of Chicago; LL.D., 1969, University of Frieburg; LL.D., 1970, Lehigh University.
1. Engles used this expression to describe the ultimate fate of the state when the
classless society had been achieved. See F. ENGLES, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE STATE ch. 9 (1884). This passage caught the attention of the author
of the first study of Soviet attitudes toward international law who concluded that not
only the state but its handmaiden, the law, is doomed also to wither away. See T.
TARACOUZIo, THE SOvIEr UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1935).
2. "I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and
then shut up shop." Quoted from Trotsky's autobiography in 3 E. CARR, THE BOLSHEVIK
REVOLUTION 1917-1923, at 16 (1953).
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fated to exist for long years to come, whether their leadership
be in the hands of a Communist party or a non-Communist
structure. Although Communist parties in various states are
seen by Soviet authors to enjoy fraternal relations, the states
they govern are interrelated through a network of norms they
call "laws," just as are the states of the non-Communist world.
Thus, although the quality of the norms is said to vary in
accordance with the ends they are designed to serve, the norms
are seen as constituting law nevertheless and are created and
modified by a process recognized as "lawmaking."
It is that lawmaking process, especially as it relates to the
restructuring of general international law applicable to relations between states of differing economic systems, to which
this paper is devoted. Intrinsically, the Soviet process is of
concern to Americans planning their own lawmaking tactics.
Some may or may not be aware of changes that are occurring
in Soviet practice and of explanations given by Soviet authors
of that practice. Professor G. I. Tunkin, formerly chief of the
Legal Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr.
V. A. Movchan, who has recently been transferred from the
Ministry to the academic halls of the Institute of State and
Law, I. P. Blishchenko of the Legal Department of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry, and V. A. Kartashkin, formerly of the United
Nations Secretariat and now of the Institute of State and Law,
are men to read, for all are close to the practitioner and to the
scholar.
What are these lawyers saying that commands attention
from those who have been following the literature on Soviet
tactics ever since Lenin rejected Trotsky's "No war; no peace"
formula in 1918 as an impractical posture to assume in dealing
with the German victors? Lenin's acceptance of a treaty at
Brest-Litovsk signalled adoption of the tactic of negotiating
treaties to create law.' For subsequent decades the treaty was
heralded as the primary and preferred source of law by Soviet
international lawyers. But today there is emerging a new
stance, one based on the evaluation of the changes in the international community. In the years between the two world wars,
the U.S.S.R. stood alone as a Communist-led state, and inde3. The Brest-Litovsk negotiations are treated in detail in 1 L.
26-78 (1930).

ETS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

FISCHER,

THE SOvi-

1977

SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING TACTICS

pendent states were few in Africa and Asia where the colonial
system was still widespread. Now, the situation has greatly
changed. The postwar expansion of the Communist-led system
to a total of fourteen states soon after World War II and the
constant addition of new states to the membership of the
United Nations have brought new actors into the lawmaking
process. This quantitative change is heralded as having introduced a qualitative change as well in the relationship of forces.
On occasions when the Communist-led states find it possible
to team up with the developing states, the resulting coalition
outnumbers greatly the old states who constituted the bulk of
the membership of the League of Nations and of the founders
of the United Nations at San Francisco. In considerable measure, although by no means under all circumstances, the coalition creates a new majority with the capacity to make international law rather than solely to receive it.'
With this reversal of the early postwar majority, Soviet
authors indicate that Soviet diplomats have opportunities previously denied Soviet tacticians. Consequently they are revising their positions on sources of law, and this revision has had
its impact even on the legal philosophers, who are asking
whether long-held attitudes toward the predomjnately bourgeois class nature of international law must be revised.
To begin with tactics: treaties have been the preferred
source of international law for Soviet diplomats and scholars
for the decades that have passed since Brest-Litovsk.' This
attitude reflected a lack of confidence in custom as a source of
law, and Soviet scholars frequently expressed this view in the
years between the two world wars.' Authors based their reasons
in part on Soviet Russia's early experience and in part on the
Marxist philosophy of law which they espoused. The experience was clear: Western statesmen demanded that the fledgling Soviet Russian State recognize its legal obligation to pay
full value for nationalized properties and that it recognize the
established rule that successor states are responsible for the
4. Ambassador John A. Scali of the United States expressed dismay in the United
Nations at the steady stream of votes against the West. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1974,
at 1, col. 8.
5. T. TARACOUZIO, supra note 1, at 13.
6. Id.
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obligations of predecessors. Westerners also argued that pacta
sunt servanda was a principle to be applied to treaties almost
without exception and that there was no basis for the Soviet
leadership's early decision to pick and choose freely among the
Tsarist treaties to find those that suited Soviet needs.
The Soviet denunciation of custom as a source of law had
a philosophical base as well as a practical one. Philosophically,
the Soviet leadership took the position that custom had developed over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries among
states governed by capitalists and that it inescapably reflected
the interests of the capitalist classes that governed those states.
This position was the logical extension of the Marxist concept,
expressed in the Communist Manifesto of 1848, that law is but
the will of the capitalist class made into a law for all.7 This
being so in Soviet minds, there was reason to reject international custom as a reflection of interests opposed to those of the
working classes.
But in practice there was need to accept some elements of
custom because these were protective of Soviet State interests.
The most important was the customary law of diplomatic intercourse. Soviet envoys could claim no diplomatic protection
of their persons or of their quarters if the customary international law on diplomatic privileges and immunities was not
recognized. The problem was not solely theoretical, as became
evident when some Soviet envoys were harrassed and even
murdered, and their premises searched.' Thus, while custom
was regarded as suspect from a proletarian point of view, some
aspects of custom, as well as some treaties dating from Tsarist
times, especially those creating the long frontier with China,
had to be accepted to avoid unmanageable conflict. The difference in attitude toward treaty law and customary law, with
preference for the former, was based on the simple fact that the
Soviet diplomats could negotiate new treaties to their liking
faster than they could change custom. Indeed, until the series
of diplomatic conferences, held under United Nations auspices
7. COMMUNIST MANIFESTO § 2 (1848), reprinted in I MARX ENGELS SELECTED WORKS

44-51 (1950).
8. The most dramatic episode was the assassination of Plenipotentiary Vorovsky
in Lausanne in 1923 during a conference on the regime of the Straits. See 3 E. CARR,
supra note 2, at 489.
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well after World War II, there was no indication that the nations of the world were prepared to review great bodies of customary law in multinational conferences and to codify them in
treaty form.
The process of reformulating international law through
newly negotiated treaties attracted the attention of Soviet legal
philosophers in the early 1920s after the early period of resistance to international law in all its forms had ended. These
philosophers thought it desirable to rethink hostile attitudes
toward the nature of international law based on its origin
among capitalist powers because they saw their own Soviet
statesmen participating in the revision of some of the principles
previously accepted. Eugene A. Korovin was the first to take
the position that there was in formulation a new international
law of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism,
which was different in kind from what had existed before.' He
was not prepared to say that it was wholly different, but he
thought it a set of norms in process of transition, and therefore
acceptable to him as a class-oriented legal philosopher and to
the diplomats who directed Soviet international relations.
Still, Soviet policymakers wanted to present an image to
the world of a state that was essentially different from other
states, even though it had to act in accord with some of the
established rules of international law in order to conduct its
international relations with a minimum of friction. Soviet leaders certainly were not in a position to enforce their views by
military means. They had to coexist with capitalists, even
though they hoped eventually to overthrow them through world
revolution. One of their most noted efforts to change the Soviet
State's image among the peoples of the world was to reject the
century-old ranking of diplomats established by the Congress
of Vienna after the defeat of Napoleon. The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs refused to designate its diplomats as
Ambassadors and Ministers, but called them "plenipotentiary
representatives" (polpredy). Other foreign offices did not know
where to place such persons on their protocol lists, with the
result that generally Soviet diplomats were ranked at courts
and republic capitals below the traditionally designated diplo9. For a survey of early theories see K. GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC
LAw 4-6 (1970).

INTERNATIONAL
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mats of other states.'" This ranking irked Soviet authorities so
that ultimately, even on this point, Soviet policymakers accepted tradition. The ranks of Vienna were reestablished in the
Soviet diplomatic corps, and the evident contrasts in nomenclature between the diplomats of capitalist states and of the
Soviet Union disappeared.
Korovin's sally into the realm of philosophy to define a law
of the transitional period was subsequently rebuffed by another
Soviet legal philosopher who came to the fore in international
law toward the end of the 1920s, namely, Eugene B. Pashukanis." He moved into the international field from the municipal field of law and carried over to the international field his
basic point of view on law generally. This was that the law of
the twentieth century was "bourgeois law" because it had been
formulated by capitalists in the marketplace to foster the capitalist system of economy. Pashukanis admitted the need to
introduce into a Soviet Union that had restored a measure of
capitalism with Lenin's New Economic Policy in 1922 many of
the principles of Western European law and, most especially,
a conventional Romanist-type civil code. However, he looked
for departure from the Romanist models as socialist concepts
became a major feature of the political and economic culture
of the new Soviet Union. His argument was simply that during
the mid-1920s the Soviet policymakers would utilize bourgeois
law for a time, but that this did not affect its character. It
would remain bourgeois in form. He and his colleagues began
to attempt to formulate a new legal system that would reflect
socialist principles, and this they did by beginning to draft a
code of "economic law" to replace ultimately the civil code and
to systematize the rules relating to state enterprises functioning under a national economic plan. They also tried to draft a
new criminal code which would establish no fixed penalities,
for they thought such penalties were the heritage of a codification practice introduced by bourgeois draftsmen to reflect the
market principle of their societies by assigning a cost value in
terms of sanctions for every type of criminal act.
With his analysis that commonly accepted municipal legal
norms were bourgeois, Pashukanis, when he turned his atten10. See T. TARACOUZIO, supra note 1, at 179-82.
11. See K. GRZYBOWSKI, supra note 9, at 6-9.
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tion to international law, saw its norms also as bourgeois in
character. He argued that international law could not become
a law of the transitional period, as Korovin thought, but must
remain bourgeois until Marxian-socialist principles were
adopted widely throughout the world, creating a community
within which international relations would be conducted on
socialist lines. He admitted that existing principles of international law could be useful to Soviet policymakers; indeed, conformity to them was necessary to conduct international relations, but he could not see that this altered their character in
a socialist direction.
Pashukanis' views completely supplanted those of Korovin
among Soviet scholars so that Soviet utilization of norms of
international law, both treaty-based and custom-based, was
accepted as nothing more than application for utilitarian reasons of norms of bourgeois international law. Preference was
still for treaty-based norms, and custom remained in a decidedly inferior position, being accepted only in limited situations
after careful thought had been given to the consequences of
acceptance of custom in future relations with hostile states.
Pashukanis, in turn, fell from favor in the early 1930s as
Stalin departed from his flexible approach to the observance of
municipal law by his junior officials and by the public generally. Although Stalin practiced flexibility in his own personal
observance of the law which his Communist Party had inspired
and his legislators had enacted, he began in 1936 to talk of
"stability of law." This followed his denunciation in 1930 of the
previously accepted concept of an early step-by-step withering
away of the state and law as socialist principles were developed
in society. He declared the incremental view to be out of keeping with a truly dialectical process through which, according
to his explanation of it, the coercive power of the state could
wither away only after the state had first become the strongest
the world had ever known."
Stalin's legal technician, A.Y. Vyshinsky, was given the
task of purging the legal profession of the ideas of Pashukanis
12. Address by J.V. Stalin to the XVI Congress of the Communist Party (1930),
reprinted in S. GOLUNSKII, V. LENIN, E. PASHUKANIS, M. REISNER, J. STALIN, M. STROGOVICH, P. STUCHKA, I. TRAININ, A. VYSHINSKY, & P. YUDIN, SovIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
235 (H. Babb trans. 1951).
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and his colleagues. Vyshinsky swung toward a brand of normativism in Soviet law and strict observance of statutes. He left
unexpressed the exception that he must have known from his
participation in the early purge trials for situations where Stalin dictated otherwise. This new normativist attitude, phrased
always in class terms, was carried over to international law, as
Soviet diplomats negotiated great numbers of treaties and
began to build a body of precedent which favored Soviet interests. Hostility to customary law continued to be evidenced in
Soviet texts and practice; philosophical opposition to custom,
believed to have been created by bourgeois interests during
preceding decades, continued to prevail.
The Second World War was extended by Hitler in 1941
into the U.S.S.R. in spite of his solemn pact of nonaggression
with Stalin. Law in treaty form had failed Stalin, and, according to what had reached the West, he was surprised. In spite
of this experience, he turned to treaties again as the war neared
its end, and he expressed his willingness to Roosevelt and
Churchill to enter into a treaty-based postwar organization in
which he would play a major part in preventing the resurgence
of Germany and of Japan. The United Nations was brought
into existence by a Charter placing emphasis upon international lawmaking. Soviet scholars and diplomats were to be
represented in its every agency, including the new International Law Commission, which was to codify and develop international law, and the restructured International Court of Justice, which was to apply it.
The Soviet Union thus became one of the lawmakers in
concert with powers which it still considered to be bourgeois
and even imperialist. It now had a world forum in which it
could develop new tactics. It was no longer limited to the creation of advantageous law through bilateral and multilateral
treaties, for its lawyers were functioning at the key coordination points through which the revision of international law was
passing. The Soviet delegation's first steps within the United
Nations were hesitant, for Stalin evidently did not trust his
partners in an organization where his diplomats were sometimes outvoted. Not until Stalin's death in 1953 was the way
opened for full change in the attitudes of Soviet leaders, and,
even at that time, the change was not immediate. Not until
1956 when Nikita Krushchev declared that war between the
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capitalist and socialist states was not inevitable and that the
only possible policy was one of peaceful coexistence was the
ground prepared for markedly new positions.
In the mid-1950s international lawyers of the Communistled states began to speak of the law of "peaceful coexistence."
The term was not new, for Lenin had invented it, but it had a
new application. Initiative for development of the concept
seemed not to come from the Soviet side, but rather from its
Marxian-socialist allies. It was the legal adviser of the Yugoslav
foreign office, Milan Bartos, who introduced a proposal into the
Dubrovnik conference of the International Law Association in
1956 calling for a study of this new law. 3 By 1961 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which was prepared to conform
to Khrushchev's views inserted in its new Program the proviso
that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union would be based upon
the principles of peaceful coexistence, albeit with continuing
ideological struggle.14 This stimulated Soviet international lawyers, together with their colleagues from other Communist-led
states, to press for codification of international law as a law of
peaceful coexistence.
Lawyers of the West feared that the new directions would
ultimately unsettle, or perhaps even eclipse, traditional international law." The committee of the International Law Association charged with preparation of a study of the subject heard
charges from Western scholars that all international law was to
be reconsidered under Soviet pressure and that much would be
lost in the process. At this point G.I. Tunkin, who was the
Soviet scholar on the committee as well.as the legal adviser to
the Soviet Foreign Ministry, came to the fore with the proposition that the norms of general international law were to remain
intact, except for those that pertained to colonialism, those
that legalized inequalities of states, and those that legalized
13. See intervention of Milan Barto (Yugoslavia) introducing for the first time
in the I.L.A. a report on the law of peaceful coexistence. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE 17-39 (1957). For a resolution of the
48th Conference requesting formulation of a definition see INTERNATIONAL LAW AsSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE Xiii-Xiv (1959).
14. Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union pt. I, § 8 (1961),
reprinted in SOVIET COMMUNISM: PROGRAMS AND RULES 66 (J. Triska ed. 1962).
15. For an account of positions taken during the debate, see McWhinney,
"Peaceful Co-existence" and Soviet- Western InternationalLaw, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 95170 (1962).
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various forms of intervention in the internal affairs of states.
To put his position in some detail, he had the Soviet Branch
of the International Law Association, which he headed, prepare
a draft of the principles which were to constitute the law of
peaceful coexistence." The American Branch of the International Law Association, in an effort to clarify the concept and
to preserve essential elements of traditional international law,
also prepared a draft, 7 emphasizing the need to program over
time the independence of colonies and to foster and routinize
through agreement the peaceful settlement of disputes, the
expansion of commerce and cultural exchange, the granting of
economic aid, and the achievement of disarmament subject to
effective control. Out of these first steps taken in the informal
halls of the International Law Association came the work of the
United Nations, leading ultimately to the Declaration on
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in honor of the twentyfifth anniversary of the United Nations in 1970.18 Without question, this Declaration, although accepted by the Western
States, reflects in the main the interests of the Eastern European and the former colonial states. Soviet authors declare it
to be a codification of the law of peaceful coexistence, in spite
of the title forced upon them by Western States seeking to
disassociate the subject from the purely Soviet concept.
Achievement of a United Nations declaration, shaped
largely by Soviet diplomats in concert with those of the developing states, marked a notable turning point in the progress of
the Soviet thinkers away from early attitudes toward international lawmaking, but it was not the first step in that direction.
This is made clear by an extensive review of Soviet practice
conducted by a Western author who concludes that in the main
Soviet international policy has been moving for a long time
toward heavy reliance on established custom for its implementation." In reaching this conclusion, the author asks why such
16. The draft is published in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE
361-63 (1963) and Hazard, Co-existence Codification
Reconsidered, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 92-93 (1963).
17. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 344-45; HAZARD, supra note
16, at 93-94.
18. Declarationon Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States, [1970] U.N.Y.B. 789-92.
FIFTIETH CONFERENCE

19. See R. ERICKSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE (1972).
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a change should occur? Does it mean that custom has become
useful in implementing policy and, if so, why? He decides that
the Soviet policymakers have become conservative in many
ways, such as with their desire to maintain the principle of
freedom of the seas under which their fishermen contribute
significantly to Soviet food stocks, and their large navy is enabled to transit straits in much the same way as the United
States Navy. In short, in his view the Soviet Union is no longer
revolutionary in the sense of 1917. It is a Great Power with
benefits to be gained from customary law which has long protected Great Powers, whatever their economic systems.
It is true that Soviet scholars have been taking positions
friendly to customary law in their books and articles. G.I. Tunkin in his monumental study first published in Russia in 1970
indicates preference for the treaty as the basic source of international law, but he says that Soviet doctrine by no means
denies the important role of custom.'" He cites with evident
approval decisions of arbitral commissions which have found
acceptance of a modification of a treaty through acts of the
parties, the establishment of custom superseding the precise
words of the treaty. He recognizes that states may be bound by
custom as much as by treaty. His concern, however, is that
there be evidence of tacit acceptance of the custom. 2 He is not
ready to accept all claims of custom as a source of general
international law, but only those for which some form of tacit
agreement may be found. Perhaps the difference between this
position and the positions popular among Soviet authors in the
1920s is his willingness to accept a tacit rather than a specific
agreement, but agreement there must be. This being so, Western lawmakers must concern themselves with what makes for
tacit agreement, if they are to expect the Soviet side to observe
a principle of general international law formulated by custom.
The question for the West now is: How can the world know
what custom is acceptable or whether a tacit agreement has
been evidenced? Tunkin has an answer which recognizes the
change in the qualitative membership of the United Nations.
He finds that a General Assembly resolution has become proof
20. G. TUNKIN,
21. Id. at 124.

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

136 (W. Butler trans. 1974).
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of general acceptance of a new norm. 2 Of course, he recognizes
that General Assembly resolutions are specifically denied the
capacity to create international law by the Charter, but he
argues that if the resolution has been supported by states of
both the capitalist and the socialist worlds, the resolution is
proof of acceptance of a new norm.23
The resolution becomes in words frequently used among
approving lawyers "crystallized custom," which Tunkin sees as
a definite stage in the formation of a customary norm of international law. Recognizing the advantage to be gained by such
resolutions in support of a Soviet position, the Soviet tactician
now seeks allies on issues coming before the General Assembly,
when those issues are important to the implementation of Soviet foreign policy. The resolution must attract a majority or
at least be unopposed by a majority.
This is the point at which Dr. Movchan adds his word in
support of an increasingly popular form of approval not involving formal votes. It is the practice which is now widely used in
the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly, namely,
the process of consensus. To Movchan, consensus has become
the method by which the Sixth Committee participates in the
development of international law.24
Consensus is not "voting" in Movchan's eyes; he opposes
voting because he thinks it smacks of "arithmetical majorities." This is his adoption of a frequently used phrase among
Soviet jurists in earlier years to denigrate the authority of votes
dominated by the Western powers. Consensus is seen as something other than a majority vote, yet it is not a requirement of
total approval. The latter would give a minority a veto power
over a majority. Consensus approval is a procedure that requires explanation, and this explanation has been given by the
Legal Counsel to the United Nations, Professor Erik Suy. 25
22. Id. at 165, 170, 172.
23. Id. at 172.
24. Movchan, Detente and the InternationalLegal Order (in Russian), SOVETSKOE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO

94, 95 (1976).

25. See Suy, International Law-making in the United Nations: A Look at the
Future, PROCEEDINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 23 (1976).
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In Professor Suy's view the concept of consensus is not
new; it is found in Roman law, but it has come to have a special
meaning, for there have been cases in which delegates have
taken the floor after adoption of a resolution by consensus to
declare that, had it been put to a vote, they would have had to
vote against it or abstain. In one case in the Sixth Committee,
such interventions were made by twenty-five members, among
which were the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Japan. Professor Suy sees in this event the utility
and limitations of the consensus procedure, in that a resolution
of importance was adopted without a vote, but the express
reservations of the members who spoke subsequently indicated
that the legal consequences of the adoption of the resolution
were somewhat limited.
Professor Suy also considers the impact of consensus procedures upon the adoption of a treaty draft, since in this case
the treaty can have no effect until ratified. He believes that
when there has been a consensus on a draft, the text may have
enhanced value as an instrument of guidance prior to entry of
the treaty into force. It could not be such a guide had the draft
been adopted by a two-thirds vote.
Although Professor Suy, as a Belgian, obviously does not
speak for the U.S.S.R. and the Communist-led states, his reputation as a keen observer and interpreter of trends in international lawmaking gives some reason to believe that his observations are widely based. Dr. Movchan's support for consensus
procedures in light of his government's practice to which Professor Suy refers suggests that for the Soviet diplomat there
is a difference between an affirmative vote and acceptance of
a consensus.
Dr. Movchan adds a qualifying comment to acceptance of
the consensus procedure. He requires that within the consensus
there be states from the three major groups in the world: the
socialist states, the developing states, and the capitalist states.
This is not the first time that need for such tripartite agreement has been expressed by Soviet scholars. It even found
expression in the Soviet Government's proposal some years ago
that the Secretary General of the United Nations be not one
individual but a troika of three persons, each coming from one
of the groups into which Soviet writers see the world presently
divided. Dr. Movchan is explicit in saying that the U.S.S.R.

22

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 7:9

will accept no new principle in the formulation of which the
agreement of the socialist powers has not been obtained."
Thus, resolutions of the General Assembly may be proof of
recognition of newly emerging custom, but the Soviet authorities will not accept the new rule unless its diplomats have
participated in its formulation to the extent that adoption of
the consensus has been accepted.
Dr. Movchan assesses the Helsinki Declaration of 1975 in
terms of consensus. He sees the Declaration as the result of
such an agreement of all signatories establishing as a new principle the rule that frontiers of participating states are inviolable. He makes no reference to principles thought by the Western signatories to lie in the human rights provisions of "Basket
III," over which there was much dispute during 1976. Here the
issue seems to be not the binding nature of the consensus but
dispute as to what the consensus concerns. From the Soviet
point of view the issues are not as clear as they seem to be to
those claiming that they have been violated."
Another point of major concern to Soviet scholars at the
moment is the limitation placed by jus cogens on the subject
matter to which states may give their agreement in treaties.
The issue came to a head at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference
on the Law of Treaties when the Western delegates expressed
doubt as to what thejus cogens principle means under contemporary conditions. Certainly in the United States scholars have
not seen it to be the limitation on agreement that European
scholars have felt it to be. Probably this is because the concept
of natural law has not been widely accepted by contemporary
international lawyers in the United States, where positivists
reign almost supreme. The position in the United States has
been that parties may agree to almost anything so long as
agreement has not been prohibited by a constitutional or statutory provision. This position runs counter to that of proponents
of natural law who exclude the possibility of making a binding
agreement on a matter which is already established in natural
law. Thus, natural lawyers will argue that bills of rights in
constitutions are no more than the statement in a basic docu26. Movchan, supra note 24, at 99.
27. See Malinin, The Helsinki Conference and International Law (in Russian),
PRAVOVEDENIE 20-29 (1976).
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ment of what is already the law by virtue of general natural
law, so that the amendment procedure established in the con-2
stitution may not be used to eliminate the bill of rights.
United States positivists can accept no such view, for to them
anything may be changed in the constitution so long as the
proper procedure is followed. All that positivists recognize is
political opposition to elimination of a bill of rights. They surmise that the requisite vote could not be obtained from representatives of a public strongly imbued with a sense that human
rights should be protected if a given system of government is
to remain acceptable to the governed.
Soviet authors take the position that, while they cannot
accept the concept of natural law, they are prepared to accept
a position taken by the great majority of states, especially if
taken by consensus in the manner already indicated. Such
principles, when accepted, become so firmly fixed in the morality of the world community that no two or more parties may
agree to the contrary. Thus, a treaty violating the jus cogens is
a nullity in international law.
Professor Tunkin sees the United Nations Charter as one
such norm-creating treaty, and it has become binding as jus
cogens upon states even if they are not members of the United
Nations." Thus, Switzerland is bound although its government
has refrained from joining the organization. Professor Tunkin
goes farther; he sees the practice of states in executing other
treaties as creating the norms of jus cogens which become binding on nonparties whether they like them or not. Not every
bilateral treaty qualifies as generally norm-creative in Tunkin's view, for he explicitly excludes a treaty to which only two
or a limited number of states are parties. Nevertheless, one has
the impression from his text that if a large number of members
of the United Nations ratify a multilateral convention, they
have created a norm of the jus cogens, and this is then binding
28. This position was taken by B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch in saying, "Political regression requires taking up again today the first verities of democracy. A vote which
is irreproachably regular, sincere, a popular vote in favor of totalitarianism is not valid,
either politically, morally or even legally: liberty is inalienable, and a vote aiming at
its suppression is a nullity." B. MIRKINE-GUETZEVITCH, 1 LES CONSTITUTIONS
EUROPEENES 149 (J. Hazard trans. 1951).
29. See G. TUNKIN, supra note 20, at 147-60.
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on nonparties who may wish to agree among themselves to act
in some other fashion.
In the light of the emergence of the new majority within
the United Nations, it becomes evident that in the view of
Soviet scholars a new jus cogens is in the process of creation
that will differ from the one European natural lawyers recognized in the past. Tunkin has already given some clues as to
the basic norms now binding upon all: those establishing
crimes against humanity as set forth in the Nuremberg principles, crimes against peace, and principles relating to the end
of colonialism. He gives more detail in his chapter 3, including
nonaggression, peaceful settlement of disputes, self-determination of peoples, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, respect
for human rights, and the prohibition of war propaganda.
Several of these, notably peaceful coexistence, cover a multitude of principles, not all of which have yet been clearly defined in spite of the Declaration on Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States.
The Vienna Diplomatic Conference on the Law of Treaties
incorporated the attitudes of the new majority on jus cogens,
in spite of opposition from the Western delegates. Thus, article
53 declares a treaty to be a nullity if it is in conflict with the
imperative norms of international law, and article 71 establishes the obligation of states to conduct their relations in accordance with the imperative norms of general international
law.30 Dr. Movchan cites these treaty provisions with approval.
In reviewing consensus and jus cogens, Dr. Movchan concludes that never in previous epochs has there been a tendency
in international law like the one evident today to seek out legal
agreement on the system of principles and norms governing
international relationships.31 He sees everything pointing to
adoption of the principles of peaceful coexistence in the establishment of which he declares the socialist states to be leading
the way.
The way being plotted by socialist states seems not to be
indicated solely by what they do in the United Nations, nor in
30. For the text of the treaty, see THE TREATY MAKER'S HANDBOOK 330 (H. Blix &
J. Emerson eds. 1973).
31. Movchan, supra note 24, at 101.
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their relations with states of the developing or Western worlds.
It is also being sketched in what socialists do among themselves. While no one among the Soviet scholars argues that
relationships between Soviet states have become moral rather
than legal, there is a claim that they have become qualitatively
different; they are creating a new socialist international law,
fundamentally different from general international law applicable in relationships between the Communist-led states and
those with non-Communist leadership. 2 Some Soviet authors
have argued that these new relationships are being extended
beyond the Communist-led states to those in the developing
world which are following what Soviet analysts call a "nonCommunist" path,3 but this position has generally not been
accepted by the established authors. The conservatives say
that while the states of the noncapitalist path, such as Guinea
in Africa, maintain relations with the U.S.S.R. different from
those maintained with states such as the Ivory Coast, which
make no claim to being socialist or noncapitalist, principles of
socialist international law are not applicable to them. These
principles are in force only between states that are accepted as
being fully within the family of Marxian socialist political systems.
The variety of states now just over the border of the socialist group, whether they be on what is accepted as the noncapitalist path or under governments like that in Italy where Communist parties have an important influence upon policy, is
causing Soviet international lawyers to rethink their philosophy. Should they now accept the conclusions of the 1920s and
1930s that international law is the creation of the bourgeoisie
and essentially a hostile class law, although usable in specific
situations, or should they recognize that a sea-change has
occurred? It was to this topic that Dr. I. P. Blishchenko devoted his attention in a paper read to the Soviet Society of
International Law in 1972. 31 That his view is not a generally
32. This interpretation of the Soviet position taken by the author in Renewed
Emphasis upon a Socialist International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1971), was
challenged in Butler, "Socialist InternationalLaw" or "Socialist Principles of International Relations"!, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 796 (1971).
33. See Usenko, The Principle of Democratic Peace Is the Most General Basis of
International Law (in Russian with English summary), [1973] Sovir Y.B. INT'L L.
13, 35.
34. Dr. Blishchenko's paper, The Class Struggle and InternationalLaw, is sum-
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accepted view among Soviet scholars is indicated by the report
of the discussion from the floor that followed the principal
paper, but the view may be a harbinger of attitudes to come.
As such, it deserves attention.
Blishchenko argues that the content of general international law now reflects the will of the broad masses of peoples
rather than the wills of the various ruling classes. He finds that
contemporary general international law no longer serves capitalism and does not strengthen it. Rather, it improves the position of socialist tendencies in the contemporary world. Blishchenko looks at the same record as that examined by Dr. Movchan. He notes the swing toward the new majority, and he
argues that general international law can no longer reflect the
will of the "monopolist bourgeoisie" because the forces of peace
and progress are not so strong that they can force the imperialists to accept the legal principles of peaceful coexistence. He
notes that these masses are in the imperialist states themselves, and that the rulers of these states must take them into
consideration in formulating policy. One can imagine that,
seen from his position, the abandonment of the war effort in
Vietnam must have been the result of demonstrations in American streets, leading finally to influence upon Congressmen and
upon the press so that governmental policy had to be changed.
Blishchenko's rather daring departure from traditional
class views of law as the law of a ruling class was echoed a year
later by Dr. D. B. Levin who saw general international law
today reflecting not only the interests of the peoples of socialist
states and of the national liberation movement, but also of the
popular masses of capitalist states with whom the ruling
classes of capitalist states have to reckon. 35 He is not prepared
to depart as completely as Blishchenko from traditional views,
for he says that generally recognized international law is
"neither bourgeois nor socialist, but is of a traditional democratic character which guarantees the presence in the international arena of states of the world-wide socialist system." For
marized in the Chronicle of the 1971 Conference held at the Moscow State Institute of
International Relations. See (1972] Soviwr' Y.B. INT'L L. 201.
35. D. LEVIN, AKTUAL'NYE "PROBLEMY TEORI MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA (Current

Problems of the Theory of International Law) (1974).
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him, international law still reflects class struggle, but, since it
is the law of peaceful coexistence, its task is to prevent the
struggle from breaking out into war. It has room for continuing
ideological struggle, but this is not the same as war.
While it has become increasingly evident that Soviet authors think that the wind is blowing their way in international
lawmaking, due to the new majority in the United Nations and
the developing popular influence in the Western democracies,
they are not prepared to accept entirely the results of currently
perceived trends. Their hesitancy is most noticeable in the field
of human rights law. While the Soviet position has been dramatically indicated in Soviet protests to President Carter's
personal letter to Dr. Andrei Sakharov setting forth the President's policy with regard to espousal of human rights," the
position has been clear for some time. It is stated in detail in a
monograph written by Dr. V. A. Kartashkin, a Soviet scholar
who has served in the Human Rights Division of the United
Nations Secretariat.3 7 His analysis suggests that it is current
Soviet policy to press for adoption of resolutions on human
rights in the General Assembly in the areas where there is
strong feeling by the new majority, but to resist introduction
into international law of individualistic concepts similar to
those already accepted by Western Europe under the Treaty of
Rome, which created the Human Rights Commission and the
Court in Strasbourg for appeals by citizens of Western European States against their own governments.
The argument is that the struggle to protect human rights
under international law should focus on broad inhuman policies adopted by states in violation of those rights. Kartashkin
singles out for attention policies devoted to aggression, fascism,
colonialism, genocide, apartheid, and racism. His suggestion is
that when such inhuman policies are pursued, they should be
attacked by the world community through the United Nations
and declared illegal. Although he does not indicate just what
type of United Nations action is to be favored, it may be presumed that it is the resolution of the General Assembly. It has
36. See Hovey, U.S. Stoutly Defends Letter that Carter Wrote to Sakharov, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
37. V. KARTASHKIN, MEZHDUNARODNAIA ZASCHrrA PRAV CHELOVEKA (International

Protection of Human Rights) (1976).
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been Soviet Government practice to vote in favor of General
Assembly resolutions devoted to the castigation of such policies. Examples of such resolutions are those incorporating the
principles propounded at Nuremberg against aggression, the
definition of aggression, anti-colonial and anti-racist 'statements, the genocide convention, and the persistent attacks
upon apartheid. Dr. Kartashkin says nothing about Security
Council action, and probably for good reason, as the Security
Council has not pretended to develop new law but to enforce
existing law. Also, he leaves untouched judgments of the International Court of Justice, perhaps because he and his government do not consider courts as creating law but only as interpreting and enforcing law in specific cases, as they do generally
in states subject to legal systems based upon Romanist principles.
As for action by the specialized commissions of the United
Nations, Kartashkin's argument is that these should be reduced in number, including the offices within the Secretariat
which monitor human rights activity. It is argued that there is
presently much overlapping of jurisdiction and heavy expense
in maintaining the various commissions and agencies currently
functioning. Kartashkin proposes that even the Human Rights
Commission should hold fewer meetings, at two year intervals
rather than every year. Under this arrangement the Human
Rights Commission would necessarily be limited to discussion
of broad, long-range policies rather than those currently in the
news and likely to concern individualized problems.
Most importantly, the Soviet authors, and the Soviet Government as well, have opposed development of a law of individual petition. The argument is that individuals are not subjects
of international law and have no right under the Charter or
general international law to take their individual claims to an
international body. Secondly, their concerns are those of the
states in which they reside and not of the international community. This being so, to listen to individual complaints and
to take international action to rectify any wrongs that might
be discovered in the hearing would, in the Soviet view, violate
article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter, which
prohibits intervention by the membership in the internal affairs of states. The proposed reduction in the number of meetings of the Human Rights Commission is to make clear to the
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public that the Commission is not to be concerned with problems of individuals.
Dr. Kartashkin is opposed to the creation within the
United Nations system of any specialized agency to consider
and protest violation of the rights of individuals. Thus, the
proposal from some Western advocates of human rights protection that a Human Rights Procurator or Ombudsman be created is resisted as creating a potentially super-state office. It
is argued, further, that to put such power in the hands of one
official would undermine the entire structural foundation on
which the United Nations is based. The United Nations is seen
as an assembly-type organization in which power is spread over
the entire membership. This conception once led to the above
mentioned Soviet proposal that even the Secretary General
should be a "troika" representing the East, the West, and the
developing states, rather than a single individual. Kartashkin's
argument continues that it would be undesirable to expand the
Secretary General's power by creating, as has been proposed by
an American scholar, a Council for Human Rights responsible
directly to him.
In short, the Soviet position is that the General Assembly,
in which the Soviet diplomats find themselves in the company
of a congenial majority, must not be bypassed, nor must it be
replaced by a differently constituted body. This stance leads to
opposition to a Western proposal that human rights matters be
taken before a new assembly to be composed of members of
parliaments rather than the delegates presently commissioned
by the executives of member states. Probably, the fear is that
parliamentary deputies might disregard an overall national
policy of silence on an individual human rights issue as a
tradeoff for cooperation on some other higher priority matter
on which the executive concerned proposes to take an initiative; also, perhaps, that members of parliaments might represent minority parties out of power and, therefore, be irresponsible, whereas the delegates sent by executives could be
expected to represent responsible parties in power.
The implications of Dr. Kartashkin's position are clear:
the development of international law in the direction of protection of individuals is not desired because there could be no
expectation that Soviet voices could guide its development
through case by case formulation of new international law. As
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has been seen, the method of creating international law proposed by Soviet authorities is the treaty. In second place is the
General Assembly resolution, permitting the recognition of
custom by a group now holding Soviet confidence. There is no
third place for judicial lawmaking.
It is tempting to suppose that the Soviet position on the
tactics of international lawmaking is inspired by the Soviet
national legal tradition, which is the tradition of the Romanist
legal systems. Rejection of judge-made law is routine among
the Romanists, at least on the level of theory, if not in practice.
But is such an explanation reasonable under current circumstances on the international level? A Western writer on the
current prospects for the International Court of Justice weighs
the relative impact of legal tradition and national interest with
regard to the role of the Court and concludes, "National interest, rightly or wrongly understood, rather than cultural traditions, seems to be the decisive factor in the determination of
policies toward international law and affairs. ' 38 Ever since 1917
Soviet diplomats have indicated consistently that the interests
of their state require that control over lawmaking in the international arena be kept in their hands to the greatest extent
possible. Only as the means of influencing results have multiplied with changes in the constituency of law-creating or lawinfluencing bodies has the Soviet acceptance of nontreaty tactics become evident.
Diplomats of Western states have also changed position in
the postwar years. It is a long time since it has been argued that
customary law should not be codified by diplomatic conferences or by the International Law Commission lest it be reduced to its lowest common denominator. It is even some years
since resolutions on such topics as a definition of aggression or
friendly relations were resisted because the topics were too
vague to be defined. In consequence, there is today considerable correspondence in tactics of international lawmaking by
both Eastern and Western diplomats, but the issue of human
rights remains in great debate.
The debate is at its sharpest over the enforcement of the
1975 Helsinki obligations. In the West, governments have
38. Anand, Role of InternationalAdjudication, in 1 THE
6 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
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taken the position that the human rights issue has been recognized in treaty form, and Western diplomats and even heads
of state are now demanding recognition of individual complaints. Soviet voices and the Soviet Government itself resist
this argument. In consequence, human rights have become the
major issue in the tactical field in debate between East and
West. Why should there be such Soviet resistance, especially
since the Soviet Government claims, and probably rightly so,
that its dissidents have no large following among the
population? Perhaps the answer is to be found in consideration
of the impact of a cultural experience throughout long years of
history which is even deeper than the rejection of judge-made
law. One cannot forget that contemporary Soviet society is but
the successor to a society where traditionally opposition voices
have been feared. Dissidents may be seen to be more dangerous
than Soviet leaders will admit publicly, and perhaps even to
themselves.
A clue as to this motivation was offered some time ago by
a Czech diplomat who rose in a public lecture to remark that
Americans, who are satiated with opposing voices to such an
extent that they pay little or no attention to them, cannot
understand the attention a dissenting voice can receive in a
society which has not heard such a plethora of comment. Perhaps, if this be so, the Soviet Union has yet to pass through a
transition similar to that which occurred in Portugal after the
gates to public expression had been opened with the ouster of
Marcel Caetano. Chaos reigned until the public became used
to hearing a multitude of voices. It took months before people
found time to consider the merits of arguments before they
rushed to follow one or another determined speaker. Transitions from strict control over dissidence are difficult in any
country, and it can be expected that it will be some time before
Soviet leadership can accept as a tactic the development of
international law through a case by case review of individual
complaints against the individual's own government.
In sum, if the record has been read aright, Soviet tactics,
although still focused upon the treaty form, have been expanded to include acceptance of custom as well as of the treaty
as a source of international law, so long as the custom is evidenced appropriately. Such acceptable evidence now includes
resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
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Further, there is determination to prevent lawmaking contrary
to Soviet-perceived interests by non-Marxist diplomats. The
argument is heard that a new jus cogens is coming into existence which prohibits development of law in certain directions,
even if two or more parties would like to speed such development in agreements to which they alone are parties. Finally,
there is complete rejection of lawmaking by courts or administrative bodies on the application of individuals complaining of
violations of law by their own governments. Soviet authors and
the Soviet Government itself continue to show themselves in
recent proposals on the protection of human rights unwilling to
accept a tactic of international lawmaking beyond their control
or the control of those in whom they have confidence.

ARTICLES
Negotiating for Dispute Settlement in
Transnational Mineral Contracts: Current
Practice, Trends, and an Evaluation from the
Host Country's Perspective
THOMAS WXLDE*
I.

INTRODUCTION: TRANSNATIONAL MINERAL CONTRACTS

Transnational investment contracts between transnational enterprises' (TNEs) and host countries, particularly developing countries, have been shrouded in a veil of secrecy for
a long time. Such secrecy may have been due mainly to the
often one-sided distribution of benefits, favoring the TNE at
the cost of the host country. Host countries often had comparatively weak bargaining power and little experience in negotiating the complex and comprehensive contractual and legislative
regime for large-scale investment projects. This secrecy is gradually disappearing particularly in the area of natural resources
development, which is the focus of the present paper.2
* The author worked in 1976 and 1977 with the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations as an Associate Transnational Corporations Officer. At present
he is a research fellow with the research team on the International Law of Natural
Resources at the Institute of Foreign and International Economic Law (Auslindisches
und Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht), University of Frankfurt. Part of the research on
the present article was financed by the Deutsche Forschunsgemeinschaft. The views
expounded in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily representative
of the views of the institutions with which he has been affiliated.
Much of the author's analysis is based upon an examination of approximately 200
large-scale mineral contracts, some public, some confidential, dealing with petroleum
and nonfuel mineral development. Because of the confidentiality of many of the documents, no reference can be made to their source. The author has also relied upon a
series of interviews with negotiators from mining companies, international institutions, and host countries. For their assistance and criticism, the author is especially
grateful to Charles Lipton, Esq., and Eric Bergsten, Esq., as well as to his colleagues
at the United Nations and the Institute.
1. For the use of the term "transnational" instead of either "multinational" or
"international," see P. JEsp, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956). In the official terminology
of the United Nations corporations formerly called "multinational" are presently
termed "transnational." See E.S.C. Res. 1913, 57 U.N. ESCOR, Special Intersessional
Committee (1931st mtg.), U.N. Doc. E/5599 (1974). A transnational investment contract means, for the purposes of this study, a contract between a transnational corporation (enterprise) and a host country or a host country entity relating to investment.
2. See Walde, Lifting the Veil from TransnationalMineral Contracts:A Review
of Recent Literature, 1 NAT. RFs. FORUM 277 (1977).
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Traditionally, information on such agreements has come
to light only from the few surfacing and published international
arbitration cases.' At present, information concerning their
actual texts derives mainly from publication in official gazettes
and from the Security and Exchange Commission's publicly
available files, while information concerning the main elements of such agreements appears also in trade journals and
commercial information services.' Additionally, the political
sensitivity of natural resources exploitation in developing countries and the evolution of the right of host states to permanent
sovereignty over natural resources' have stimulated research in
this area from the legal, economic, and political science
perspectives.'
The transnational mineral agreements to be discussed here
involve economic and political interests of great weight, i.e.,
the interests of consuming nations in maintaining a steady flow
of raw materials necessary for the functioning of their industrial systems and the interests of developing countries in
using their natural resources to obtain the substantial funds
3. Reports of these arbitration cases are repeatedly encountered. In the prewar

period, the major cases were Lena Goldfields, I ANNUAL DIGEST OF INT'L LAW CASES,
nos. 1 & 258 (1930), and Socidt6 Rialet, VIII RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DES TAM 742
(1929). For postwar cases, see Saudi Arabia v. Aramco, 27 INT'L L. REP. 272 (1958);
Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., 20 INT'L L. REP. 534 (1953); Petroleum
Development, Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 INT'L L. REP. 144 (1951); the Sapphire
arbitration, extracted in ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 273 (1952); Sentence
arbitrale du 19 janvier 1977, L'Arbitre Unique, Rend-Jean Dupuy (Fr.), reprinted in
104 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 350 (1977) (Un Grand Arbitrage Ptrolier, Texaco/Calasiatic c/ Gouvernement Libyen); Imperial Ethiopian Government v. BaruchFoster Corp., 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Weil, Problkmes relatifs aux
contrats passes entre un 6tat et un particulier, 1969-111 RECUEIL DES COURS 95, 164
(1969); J. Kuusi, State Contracts with Foreigners: Considerations on Law and Policy
(1976) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University).
4. See Development of an Information System 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/28 (1977).
5. For recent action, see G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3171 (1973). For relevant resolutions concerning the New Economic Order
see also G.A. Res. 3202, 6 U.N. GAOR, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Sixth
Special Session (Agenda Item 7), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3202 (1974); G.A. Res. 3281, 29
U.N. GAOR, Report of the Second Committee (Agenda Item 48), U.N. Doc. A/RES/
3281 (1975). For an analysis of the development until 1966, see M. MUGHEABY, PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER OIL RESOURcES (1966); for a discussion of the recent evolution
of the permanent sovereignty concept within the framework of the New International
Economic Order, see RiA KEMPER, NATIONAL VERFOGUNG OBER NATORLICH RESSOURCEN
UND DIE NEUE WELTWIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG DER VERRINTEN NATIONEN (1976).
6. Wkilde, supra note 2. Mention should also be made of the recently published
study of the COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, A STUDY ON THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK,
AGREEMENTS AND FINANCIAL IMPOSITIONS AFFECTING THE MINING INDUSTRY IN AFRICAN
COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES (1977).
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necessary to achieve speedy industrialization. In addition, developing countries would like to employ their resource base as
a starting point for resource-centered industrialization by processing, refining, and finally fabricating their natural resources
and by creating forward and backward linkages. The nonrenewability of most exploited resources raises the fear of exploitation by TNEs to very high levels of concern.
Transnational mineral contracts (TMCs) constitute the
legal regime for investment projects cf enormous investment
volumes. Due to exploitation of low-grade ore bodies, the necessity of exploiting economies of scale to the greatest degree,
and rising costs of infrastructure in remote, unexplored, and
undeveloped areas of the world, the investments required for
many recent individual projects in copper, iron ore, and bauxite often reach the magnitude of $1 billion. The Carajas iron
ore project in Brazil, for example, apparently requires an investment of $3 billion. Thus, it is not surprising that large-scale
mining projects are following the tradition of petroleum exploitation. These operations are undertaken by large consortia encompassing various mining companies, metals trading houses
with long term purchase commitments, and lending groups,
often consisting of up to forty private banks and development
financing institutions.7
Accordingly, the negotiation and the final drafting of the
legal regime for such large-scale investment projects poses a
great challenge. Evolved from simple concession contracts with
straightforward royalty provisions and few "frills," the modem
transnational mineral contract often constitutes a hybrid combination of contractual alternatives. These include traditional
concessions forms, joint ventures, service, management, and
technical assistance agreements (with long-ranging commitments), reinvestment, expansion into processing, and long
term purchase obligations. A complex array of legal forms is
designed to cover the multifaceted interests of the host country
related to the mining venture. The complete dependence of
some producer countries on the mining project along with the
inevitable clash between the TNEs worldwide, oligopolistic,
and integrated planning system and the host country's escalating demands do not facilitate the negotiation.
7. See Zorn, New Developments in Third World Mining Agreements, 1 NAT. REs.
FORUM 239 (1977).
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Research on the various issues of negotiation for TMCs
requires an interdisciplinary approach, combining legal, business, economic, and political skills. The objectives of such research depend on the audience to which it is directed. For
instance, if the TNE is the addressee, research is intended to
assist the TNE to find a contractual regime which accounts
for probable political upheavals. Additionally, a thorough
understanding of the political risk involved8 as well as the
needs, interests, and perceptions of the host country may help
to design contractual forms less visible, less antagonistic, and
more viable for the specific situation of the host country.' Research for home governments may point to the alternatives best
securing a steady flow of raw materials, e.g., through either
indirect support of operations of TNEs or by direct or mediated
relationships with the producer countries. Finally, the mere
collection of information and research on transnational mineral
contracts will probably be of assistance to developing host
countries.' 0 This collection and analysis of contract-related information will assist host states in gaining the necessary experience in order to secure a more equal footing with TNEs, to
formulate more precisely their own policies in the development
of their mining industry," and to implement such policies by
effective negotiation with foreign investors. In this area the
potential contribution of the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations is of considerable importance-be it in collecting and
disseminating relevant information to developing countries or
in stimulating cooperation among developing countries for a
2
mutual exchange of relevant experiences with TNEs.'
Traditional legal research has focused mainly on the legal
issues which arise once a conflict has been brought to an inter8. Kobrin, The Conditions under which Political Disruption Results in Increased
Political Risk (1977) (working paper, Mass. Inst. Tech.); D. HAENDEL, G. WEST & R.
MEADOW,OVERSEAS INVESTMENT AND PouTicAL RISK (1975).
9. See Wells, Negotiating with Third World Governments, 55 HARv. Bus. REV. 72
(1977).
10. Smith, Information-Sharing and Bargaining:Institutional Problems and
Limitations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES FLows (G. Garvey
ed. 1977).
11. R. BossoN & B. VARON, THE MINING INDUSTRY AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
252 (1977).
12. For the establishment of the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations and its duties, see 57 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1A) 3, U.N. Doc. E/5570/Add.
1 (1974). See also United Nations, Programme of Technical Cooperation on Matters
Related to Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/29 (1977), for a description
of the technical services related to negotiations with TNCs.
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national arbitration tribunal for attention.' 3 It has rarely been
concerned about issues of how to negotiate and draft investment agreements in a way which takes full account of the
objectives of developing countries and which contributes towards a maintenance of the investment relationship that is
advantageous to the developing countries and acceptable to the
TNE. The traditional perspective dominating most of the literature on dispute settlement in concessions agreements is due
partly to the fact that most commentators come from Western
legal systems and accordingly will be more likely to defend
legal positions favorable to TNEs and the capital-exporting
states. Perhaps a reorientation of legal research from postdecision analysis of a dispute to conflict avoidance is necessary.
Such a reorientation could be representative of the interests of
home countries, of TNEs, or of host countries. This new approach will be able to contribute towards a greater stabilization
of mutually advantageous investment relationships, to minimize the costs of the often escalating conflicts between investor
and host state, and to assist the achievement of the objectives
of the New International Economic Order.
The main issues in negotiating TMCs are the fiscal regime
of the contract, the determination of the distribution of direct
benefits from the projects, and, increasingly, the economic development provisions. Through the latter technique, the host
state attempts to increase its indirect benefits, such as local
processing, national employment, localization of supply purchases and participation in marketing. The present paper,
however, focuses on dispute settlement.
Dispute settlement is the classical area upon which lawyers have focused their interests when negotiating and analyzing such agreements. The abundant literature available on
legal issues of international arbitration has had a strong impact
on the actual drafting. The negotiation for dispute settlement
provisions in agreements is also heavily affected by the strong
controversies raging at present on issues of international arbitration and of the internationalization of investment agreements. One of the major thrusts in the evolution of the concept
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources'4 has been the
13. See Weil, supra note 3, at 121-25; Lalive, ContractsBetween a State or a State
Agency and a Foreign Company, 13 1r'L & Con. L.Q. 987, 988-90 (1964).
14. See Mughraby, supra note 5.
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attempt of developing countries to throw off the burden of international arbitration as an imposition on their national sovereignty. In the current international negotiations being held
on the implementation of the New International Economic
Order, on the Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations
and on the future shape of an international law of the sea, 5 the
scope and form of dispute settlement is very controversial. A
focus point is the clash between Western states' policies of
protection of foreign investment and the emphasis which the
Third World strongly places on economic sovereignty.
The present paper is directed towards filling the gap of
information concerning existent transnational mineral contractual practice. As mentioned, information of a larger scale on
TMCs has been forthcoming only very recently and mostly in
the area of petroleum concessions." These traditional concessions have substantially evolved, first in petroleum, from the
joint venture (1957) to the service contract type (1966), with
nonfuel mining gradually following this development. Emerging concepts of permanent sovereignty, the energy crisis, and
a wave of nationalizations in the 1970s have exercised a strong
impact on subsequent negotiations and renegotiation of agreements. These changes, strongly reflected in dispute settlement
clauses, have not yet been reflected in the available studies.
An updated survey of recent developments is warranted
for various reasons. First, it helps to inform those parties
(TNEs and host countries) directly affected by natural resources development about the present context of contractual
negotiations. Additionally, it may contribute toward an evolution taking place in the theory of transnational contract law.
Legal writers, particularly those from capital-exporting
countries, have attempted to "internationalize" investment
agreements. This has occurred with a view towards achieving
greater investment security by exempting such contracts from
15. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975);
G.A. Res. 3202, 6 U.N. GAOR (Special Sess.), Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); G.A. Res. 3201, 6 U.N. GAOR (Special Sess.), Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974). See also THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (K. Sauvant & H.
Hasenflug eds. 1977).
16. Relevant literature is reviewed in Wilde, supra note 2. For a particularly
informative discussion of arbitration provisions in petroleum concessions, see Sarre,
Arbitration Clauses in the Oil Industry in the Middle East, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION 336 (C. Schmitthof ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION].
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national law and placing them under the protection of a body
of international law, which in its traditional form still favors
the interests of TNEs. Such internationalization has been
hindered by the absence of substantive legal rules to be applied
to investment agreements once they are thought to be subject
to an "international" or "transnational" law of contracts.
Commentators have also looked upon existing contractual
practice as a means to furnish some substantive rules. 7 In
doing so there is substantial risk that contractual practice of
the past, generally more favorable to TNEs, may be relied upon
to justify the arguments about a substantive law applicable to
agreements. On the other hand, this practice has in the meantime evolved to the considerable advantage of developing countries. Yet, the frequent application of a nonnational law and a
nonnational jurisdiction in older agreements has been mistakenly used to construct general principles for submitting investment agreements to principles, rules, and jurisdictions outside
the host state.
The present paper intends to give a descriptive survey of
current contractual practices as well as some indication of the
method that the host countries should use in evaluating the
various alternatives of dispute settlement solutions. It does not
purport to be a strict guide to negotiations. Indeed, a host
country may often be advised to give concessions in the area
of dispute settlement if it obtains corresponding benefits in
other areas of negotiation. However, for a sophisticated negotiation, a clarification of the maximum objectives in bargaining
and a clear idea about possible fallback positions and their
evaluation is necessary. Hence, the present paper will attempt
to outline some maximum positions achievable in addition to
fallback positions for compromise solutions. The position to be
agreed upon in the final analysis obviously hinges upon the
relative bargaining power and the particular preferences of the
TNE and host country. Finally, the present practice may give
some clues about future trends. Such trends may lead to solutions which accommodate the security interest of the investor
and the sovereignty objective of the host country. The present
paper is based on a survey of a large number of recent contracts
(dating from 1968 to 1977), in the area of petroleum as well as
nonfuel mineral development.s A systematic tabular survey
17. See Weil, supra note 3, at 196-99.
18. See generally D. SMITH & L. WELLS, NEGOTATING THIRD WoaLD MINE.L
AGREEMENTS 123 (1976).

40

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 7:33

has not been prepared, as such a survey may give a false impression of the extent to which contracts treated here are representative of others.
II. DISPUTES IN TRANSNATIONAL MINERAL CONTRACTS AND
FUNCTIONS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

In transnational mineral contracts relating to large-scale
and long term investment projects, the quantity and the intensity of disputes will generally be considerably greater than
in traditional sales or equity investment transactions. 9 They
relate to issues of broad multifaceted business relationships
and involve questions of management, marketing, accounting,
reinvestment, and the economic feasibility of a multimillion
dollar investment. In particular the worldwide planning system
of the TNE, and certain interests of home countries it represents, e.g., to maintain employment in mineral processing and
fabricating industries, will certainly confront the development
goals of the host country. The characteristic controversies between North and South, as reflected in the discussion for a New
International Economic Order, are reflected as well on a microlevel in the disputes between the TNE and the host country.
Worldwide profit maximization and home country interests
therefore clash with the objective of the host country to use the
mining venture as a vehicle for development. Some common
reasons for disputes characteristic of natural resources foreign
investment are the following:
(1) the long duration of the projects (historically up
to ninety-nine years, now generally between fifteen
and thirty-five years) and the great uncertainty of
future events bearing upon the projects' economic
feasibility (e.g., commodity prices on world markets,
inflation, possible substitutes for the minerals extracted, exchange rates, and political instability);
(2) the long time between the initial heavy investment and the first returns to the investor (often seven
to ten years);
(3) the large number of actors involved, i.e., mining
companies, consumers with long term commitments,
19. C.
M.

KIRCHNER, E. SCHANZE, F. VON SCHLABRENDORFF, A. STOCKMAYER, T. W.LDE,
& R. PATZINA, ROHSTOFFERSCHLIESSUNGSVORHABEN IN ENTWICKLUNGS-

FRITZSCHE

LANDERN 301 (1977) [hereinafter cited as KIRCHNER]. A second volume, scheduled for
publication in 1978, will concentrate, amongst other issues, on dispute settlement of
transnational mining agreements.
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financing institutions, local interests among host
country ministries, often compel the contracting parties to elect between contradictory demands-even
on the side of the investor and the financing institutions, conflicts among consortium members are
rather frequent; and
(4) the high political visibility of natural resource
exploitation, i.e., the transportation of nonrenewable
resources, the financial scale of the project, the dependence on outside financing, and the typical dependence of the host country on foreign exchange
earnings from project revenues.
Disputes in such long term investment relationships may
be divided into several categories:
Disputes of a predominantly technical
character.0 Disputes concerning technical decisions
and expertise are more common and warranted than
legal interpretation problems of the contract. Qualification of a dispute as "technical" does not imply
minor importance. The decision on the economic feasibility of the exploitation or a processing project may
be of primary importance to both parties. But it does
not imply that such disputes can automatically be
decided in a mechanistic, "neutral" application of
technical rules. The issue of inherent biases in technical rule application is discussed below.
Disputes concerning the interpretationof the
agreement and applicablelaw. Such disputes may be
called "minor" disputes, as they do not question the
validity of the agreement as such, but only refer to
various constructions of it. This type of dispute is the
traditional working ground for legal skills.
Disputes arising from gaps in the agreement.2
Such disputes involve matters which have not been
20. For an analysis of technical dispute settlement provisions in petroleum concessions, see P. FISCHER, DIE INTERNATIONALE KONZESSION 415 (1974).
21. See the PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONGRESS
(1975), and in particular the contributions of Holtzmann, Powers of Arbitratorsunder
United States Law to Fill "Gaps" arisingunder Long-Term Contracts, id. at C IVh 117, and Bernini, Techniques for Resolving Problems in Forming and PerformingLongTerm Contracts, id. at C Iva 1-37. See also H. Holtzmann & G. Bernini, Arbitration
in Long-Term Transactions,PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

(1974).
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covered in the agreement and which cannot be resolved by legal reasoning on the basis of an existing
authoritative text yet do not involve a demand for
complete revision of the contract.
Disputes arisingfrom one party's desire for a revision of the basic terms of the agreement (particularly the fiscal regime).2 This party is often, but not
always, the host country. Such demands are caused
by changed circumstances, excessive profits, a
change in government, or other similar reasons. Such
disputes are different in their character and in their
amenability to dispute settlement from the "minor"
disputes mentioned above. Attempts to transfer settlement mechanisms workable for minor disputes to
such major disputes have been a constant cause for
dissatisfaction, threatening the utility of arbitration
in the area of minor disputes.
The general functions of specific dispute settlement provisions, as opposed to those which impliedly or expressly require
submission to a national jurisdiction, are, first, to provide a
forum for dispute settlement, which, by its atmosphere and
supposedly greater familiarity with the commercial issues involved, is more conducive to amicable settlement. The likelihood of such an amicable settlement promotes the greater
readiness of the parties to accept an arbitral award and contributes to the maintenance of the long term relationship even
after potentially disruptive disputes have taken place.23 A
second function is to provide a forum for dispute settlement
which is not favorably disposed towards one party. The suspicion of partiality of national courts is a major cause for TNEs'
insistence on international arbitration tribunals.2 4 On the
other hand, developing countries often have an equally strong
suspicion that international arbitration tribunals have a systemic bias in favor of the causes advanced by investors. This
apprehension can be caused by the selection of umpires, by the
22. A survey prepared by the author of major mining agreements reveals that such
major agreements, in particular recent ones dealing with petroleum and bauxite, rarely
remain unaltered over a period of more than ten years. See generally Committee on
Natural Resources, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 4 U.N. ESCOR,
U.N. Doc. E/C.7/53 (1975); 29 U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. A/97/6 (1974).
23. See C. Schmitthoff, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 16, at 1-45.
24. See Sarre, supra note 16; Wesley, The ProceduralMalaise of Foreign Investment Disputes in Latin America: From Local Tribunals to Factfinding, 7 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 813 (1975).
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inherent effects of procedural rules, or by bias of the decision
criteria employed in favor of investment by TNEs, and their
suspicion is exacerbated by multiple decisions in favor of the
investors in the few reported decisions of international arbitration tribunals. 5 Third, the dispute settlement provisions are
meant to provide, particularly in the form of international arbitration, an instrument for the TNE to stabilize the terms of
investment initially negotiated. It is recognized that in the
initial period before the bulk of the investment is committed,
and before any decisions on expansion and reinvestment are
taken,"6 the TNE often has considerable superiority in terms of
bargaining power, along with its frequent superiority in terms
of information, know-how, and experience. Terms negotiated
initially will necessarily reflect the TNE's superior bargaining
power. Once the investment has been committed and once the
operations prove successful, however, the pendulum swings in
favor of the host country. Then attempts by the host country
to obtain a revision of the unequal terms of the original agreement are rather frequent and often unavoidable." Failure of
the TNE to respond may then lead to costly escalation for
both parties. The most visible forms of such costs are nationalization on one hand and isolation from international marketing
channels on the other. The TNE accordingly will try to build
into the contractual regime a number of defenses against later
revision along with other defensive measures such as constructing a common front of financing institutions, long term
purchasers, and mining competitors." The TNE may also attempt to induce home countries to grant additional protection
in the form of diplomatic support, foreign and military aid
investment, investment insurance, or bilateral investment
protection treaties."
One major instrument that bblsters the TNE's defense
25. The Baruch-Foster decision appears to be one of the few exceptions. For
reports and analyses of these cases, see sources cited in note 3 supra.
26. This issue has been explored in considerable depth in T. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE PoIrTIcs OF DEPENDENCE 153 (1975). See also KIRCHNER,
supra note 19.
27. Sources cited note 22 supra.
28. See Moran, TransnationalStrategies of Protection and Defense by Multinational Corporations: Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost for Nationalization in
Natural Resources, 27 INT'L ORGANIZATION 273 (1973); N. GIRVAN, CORPORATE IMPERIALISM: CONFLICT AND EXPROPRIATION 52 (1962). As I understand it, OPIC is planning to
develop an insurance scheme geared to protect investors against forced alteration of
investment contracts.
29. See A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (1962);

GIRVAN, supra note 28.
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lines against renegotiation is international arbitration.0 Judging from the TNEs' present posture supporting such international arbitration, it appears that in TMCs it is not so much
the function of amicable settlement but rather the function of
investment protection which is at the heart of dispute settlement negotiation. The prospect of a negative award from an
international arbitration body and the prospects of the various
sanctions implied, e.g., loss of credit rating, of foreign investment, of foreign aid, and isolation from established marketing
channels, will often deter host countries from invoking their
sovereign power to change contracts by legislative action.,
The negotiation of dispute settlement provisions necessarily occurs in the context of the asymmetric relationship between a sovereign, developing state and the TNE, a direct or
vicarious holder of economic power often far superior to that of
the host country. This asymmetric relationship obviously limits the application of orthodox legal theory related to dispute
settlement and international arbitration. Thus, many experiences and considerations valid in international commercial
arbitration are therefore not applicable.
It is often remarked that the amount of legal literature
devoted to the legal theories surrounding arbitration disproportionately surpasses the small number of actual arbitration
cases. My survey of the major contracts in petroleum and nonfuel minerals reveals that in less than one percent of the contracts have the dispute settlement provisions actually been
invoked. However, arbitration provisions have an importance
which may be considerably greater than the few cases suggest.
Submission to nonnational arbitration affects the ongoing
bargaining processes which take place among the parties
throughout the whole life of the project.2 This bargaining
process may entail constant revision, modification, and implementation of the original contractual document. In this bargaining game the original document and its terms are not without effect. The agreements lays down certain positions, which
may be the basis for implicit bargaining, as it provides the
parties with leverage against demands from the other side.
Such leverage is conferred upon the investor by virtue of a
potential appeal to an international arbitration tribunal. As
30. The investor's perspective is very clearly presented in Schmidt, Arbitration
under the Auspices of the ICSID: Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in
ALCOA v. Government of Jamaica, 17 HAMv. Ir'L L.J. 90 (1976).
31. See GIRVAN, supra note 28.
32. KIRCHNER, supra note 19, at 301.
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the Jamaica bauxite cases have shown, such an appeal may
not always eliminate a unilateral change of the project's terms
by government legislation. However, any party deciding on a
unilateral course of action will carefully consider the costs imposed by a negative award.
Apart from their deterrent effect, the dispute settlement
provisions will always have an impact on the continuing negotiations for a revision of the terms of the contract. Most contracts do not expire without having been subject to numerous
changes. 33 In bargaining for such revisions the TNE has some
leverage if it can point to the adverse effects of a potential
arbitral award in its favor. Accordingly, it can "sell" its arbitration rights for concessions from the host country. Major recent renegotiations of agreements contain such a retreat by the
TNE from institutional arbitration proceedings in exchange for
concessions from the host country. The bargaining chip effect
of dispute settlement provisions is shaped by the individual
traits of the dispute settlement mechanism at issue. Thus, a
party will carefully consider the procedural framework, time
limits, and the applicable substantive law upon which the selected tribunal (the arbitrators and the prospective umpire)
will rely.
III.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

The main conflict in negotiations for dispute settlement in
TMCs evolves around the issue of international or nonnational
arbitration. Arbitration between corporations of various nationalities in international business is quite common. Such an
arbitration has widely replaced the jurisdiction of national
courts and has become recognized by the various national laws
recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards. 4
In the asymmetric relationship of a developing host country and a TNE, however, many of the factors contributing towards the growth of international commercial arbitration are
missing, particularly the homogeneity of principles of decisionmaking, of business outlook, and of comparable structures of
organization and attitudes. The issues at stake are different
from commercial arbitration. The obligations of a commercial
nature are subordinate to public law, the legislative, taxing,
and foreign trade authority of the host state. Hence, it is not
surprising that governments are very reluctant to submit issues
33. See sources cited note 22 supra.

34. For an examination of the pertinent issues, see
16, passim.

ARBITRATION, supra note

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
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involving their national sovereignty to nonnational jurisdiction.
Additionally, Western governments generally do not agree
to submit matters involving their legislative powers to a nonnational tribunal. For example, Australian mineral contracts,
constituting a very substantial part of the present mineral projects of the world, do not provide for such arbitration. France,
as well, has been very reluctant to submit even matters of a
merely commercial nature to international arbitration when
government-owned enterprises are concerned.3 5 Investment
agreements of TNCs in Western countries, concluded particularly with the government on the state or municipal level, also
do not contain international arbitration. No contract between
a TNE and the authorities of a Western host country contains
submission to the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investments Disputes (ICSID), unlike a large number of agreements in African and some Asian developing countries."6
It is therefore more understandable than some Western
commentators suggest37 that developing countries perceive international arbitration as an imposition on their national sovereignty by authorizing a nonnational body to judge their sovereign acts. Latin American countries, in their opposition to
nonnational arbitration, rely on the tradition of the Calvo doctrine, whereas several oil producers of great bargaining power
(notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Algeria) rely on strong
OPEC recommendations against international arbitration. 8
The United Nations resolutions dealing with permanent sovereignty over natural resources of the 1970s clearly espouse the
view that international arbitration, particularly in natural re35. See Battifol, Arbitration Clauses Concluded Between French GovernmentOwned Enterprisesand Foreign PrivateParties, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 32 (1968).
36. Frequently, African countries which were once French colonies submit to
ICSID arbitration, e.g., Agreement between Ivory Coast and Uniwax (1968); Agreement between Senegal and Societe Textile (1968); Agreement between Mauritania and
AGIP (1971). See generally Delaume, Excuse for Non-Performance and Force Majeure
in Economic Development Agreements, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 242, 261 n.54
(1971).
37. Representative of the view of most Western commentators on the general
utility of international aribitration is Wesley, supra note 24. Western governments
have adopted the same position in the current negotiations for a Code of Conduct of
Transnational Corporations. See Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/
Ac. 2/1 (1977); Transnational Corporations: Material Relevant to the Formulation of
a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/18 (1977).
38. See OPEC Res. XVI. 90 (1968), reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1183
(1968); Vafai, Conflict Resolution in the InternationalPetroleum Industry, 5 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 427 (1971).
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sources, is contrary to the sovereignty of host countries.39 Yet
it remains unclear whether such resolutions serve mainly as a
recommendation that host countries abstain from the critical
submission to foreign arbitration in natural resources exploitation matters or whether these resolutions imply that submissions are void insofar as sovereignty rights are inalienable.
As far as the actual submission to nonnational arbitration
is concerned, one can safely state that the Latin American
countries have to a large extent adhered to the Calvo doctrine
and refused submission to an international arbitration tribunal
(e.g., ICSID or ICC). Occasionally, however, when under pressure to enter an investment contract, complex solutions have
evolved. Also, ways have been found to restrict the scope of the
Calvo doctrine.
With respect to OPEC countries with strong bargaining
power, such as Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, submission to any foreign jurisdiction and any foreign
law has become increasingly rare in recent years. Certainly, the
strong stance of OPEC on this issue has had some repercussions
in actual negotiations. It seems that by now submission to
nonnational jurisdiction and foreign law is antiquated in petroleum contracts. In mineral agreements, the trend is slower but
points in the same direction. National law is increasingly the
only law stipulated as applicable; nonnational arbitration is
less frequent. Compromise solutions are national arbitration
procedures, according to the contractual provisions or, as observed in countries with an English legal system, according to
the national arbitration act.40 National courts acquire a growing role in matters related to the contract.
Ultimately, the form of arbitration depends on the bargaining power of the parties and the give-and-take peculiar to
the contract. A policy of steadfast refusal to submit to international arbitration may, therefore, be broken occasionally. If one
is willing to perceive the dispute settlement as an indicator of
the relative bargaining power, one will find that TNEs have
more bargaining power in licensing and manufacturing contracts than in natural resources agreements. Most manufactur39. See sources cited note 5 supra. The position of the developing countries in
the negotiations for a Code of Conduct, see note 37, supra, is also opposed to international arbitration.
40. For the English Arbitration Act, a model most often used in former English
colonies, see INTERNATrONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 16, at Appendix 21.
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ing agreements examined by the author contain international
arbitration. An analysis of licensing contracts of a major developing country (114 contracts) showed that forty percent of the
dispute settlement provisions are subject to national law and
fifty-four percent are submitted to other jurisdictions, generally the licensor's country. Additionally, forty percent are subject to the national jurisdiction, ten percent are subject to the
jurisdiction of another country, and fifty percent are submitted
to international (mostly ICC) arbitration." In petroleum and
nonfuel mineral contracts of the same period, submission to
nonnational law or nonnational jurisdiction is considerably less
frequent.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TYPES OF DisPuTE SETTLEMENT IN TMCs
Dispute settlement provisions in TMCs reflect the distribution of bargaining power and bargaining skill between the
parties, their specific interests and preferences, and the various
trade-offs in the course of the negotiations leading to the agreement. A considerable evolution in content and sophistication
has taken place in recent years, partly prompted by the increasing success of host countries in achieving permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources.
The crucial decision in negotiating for dispute settlement
is the selection of a specific mechanism to settle disputes generally by arbitration. The parties often stipulate a number of
other elements concerning the selection of the arbitrators, the
procedure, the choice of applicable law, and issues of enforceability. At first, the selection of arbitration mechanisms is discussed in terms of current practice, trends, and evaluation of
the host country's negotiating goals. Occasionally, conciliation
is stipulated as a prerequisite to formal arbitration. Express
conciliation provisions, however, are rarely found in TMCs. In
view of the high costs and long delays in arbitration, the parties
have sufficient incentives and opportunities to reach a settlement by informal conciliation without any express stipulations
to this effect.
The main forms of contractual dispute settlement are the
following:
41. These data derive from a confidential analysis of agreements for the transfer
of technology in a developing country adhering in principle to the Calvo doctrine.
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(1) arbitration by an ad hoc tribunal set up in accordance with the terms of the contract;
(2) specific settlement procedures for disputes of a
primarily technical nature; and
(3) recourse to an institutionalized arbitration tribunal, such as submission to the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the Arbitration Court of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and the Inter-American Arbitration
Commission.
A. Ad Hoc Arbitration
Ad hoc arbitration according to terms determined by the
agreement itself and without recourse to any institutionalized
arbitration body is the most flexible instrument of dispute settlement. In earlier transnational contracts this form of arbitration prevailed mostly in a simple and straightforward formulation. Modern contracts use ad hoc arbitration either as the only
form of dispute settlement or as a substitute for recourse to
ICSID, in case such an arbitration tribunal should not be accessible.
The various terms set forth in the transnational contracts
relating to ad hoc arbitration, such as procedure, choice of law,
and provisions relating to enforcement, have evolved considerably. However, such rules are not a feature unique to ad hoc
arbitration, but will be found also in other forms of institutional arbitration. At the core of ad hoc arbitration is the determination of the arbitrators. The parties also have considerable
discretion in the selection of arbitrators in institutionalized
arbitration bodies. Yet in contractual ad hoc arbitration, the
greatest variance of various models of selection exists.
Generally, the agreement provides for three arbitrators,
two chosen respectively by either party and the third, often
called "umpire" or "president of the tribunal," named by
agreement of the two arbitrators. Failing such an agreement,
the contract generally provides for a third, neutral authority to
appoint the umpire. The selection of the umpire is of crucial
importance for the role of the dispute settlement provision in
the bargaining relationship between the parties. His decision
is usually decisive, and even the anticipation of such decision
will make the parties stronger or weaker in their demands towards each other. Accordingly, the selection of the neutral appointing authority also has a considerable weight. The anticipation of such authority's choice will influence the parties,
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when they or the arbitrators named by them attempt to agree
by themselves on the person of the umpire. A party, expecting
the appointing authority to select a less favorable umpire, will
have a strong incentive to reach an agreement with the opponent even on an umpire it would not otherwise accept. Thus,
the supposedly rather neutral selection of an appointing authority may have subtle repercussions on later bargaining processes, favoring one party at the expense of another.
It should be emphasized here that the issue of the bias of
arbitrators and umpire is a question of the biases inherent in a
certain legal, cultural, and political background of the arbitrators, rather than a question of impartiality as understood in
legal terminology. The latter question arises in a commercial
arbitration between parties coming from the same legal and
cultural background. In older concession agreements and in
some recent contracts, particularly where the countries are
newcomers as minerals or petroleum producers, the appointing
authority chosen is the International Chamber of Commerce,
the Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID (the
World Bank President), the President or the most senior judge
of the International Court of Justice, the United Nations
Secretary-General, or a board of arbitrators named by the
chairman of a regional development bank.4 2 In recent agreements where the countries have sufficient bargaining power
and experience, there is a strong tendency to keep the appointing authority in the host country. Accordingly, the president of
the highest national court of Iran or of the Iranian Central
Bank, the Saudi Arabian Board of Concessions Appeals,43 and
the National Chamber of Commerce in Colombia44 have been
42. See, e.g., the contracts between Indonesia and Freeport (1967); Botswana and
Bamangwato (1972); Indonesia and Soriano (1969); Indonesia and Phillips (1975);
Central African Republic and CEA (1969); Indonesia and ALCOA (1969); Indonesia
and Broken Hill (1971); Egypt and Esso (1974); Papua New Guinea and ARCO
(1976); Papua New Guinea and Broken Hill (Dampier) (1976); Papua New Guinea and
Bougainville (1974).
43. Among many other agreements, see, e.g., the Agreement between NIOC and
Ameranda Hess (1971) (Governor of the Central Bank of Iran); the Agreement between
NIOC and Mobil Oil Corp. (1971) (President of the Supreme Court of Iran); the
Agreement between Iran and Japanese Oil Companies (1971). Six more recent petroleum service contracts in Iran, dated 1974, follow the same pattern. See also the
Agreement between Petromin and AGIP (1967) (Saudi Board of Concessions Appeals).
See generally Vafai, supra note 38.
44. See the Agreement between Colombia and Hanna (1970); accord, most con-

1977

TRANSNATIONAL

MINERAL CONTRACTS

stipulated as appointing authorities. Within the long range
between the British Resident in a traditional gulf coast concession" on one hand and the exclusive jurisdiction of the national
courts on the other hand," such arbitration provisions oriented
towards the host country may be acceptable in the future to
host countries.
Agreements also often stipulate qualifications of the umpire, less frequently, those of the arbitrators. Thus, "high reputation in international jurisprudence" and citizenship in a
country other than that of the parties at dispute or of a country
with an economic interest at stake is required. 7 A Colombian
agreement of 1970 requires that the arbitrators and the umpire
be attorneys of the Bogota Bar of Colombian nationality. Thus,
a further element of localization is inserted into the dispute
settlement provisions, reflecting the concern of the Calvo doctrine. One should pay some attention in negotiations to the
issues of qualification. As long as traditional international jurisprudence is dominated by jurists of Western background, one
might question the value of such qualification. Perhaps qualifications reflecting an active and expert involvement in legal
issues pertaining to economic development in developing countries may be of greater importance.
It is not clear whether the arbitrators appointed by the
parties should be as impartial as the umpire or whether they
should basically be seen as representatives of the parties' interests within the tribunal itself. The position of the ICSID is
apparently to require the impartiality of all arbitrators.48 In
order to avoid a court's vacating an award because of substansecutive agreements in petroleum (e.g., Webb, 1973), uranium (e.g. Total, 1976), and
asbestos and coal (Esso, 1976).
45. E.g., the D'Arcy petroleum concession in Kuwait (1934/1955).
46. See the Agreement between Kuwait and Hispanica de Petroleos (1967). Petroleum agreements in Peru, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ecuador,
and Colombia exclude any nonnational jurisdiction.
47. See, e.g., the Agreement between Indonesia and Freeport (1967); the Agreement between Papua New Guinea and ARCO (1976); the Agreement between ANCAP
(Uruguay) and Chevron (1969); the Agreement between Indonesia and ALCOA (1969);
the Agreement between Sierra Leone and Selection Trust (1970); the Agreement between Papua New Guinea and Dampier (1976); the Agreement between Egypt and
Esso (1974).
48. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, done Mar. 18, 1965, art. 14, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No.
6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).
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tial defaults in the procedure, the parties might want to make
the arbitrators' position in that respect quite clear.
Sometimes agreements only provide for one arbitrator.
Such a solution may be advisable when a rapid decision is
sought and when the substantial costs of arbitration should be
cut down. It is also possible, as in the OK Tedi contract," to
have a sole arbitrator, but a full three-man tribunal if one
party so requests. A sole arbitrator may also be appointed, if
one party fails to name an arbitrator upon an arbitration request by the opponent. Such a sole-arbitrator solution appears
to be better than allowing independent authority to name an
arbitrator for the noncooperating party.
Ad hoc arbitration can be an acceptable and effective instrument of dispute settlement, especially in the resolution of
minor disputes. It may also be used in third-party decisions in
renegotiation clauses, provided the agreement stipulates appropriate rules for the choice of law, the procedure, and the
enforceability of the award.
As for the second function of arbitration characteristic of
investment contracts in developing countries, ad hoc arbitration appears to offer less stabilization of the initial terms of the
investment than do institutionalized arbitration tribunals, the
awards of which are bolstered by adverse publicity and the
availability of informal sanctions. A number of host countries
have already achieved an arbitration mechanism, whereby the
inherent biases in favor of the TNE are reduced, the local content of decisionmaking increased, and the imposition of national sovereignty restricted. 0 Such ad hoc arbitration with
careful drafting may therefore be a flexible compromise between such opposed positions as the Calvo doctrine on one side
and the TNE's insistence on complete international arbitration
on the other side. In negotiations, a host country would give
away a valuable bargaining chip without adequate compensa49. Agreement between Papua New Guinea and Dampier (1976); Agreement between Papua New Guinea and Esso (1976); Agreement between Sierra Leone and
Selection Trust (1970).
50. The Colombian arbitration provisions, providing that Colombian law is to be
applied, that the umpire is to be appointed by the Colombian Chamber of Commerce,
and that the arbitrators are to be named from Colombian attorneys of the Bogata Bar,
are examples of such "localization" of arbitration, which is more acceptable to host
countries. See sources cited note 44 supra.
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tion by not strongly insisting on elimination of all nonnational
jurisdiction. Ad hoc arbitration can be an acceptable fallback
position if such insistence bars an agreement.
B. Institutionalized International Arbitration: ICC and
ICSID
Submission to the arbitration provided by the ICC5' occurs
frequently in international commercial transactions and in licensing contracts"2 and is occasionally found in mining agreements. As ICC arbitration is often seen as favoring TNEs' interests over host countries' interests and since it seems to be
most appropriate in intrabusiness conflicts, submission to ICC
arbitration often indicates the relatively weak bargaining
power of the host country. It may be, however, that once host
countries have reached a level of bargaining power comparable
to the rather homogeneous situation of TNEs among themselves, submission to the ICC will often become acceptable.53
The advantages of ICC arbitration are the institutional framework provided, the existence of well-tested arbitration rules,
and the availability of experienced arbitrators in case the parties do not agree on the umpire. It is claimed that such arbitration, in contrast to ad hoc arbitration, is able to deal with a
refusal of the defendant to arbitrate. 4 However, appropriate
fashioning of arbitration rules in the agreement, possibly
through incorporation of rules along the lines of the new UNCITRAL rules, 5 can also deal with the various issues of noncooperation of the defendant.
ICC arbitration has been criticized by developing countries 6 for being too costly, for being too far away from the host
51. For the new ICC arbitration rules, see Eisemann, Le nouveau rdglement
d'arbitragede la Chambre de Commerce Internationale,DRorr ET PRAQIUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONALE 355 (1975). For reference to ICC arbitration clauses, see
Delaume, supra note 36, at 245, 260. ICC arbitration is also stipulated, for example,
in the Falconbridge Agreement with the Dominican Republic (1972), the Agreement
between Ghana and HALCO, the Agreement between CVRD and Finsider, as well as
various Iranian and Algerian service or long term natural gas purchase agreements.
52. An analysis of 30 licensing and transfer of technology agreements in a major
developing country reveals that about 20% of the arbitration clauses stipulate ICC
arbitration.
53. This hypothesis may explain the fact that provision for arbitration by the ICC
has surfaced again in several recent service and sales agreements in Iran and Algeria.
54. See Eisemann, supra note 51, at 355, 357.
55. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/127/ Add.1 (1977).
56. This criticism has also been voiced to the author in various interviews with
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country, and for taking no account of the restricted means,
qualified personnel, and facilities available to developing countries when involved in international arbitration proceedings.
Concerning the crucial selection of the umpire or sole arbitrator, many developing countries feel that it is unlikely that the
personality chosen will be favorable to the aspirations of developing countries to reform the often lopsided initial terms of an
investment by legitimate adjustment. Doubts concerning the
suspected systemic bias of ICC umpires and ICC rules traditionally favoring the position of TNEs are not alleviated by the
possibility of the parties' agreement upon the umpire. The anticipated appointment by the ICC arbitration court will, as
explained above, sway the bargaining process for agreement on
the umpire in favor of the investor. It is questionable if consultation of national chambers of commerce in the course of the
selection of the umpire (articles 2 and 6 of the ICC rules) will
be sufficient to eliminate such suspicions. Accordingly, submission to ICC arbitration, even if it provides effective dispute
settlement for minor disputes, may entail a propensity to stabilize the initial contractual terms against demands for renegotiation by the host country.
After the establishment of the ICSID in 1965, submission
to this arbitration institution replaced other common forms of
dispute settlement.5" It is found in many transnational mineral
contracts with the notable exception of those involving Latin
American countries and some other countries with a strong
concern for national sovereignty."8 Insofar as recognition and
negotiators from developing countries.
57. From 1965 to the present, more than 67 states have become members of the
ICSID. Curiously, the quantity of legal literature concerning the ICSID is inversely
proportional to the number of cases decided by it. See J. CHERIAN, INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AND ARBITRATION: THE WORLD BANK CONVENTION ON THE SETrLEMENT OF INVEST-

DISPuTES (1975). Seventy-two states have become signatories to the Convention,
and 67 have deposited instruments of ratification. ICSID/3/Rev. 18 (1976). For provisions relating to the role of the ICSID in international agreements and national investment laws, see ICSID/9/Rev. 2 (1976). For actions taken by contracting states pursuant
to the Convention, see ICSID/8/Rev. 3 (1976). The 1976 Report of the ICSID recites
that five cases had been submitted that year, of which three, involving Alcoa, Kaiser,
and Reynolds, have meanwhile been withdrawn by the parties following the renegotiation of their agreements in 1976 and 1977.
58. Agreements which refer to the ICSID are the following: the Agreement between Mauritania and SOMIMA (1967); the Agreement between Ivory Coast and
UNIWAX (1968); various Indonesian and Liberian agreements of recent date; and the
MENT
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enforcement are concerned, the ICSID arbitration appears to
be more effective than other forms of dispute settlement: a
material reexamination of the arbitral award by the courts of
member states of the convention is excluded, and a state can
no longer raise the objection of sovereign immunity against
arbitral proceedings. The United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
1958 provides a smaller degree of effectiveness. 9 The Jamaica
v. ALCOA decision rendered by an ICSID tribunal has moreover clearly stated that submission to ICSID creates an irrevocable international obligation which cannot be affected by
subsequent withdrawal. 0 As for practical advantages of the
ICSID arbitration, questions might be raised concerning the
speed of the proceedings."' Most of the few cases brought
before the ICSID tribunal to the present have been withdrawn
after settlement has been reached among the parties. The
performance of the ICSID suggests that the tribunal is a
mechanism too wieldy and complicated to achieve speedy and
amicable decisions which can act as a guideline for the continuing implementation of the contract. Some forms of ad hoc
arbitration, such as specific settlement of technical disputes
by experts' decisions and even ICC arbitration, may provide
faster relief at least in the area of minor disputes. As far as
the major disputes are concerned, the specific advantages of
Agreement between Botswana and Bamangwato (1972). Agreements related to several
Latin American countries occasionally contain provisions for arbitration. For example,
a Brazilian iron ore contract of 1973 requires submission to the ICC; a Uruguyan
contract for petroleum (1975) stipulates to ad hoc arbitration; the Cerro Colorado
Agreement (Panama 1974) mandates ICAC arbitration; while Colombian agreements, see sources cited note 44, supra, provide for national arbitration. No Latin
American agreement providing for submission to the ICSID, however, has come to the
attention of the author; most Latin American countries have not acceded to the ICSID
Convention.
59. "Recognition and Enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if
• . . the'recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country." Article V(2), U.N. Register of Texts of Conventions and Other
Instruments Concerning International Trade Law, U.N. Doc. E/73/v.3/24, 26 (1973).
60. See Schmidt, supra note 30; Coll, United States Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards Against Sovereign States: Implications of the ICSID Convention, 17 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 401 (1976).
61. The two ICSID cases reported in the Annual Reports of the ICSID from 1972
to 1976 have, as of the date of the 1976 Annual Report of the ICSID, not yet been
resolved. The Jamaica bauxite cases have been withdrawn.
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an ICSID clause for the investor is the strong incentive for the
host country to respect the initial terms of the agreement. 2
It appears that ICSID submission has a rather strong effect
in deterring renegotiation or at least in providing the investor,
as in the Jamaica case, a bargaining chip vis-A-vis the host
country. Arbitral awards issued under the auspices of the
World Bank are regarded by developing countries as carrying
considerable weight. It is expected that these awards would
have adverse effects on future investment, on the credit rating
of the host country, and on the World Bank's readiness to grant
further financing. 3 The high visibility of ICSID decisions (the
"goldfish bowl effect") acts as a strong incentive in stablizing
the initial contract terms. Some recent contracts expressly aim
at reaping the benefits of such adverse publicity by stipulating,
contrary to all contract and amicable arbitration tradition,
that the investor may publish the award. Such a clause" is
indicative of the stablizing function ascribed by investors to
the ICSID tribunal. The provision reflects rather clearly the
preponderance of the function of an "investment protection"
in international arbitration over the traditional function of
international commercial arbitration, the inducement to
achieve a mutually acceptable and nondisruptive settlement.
Lastly, there is some concern in developing countries over
the selection of arbitrators by the ICSID. As with the ICC, it
is feared that the exercise of the appointing authority by the
ICSID will more likely result in the selection of an umpire with
a "systemic," not a personal, bias in favor of Western legal
concepts and the position of TNEs. It has been suggested 5 that
the ICSID roster of personalities contains little reference to
legal experts generally representing the developing countries'
position in the relevant areas of international business law.
(Such a gap is also obviously due to the organizational and
62. Schmidt, supra note 30, perceives stabilization and deterrence against the
demands of renegotiation as the major characteristic of arbitration under the ICSID.
63. See Spofford, Third Party Judgments and Economic Transactions, 1964-I1
RECUEIL DES COURS 108, 224. Interviews with negotiators for TNEs confirm 'that this
expectation is one of the major advantages seen to accrue to them from an ICSID
arbitration provision.
64. The Agreement between Botswana and Bamangwato (1972), notable for its
strong provisions guarding against subsequent legislation by the host country affecting
the investment, contains such a clause.
65. Interview with a host country negotiator.
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financial weakness of the developing countries' institutions
devoted to international legal research as compared to Western
countries' institutions.) Developing countries are consequently
underrepresented in the often decisive communication processes of the international legal community. An additional factor is the developing countries' dependence on the traditions
and institutions of Western legal scholarship, particularly on
those of the former colonial mother countries.
In evaluating the ability of the institutional forms of dispute settlement to fulfill the various functions outlined above,
we can conclude the following: Insofar as issues of interpretative and technical disputes in' the minor conflicts are concerned, the ICSID and the ICC tribunals do not appear to be
considerably better equipped than ad hoc arbitration. Such
arbitration, which can be drafted to be rapid and closer to the
parties, may be expected to produce an atmosphere conducive
to amicable settlement. Against noncooperative parties, the
institutionalized arbitration may offer certain advantages. A
careful drafting of arbitration provisions in ad hoc arbitration
and the use of the growing regional arbitration centers may,
however, yield similar results. Lastly, the premise that arbitration is always superior to judicial decisionmaking may be questioned. On the contrary, international arbitration may be more
expensive and less rapid than judicial proceedings, as one commentator has observed. 6 As is true with large-scale international arbitration cases, neither speed, efficiency, nor inexpensiveness may be particular qualities of this form of dispute
settlement. Specific obstacles of international arbitration
may include the various factors to be negotiated, the frequent
lack of expertise among arbitrators chosen for their high social
reputation, the age of arbitrators, and the various possibilities
of protracting the proceedings by an uncooperative arbitrator.
The main function of ICC and ICSID arbitration is to preserve the initial contract terms against the contract revision
66. See Layton, Arbitrationin InternationalCommercialAgreements: The Noose
Draws Tighter, 9 INT'L LAW. 741, 745 (1975).
67. The history of the few large-scale petroleum arbitration cases, such as those
involving Abu Dhabi, Quatar, Sapphire and Aramco, see sources cited note 3, supra,
suggests that speed and economy are not among the principal advantages of international arbitration.
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demands by the host country and to bestow an element of
bargaining power on the TNE in later renegotiations. Hence it
is less the incentive towards amicable settlement and more the
strong sanction against host country's attempts to change the
rules of the game which is appreciated in such forms of dispute
settlement." This assumption is supported by a number of
interviews with company negotiators.
C. Settlement of Technical Disputes by Experts' Decision
A very interesting and new development is the quantitative and qualitative expansion of specific procedures to solve
disputes of a technical character. Many disputes in mineral
agreements are primarily of a technical nature; they cannot be
resolved by legal reasoning, but rather by application of professional standards, such as "sound engineering, mining, or accounting practices." A quick resolution of such disputes is of
great importance, particularly when a decision is necessary in
order to carry out the implementation of a mining project.
Technical disputes may also involve substantial financial interests. Accordingly, agreements increasingly provide for the
decision of a single expert or a mining, engineering, consulting,
or accounting firm in the listed areas: 9
(1) application of sound mining and engineering
standards in the construction and operation of facilities;
(2) safeguarding of environmental standards;
(3) application of "arm's-length standards in intracompany transactions," particularly in pricing of
minerals;
(4) accounting issues, such as deductability and
computation of exploration costs; and
(5) acceptance of a feasibility study.
68. This probably explains why international arbitration became one of the chief
causes for the breakdown of otherwise promising negotiations in a significant negotiation between an Asian host country and a major mining company. It is interesting to
note that a later agreement for the exploitation of the mine in question did contain
those precise dispute settlement provisions which the host country objected to in its
negotiations with the first negotiating partner.
69. For the decisions of experts in older petroleum concessions, see Fischer, supra
note 20, at 261. Such clauses allowing for the decisions of experts exist in the Agreement between Iran and the Middle East Petroleum Consortium (1954) and the Sapphire Agreement. See Lalive, supra note 13, at 1003. A recent Iranian agreement
provides for technical settlement of disputes concerning the computation of exploration costs, while a diamond agreement provides the same for accounting issues and
arm's-length pricing standards. Also, an Iranian exploration agreement and the Papua
New Guinea-Dampier contract of 1976 stipulate decisions by experts on the question
of the acceptability of the feasibility study.

1977

TRANSNATIONAL

MINERAL CONTRACTS

Specific settlement of technical disputes may constitute
an area where the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of national
courts does not apply, as the necessary technical expertise may
often not be available. A host country desiring to maintain its
unimpaired national jurisdiction may accordingly consent to
submit narrowly defined technical matters to technical arbitration or an expert's decision. Such a solution can accommodate
the investor's interest in securing a forum which protects him
from the discretionary technical judgements of the government.
The criteria for the experts' decision are usually described
by reference to accepted professional standards. The professional reputation of the consulting firm at stake is a strong
incentive for the experts to abide by those standards. However,
objections are raised against a mere referral to such standards
and against a selection of consulting firms as experts, based
upon an allegedly inherent bias of such firms and their professional standards in favor of the business practices of TNEs.
The professional criteria of experts are geared to the specific
needs of business and stockholders, but do not take account of
the specific interest of the host country, as reflected in the
agreement.7 0 As long as the major consulting and engineering
firms called in as experts have strong and well-established ties
with the major mining companies, they may have a disincentive to decide against them. Even in experts' decisions, the
room for value judgement is rather large, as the differences of
asset valuation in a major litigation related to mining in Zambia illustrate.7 1 Accordingly, negotiators for developing countries have insisted that the host country retain the power to
decide on the standards of accounting applicable by issuing
pertinent regulations. The recent OK Tedi copper contract sets
forth a very interesting set of criteria to be used in arbitration
in a dispute concerning the feasibility study. The criteria merit
literal quotation:
70. See U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Transnational Corporations, Some Aspects
of Corporate Accounting and Reporting of Special Interest to Developing Host Countries, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/AC.1/4 (1976); U.N. ESCOR Commission on Transnational
Corporations, Towards International Standards of Accounting and Reporting for
Transnational Corporations: Report of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/AC.1/2
(1976).
71. Kohn v. American Metals Climax, 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

60

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 7:33

In reaching his decision on any matter referred to him . . . the
arbitrator shall judge the reasonableness of any decision of the
State having regard to whether the proposals are based on sound
mining and engineering practice, take reasonable account of the
interests of the people of Papua New Guinea and of employees
who will be working on the Project, include reasonable steps to
protect the environment, are consistent with securing an equitable return on investment to the Company having regard to the
risks associated with the Project and the efficient development
and maintenance of the Project and are not inconsistent with the
balanced development of the area, recognizing the limited pres
ent use of the area, the need for its development, the State's
desire for the Project to proceed and be economically viable, and
the effect the Project must necessarily have on the environment.

In drafting such standards some reference to the weight of
these variant, often conflicting standards should be given. The
OK Tedi contract reflects the evolution of standards of social
and financial accounting which take account of the special
needs of developing countries. 2
The negotiators should also consider whether the expert's
decision is to be final, or, as proposed in a model engineering
contract, whether it should be possible to appeal the final
decision awarding monetary compensation to the injured
party. 3 If technical and legal arbitration is stipulated separately, some thought should be given to ensure an appropriate
division of jurisdiction. The awkward situation, familiar in several publicized international arbitration cases, in which legal
experts deal with matters of high technical intricacies or when
technical experts decide legal issues should be avoided.
V.

SPECIFIC ISSUES IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROVISIONS

Besides the choice of the arbitration forum, the contracting parties can stipulate various conditions and rules concerning the arbitration. Such issues can be relevant in all the forms
72. See sources cited note 70 supra.
73. U.N. Industrial Development Organization, Guidelines for Contracting for
Industrial Projects in Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ID/149, at 57 (1975). Other less
significant details to be taken into consideration include whether the expert's decision
may be overridden by a panel of three experts upon the request of one party, as is the
case in a 1968 Ethiopian contract, and how questions of a legal and technical nature
are to be separated for arbitration. The Agreement between Algeria and CREPS (1966)
apparently permits the party requesting arbitration to select the avenue of dispute
settlement. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 415.
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of arbitration discussed. The method of issue resolution in the
transnational contract will have a bearing upon the arbitration
and, by anticipation, will affect the parties' behavior in the ongoing bargaining process during the course of the life of the
contract.
A. Place and Language of the Arbitration
The place stipulated for arbitration is often quite indicative of the power distribution between host country and TNE.
The company will favor and possibly obtain locations such as
Stockholm, Paris, Zirich, and Geneva, whereas the host country, for reasons of supposed local advantage, but particularly
for reasons of lesser costs and increased familiarity, will negotiate for its home capital or at least a neighboring capital. The
host country may be at quite a disadvantage in an unfamiliar
environment with its limited financial resources and its limited
know-how in international business customs. There are a number of compromises available. One agreement provides for the
capital of the respective defendant as the place of arbitration,
while another grants the investor the right to choose a place
other than the host country's capital, providing the investor
pays the extra costs involved. Respect for the investor's. unwillingness to go to arbitration in the host country capital may
lead to stipulation of a neighboring capital or, increasingly, of
one of the regional arbitration centers.
The issue of the language of the arbitration is similar.
Arbitration in a foreign language proceeding may prove disadvantageous for the host country. Accordingly, it will try to require that its own language be the language in which the proceedings are conducted. Such issues are of interest to the host
country's negotiators. One should, however, not pay attention
to securing a bargaining victory on one of these more symbolic
issues in return for major concessions in areas of financial concern.
B. Arbitration and the Jurisdictionof Municipal Courts
Host countries will generally prefer complete national jurisdiction to the exclusion of international arbitration. In petroleum contracts any other solution appears to be antiquated."
74. Recent arbitration clauses reviewed by the author in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Algeria, Libya, Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia reflect a quite clear and definite
trend toward an exclusive application of national law at least in petroleum contracts.
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In nonfuel minerals agreements host countries, particularly in
Latin America, have been increasingly successful in insisting
on national jurisdiction. 5 OPEC resolutions, the ANCOM decision, Decision 24, various national laws, and international
legal instruments prohibit or at least recommend against submission to nonnational jurisdictions. 6 Sometimes when the
investor's bargaining power precludes complete national jurisdiction, elaborate theories have been developed to justify submission to international arbitration. One theory restricts the
Calvo doctrine to agreements performed within the country
and thus exempts agreements containing financing obtained
from foreign sources." In the conflict between the objective of
complete national sovereignty and the need to attract sufficient foreign capital, a number of intermediate solutions have
recently evolved. Such solutions are possible compromises and
fall-back positions for the parties in the negotiations. The
main characteristic of such arrangements is the division of jurisdictions and of subject matters among municipal courts,
national and international arbitration tribunals, and specific
proceedings for technical disputes.
The role of settlement of technical disputes has already
been discussed. Some agreements allow a request for arbitration only after exhaustion of local remedies. This transfers into
contractual terms the traditional doctrine of international law
that diplomatic support by the home country requires a previous "denial of justice" by the host country." The Cerro Colo75. Almost all the recent nonfuel agreements known to the author and relating to
Latin America, in particular the Peruvian, Chilean, and Colombian copper and nickel
contracts, contain provisions requiring complete submission to national law and jurisdiction.
76. See sources cited note 15, supra;Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Resolution XVI.90 (1968), reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1183 (1968);
Andean Foreign Investment Code, July 17, 1971, art. 51, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 126, 141 (1972). The Andean Code was originally adopted on Dec. 31, 1970,
by Decision No. 24 of the Commission of the Cartegena Agreement (Acuerdo de Cartegena or Andean Pact), for which see Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration,
done May 26, 1969, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 910 (1969). See also Danino, The Andean
Code After Five Years, 8 LAw. AM. 635, 667-68 (1976).
77. Thus, a Peruvian petroleum agreement with certain Japanese companies is
expressly subject to Japanese and English law and to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Tokyo. The justification for imposition of the Calvo doctrine arises by creating an
exception for contracts performed in a foreign country.
78. E.g., the uranium Agreement between Colombia and Total (1976). For the
concept that diplomatic intervention is permissable only in the event of a denial of
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rado Copper Agreement of 1976 confers on the courts of Panama the jurisdiction to issue execution awards. Additionally,
several recent contracts in copper and petroleum from Papua
New Guinea require the arbitration tribunal to allow the municipal court to decide on issues of municipal law. Apparently,
the tribunal has to stay the proceedings and request a ruling
on the municipal law upon which to base its decision on issues
of local law raised during arbitration. Other agreements, such
as recent Liberian concession contracts and the Bamangwato
Agreement of 1972 in Botswana, exempt matters of national
law or certain narrowly defined disputes from the tribunal's
jurisdiction. In various recent Papua New Guinean contracts
and other agreements from anglophonic developing countries,
tax disputes are generally excluded from the contractual
mechanism for dispute settlement. In Egyptian petroleum
concessions disputes with the government are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Egyptian courts, whereas disputes
with the national petroleum enterprise are submitted to arbitration.79
Accordingly, the host country's strategy for negotiation
might be to reduce the procedural role and the subject matter
of jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal. Questions of the interplay between local courts and the tribunal would have to be
clarified more than has been done previously in the several
recent agreements containing such provisions. If the municipal
courts are to be competent for the execution of awards, it is
necessary to clarify whether they are exclusively competent or
whether the winning party may appeal to other countries'
courts to enforce the award. In view of the public policy reservation of article V(2)(d) of the 1958 United Nations Convention
exclusive jurisdiction of municipal courts of the host country
to enforce an international arbitral award may make quite a
difference. If disputes concerning the proper application of
municipal law are at issue, the role of the arbitration tribunal
must be defined. The intent of the respective clauses is to allow
the local courts to decide. One possible solution might be to
require the arbitration tribunal to stay its proceedings on the
request of one party or at its own discretion, while the compejustice, see Fatouros, supra note 29, at 251.
79. See the Agreement between Egypt and Exxon (1974) and other Egyptian
petroleum contracts,
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tent municipal courts decide on the legal question involved.80

Another arrangement would be to leave the complete jurisdiction over the operating company incorporated in the host country to the local courts, but stipulate international arbitration
for disputes concerning the contract with the foreign parent
company."
Finally, it is possible to divide the subject matter of potential disputes into issues where national sovereignty is concerned and other issues where the essence of the investment of
the TNE is at stake. The bulk of such disputes may be subject
to exclusive national jurisdiction, whereas disputes concerning
the "heart" of the investment may be submitted to international arbitration. Such was a proposal put forth by a major
mining company in a recent negotiation where arbitration was
a controversial issue. The "essence" of the investment requires
further clarification. Perhaps only a dispute concerning a claim
for damages for material breach of contract after termination
could be left as the only major dispute to nonnational arbitration.
Another compromise solution is the "localization" of arbitration as described above. Such national arbitration proceedings could for some disputes (mainly the "minor" ones) provide
an atmosphere conducive to amicable settlement without affecting national sovereignty. Innovative and careful drafting of
dispute settlement provisions will probably increase in order to
take account of the national sovereignty interest as well as of
the legitimate interests of investors.
C. Applicable Law and Substantive Rules Governing
Arbitration
If parties stipulate legal rules applicable to the contract,
either in arbitration or without normal judicial proceedings,
three issues may be distinguished: (1) the choice-of-law
question; (2) the "freezing" of a particular legal regime; and
(3) the insertion of specific rules concerning the substance of
80. Cf. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, also found in 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
4655, at 3853,
which requires national courts to submit issues of European law to the European Court
in Luxembourg.
81. Such was the proposal put forward by a major mining company in recent
negotiations. The company wished to reserve at least the "essence of the investment"
for a nonnational tribunal.
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the award, substituting existent or nonexistent law of transnational contracts.
The choice-of-law question must be examined before the
background of a possible unilateral change of the terms by the
host country through legislation. The stipulation of a legal system other than the host country's, or of vaguely defined, generally recognized legal rules of international law, is meant to
protect in a doubtful way the legal regime of the project against
such alteration. Freezing clauses are addressed to this issue of
subsequent unilateral alteration even more directly.
Apart from this background, the choice-of-law question is
related to the absence of particular rules appropriate to transnational investment contracts, either in the legal systems of
host countries or in the often invoked international law.2 The
specific problems raised by transnational investment have not
yet led to an elaboration of rules, standards, and norms applicable either in the national laws and regulations or in international law, which is based primarily on interstate relations.
This situation has led to an increase of substantive rules of
contract law generated by the contracts themselves. In combination with the growth of specific investment laws83 and international legal instruments applicable to TNEs and transfer of
technology, 4 future rules may slowly bring about a transna85
tional law of investment contracts.
82. See Weil, supra note 3, at 118 and passim. International law has developed
to the extent of coping adequately with international treaties between states, but not
agreements between states and private corporations. The most crucial issue is that of
a unilateral alteration of the contract by legislation of a sovereign state. Rules relating
to this issue have been proposed by Western jurists in the form of an analogy to the
traditional standards governing nationalization. But apart from this problem, many
other problems concerning the law of international investment contracts, for example,
the calculation of the amount of damages and the impact of changed circumstances,
have not yet reached the stage of international consensus which can be characterized
as a new "international law of transnational investment contracts."
83. See the survey on National Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/8 (1976).
84. See Commission on Transnational Corporations, Work Related to the Formulation of a Code of Conduct: Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the
Code of Conduct (3d Sess., Agenda Item 5) 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/31 (1977); An International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/ AC.1/2
(Supp. 1) (1975).
85. See Kahn, Probl~mes Juridiques de l'Invetissement dans les Pays de
I'ancienne Afrique francaise, 1965 JOURNAL DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 338; Schachter,
The EvolvingInternationalLaw of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976).
See also P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); Lalive, supra note 13.
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Traditionally, foreign investors have mostly been able to
have a choice-of-law clause reflecting their interests. These
choices include the law of a foreign (home) country, international law (however vague), or generally recognized legal principles (emanating from the legal systems of capital-exporting
countries). Such choice-of-law solutions also reflect several
well-known arbitration cases where a set of rules taken from
Western legal systems,"6 rather than from the often nonexistent
law of the host country, was applied. Even today, the choice
of a foreign law or other nonnational legal rules is predominant
in manufacturing, in licensing, and particularly in loan agreements.Y The development, however, is clearly directed towards
exclusive application of national law of the host country. At
first, national law is stipulated together with traditional references of a vague content, such as generally recognized principles of international law.88 In petroleum agreements of major
producing countries any reference except to national law is by
now antiquated. 0
The problem of "freezing clauses" is somewhat different.
Such clauses contained in a large number of recent agreements and several modern investment laws8 ' guarantee the in86. Such as those "generally recognized principles" found in the law common to
civilized nations and comparative jurisprudence. See sources cited note 3, supra; Suratgar, ConsiderationsAffecting Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts between Governments and Foreign Nationals, 2 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 273, 283 (1962); Lalive, supra note
13, at 998.
87. This conclusion was reached following an analysis by the author of various
large-scale investment finance agreements. See also G. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOWu DEVELOPMENT FINANCING (1967); G. DELAUME,
TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPucABLE LAw AND SETTLEMENT OF DisPUnES ch. VI (1976)..
88. It is possible now to state fairly that the application of national law prevails
in most major petroleum producing countries and increasingly in nonfuel mineral
agreements as well. But cf. Sarre, Arbitration Clauses in the Oil Industry in the Middle
East, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 16, at 336, 341, 344.
89. See the Agreement between Sierra Leone and Selection Trust (1970) and the
Agreement between Indonesia and ALCOA (1969). Also, article 42 of the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes provides that arbitrators
are to apply municipal law and international law as appropriate in the event that no
specific stipulation exists in the agreement.
90. See note 88 supra.
91. A formulation to the effect that only such national law as may b4 "consistent
with the agreement" shall apply is found in the Agreement between Papua New
Guinea and Dampier (1976), the Agreement between Liberia and Lamco, the Agreement between Liberia and Bong, and the Agreement between Panama and Texasgulf
(1976). Contracts entered into by Francophonic countries in Africa abound with
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alterability of the complete contractual and legal regime for the
project. This includes certain tax rules, the tax rate, foreign
currency exchange, and the overall financial burden. Other
provisions guarantee that new taxes will not be imposed or that
any subsequent legislation affecting the agreement's financial
character will not be applicable. Francophonic African countries have been particularly ready to grant wide and longranging privileges to TNEs. In its softer forms the freezing
clauses stipulate that municipal law will be applicable only as
far as it is consistent with the agreement. In its more severe
forms any subsequent legislation affecting the contract is declared to be a material breach giving rise to claims for damages.
As modern agreements tend to govern comprehensively all conditions of the mining project, the hands of national legislators
would be tied for twenty-five to forty years. It is practically
impossible for a developing country to abide by such a freezing
clause for the whole life of the contract. Moreover, it is doubtful
if such provisions can produce a legally binding effect on the
host country's exercise of national sovereignty by subsequent
legislation. It is claimed that the host country's right to legislate is inalienable and that provisions stipulating a law different from the host country's laws merely incorporate specific
rules contained in another legal system. These rules are amenaguarantees that no subsequent legislation will have any effect upon the investment in
areas mentioned generally and specifically. The Agreement between Botswana and
Bamangwato (1972) is perhaps the most carefully drafted in this respect, for it deems
any subsequent change in the legislative regime governing the instrument to be a
"material breach of the contract." See also the Agreement between Surinam and
ALCOA (1958) and the Brokopondo Agreement.
A number of investment laws also guarantee the tax rate, the overall tax burden,
and an exemption from other fiscal exactions for a considerable period of time, often
for the entire term of the investment agreement to be concluded. Illustrative is the
Chilean Foreign Investment Statute, Decreto Ley No. 1748, Official Gazette (March
18, 1977), which entitles foreign investors to the inclusion of a clause in their agreement
freezing taxes for 10 years. Article 8 of the Act states that sales, service, and import
tax exemptions will remain unvaried throughout the term of the agreement. It is
interesting to note that a number of mineral agreements concluded under the prior
investment statute, Decreto Ley No. 600 (1974), during 1976 and 1977 provide for a
freezing of the fiscal regime governing the mining project for a period of 30 years
following the start of commercial production. A review of legislative changes and
renegotiations reveals that such freezing clauses have rarely prevented a revision of the
terms of the investment when the government acquires an equality or even superiority
in its bargaining position in comparison to its previously inferior position. Wfilde,
Revision of TransnationalInvestment Agreements, 10 LAW. AM. (forthcoming 1978).
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ble to alteration by subsequent legislation. 2 Such a view is
strongly supported by authoritative statements of the United
Nations, particularly the resolutions on the New International
Economic Order and the recommendations of the Group of
3
Eminent Persons.9
Consequently, the effect of freezing clauses is rather questionable de facto as well as de jure. They may mainly serve the
investors' bargaining position against future expected renegotiation demands. Applying the evolving transnational law of
investment contracts, one may suggest that freezing clauses are
void and that courts, acting under the public policy reservation
of the 1958 United Nations Convention, should refuse to enforce arbitral awards based on such freezing provisions. The
evolution of several large-scale concessions suggests that freezing clauses and legal enclaves for natural resource exploitation
may be antiquated and that the agreement will increasingly be
subject to laws of general application in the host country. 4 The
92. See Brown, Choice of Law Provisions in Concession and Related Contracts,
39 MoD. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976); Geiger, The UnilateralChange of Economic Development
Agreements, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 73 (1974); Zakharyia, Impact of Changing Circumstances on the Revision of Petroleum Contracts, 12 MmD. EAST ECON. SURVEY 1
(July 11, 1969 Supp.); Rouhani, Assignment and Renegotiation, in NEGOTIATION AND
DRAFTING OF MnIo AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 21 (1976); Suratgar, supra note 86,
at 305.
However, the most recent arbitration decision recognizes a stabilization clause
and declares a subsequent nationalization void. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co.
v. Libya, in 104 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 350 (1977), and Lalive, Un grand
arbitragepetrolier entre un Gouvernement et deux societes privees etrangeres. Id. at
319. The arbitration took place without the participation of Libya. It is not apparent
that the comprehensive protection of foreign investment from nationalization and
adjustment of petroleum concession granted by the sole arbitrator, Rene-Jean Dupuy,
is the best way of achieving the international legal principles universally accepted by
TNEs and host countries; if the rules evolved by arbitrators reflect only the interests
favoring comprehensive protection of TNEs and not the requirements of host countries
for flexibility, then such rules do not seem to offer a promise of universal acceptance
and thus universal effectiveness.
93. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975);
G.A. Res. 3202, 6 U.N. GAOR (Special Sess.), Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); Summary of the Hearings Before the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the
Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations
37, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/15 (1974); Commission on Transnational Corporations, Work
Related to the Formulation of a Code of Conduct: Report of the Intergovernmental
Working Group on the Code of Conduct 7, 3d Sess. (Agenda Item 5), U.N. Doc.
E/C.10/31 (1977); UNCTAD, Progress in Implementing Resolution 39 (III), Report by
the Secretariat, in 2 Trade and Development Board (Prov. Agenda Item 5) 12, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/AC.11/12 (1972).
94. E.g., such is the development of a traditional concession like the Firestone
concession in Liberia, which began in 1926 as a 99 year concession with full enclave
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current practice of freezing clauses may, therefore, be interpreted as a reflection of the very weak bargaining power of host
countries trying to attract investment at all costs. This course
of action will not stop the trend towards submission to national
laws once a level of experience and bargaining power has been
reached .
Another trend to be examined is the increase of provisions
setting down substantive rules for the arbitration tribunal.
Such a development stems from the absence of substantive
legal rules in international law and in the municipal law of
most countries that are able to deal with complex foreign investment contracts of a private and administrative law nature.
Additionally, the vagueness of the various choice-of-law provisions and of the legal systems mentioned may motivate the
parties to set forth precisely which standards the arbitrators
should apply. Some agreements require the tribunal to give the
party in default sufficient time to remedy the breach. On the
contrary, others allow only final termination of the contract
and an award of damages to the party injured. An interesting
clause in a recent copper contract limits the amount of possible
damage which can be awarded to the total amount of management fees to be paid within eighteen months. It may be expected in the future that the contracts will contain specific
legal regimes governing the damages and consequences of default, along with a more precise definition of default and the
right of the tribunal to issue interim awards and to order specific performance. Such precise contractual stipulations may
reduce risks and increase the predictability for both parties. In
addition the more arbitration is governed by precise standards,
the less parties will be afraid to submit to an unpredictable,
foreign-based insitution.
status and which was made subject to general taxation in 1976. Developed producer
countries, such as South Africa and the provincial governments of Canada and Australia, have progressed on this path to subject the mining industry to general laws
much more than have developing countries.
95. Most of the elaborate freezing provisions and guarantees in agreements and
investment laws appear to have come from countries with a low level of development
and experience, anxious to attract foreign investment at any cost, or from countries
with weak bargaining power caused by temporary or permanent, unfavorable economic
conditions. Such countries can hardly serve as an indicator of future trends or as an
example for the negotiation strategies of host countries.
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D. Procedureof Arbitration
The rules governing the arbitration proceedings may be
drafted in the agreement. These include time limits, voting
requirements in the case of a three-person tribunal, cost apportionment, decision on default, and other issues. In case an institutional arbitration tribunal is chosen the rules of such an
institution as the ICC, the ICSID, or a regional arbitration
institution will apply. It is also possible to incorporate the rules
of such an institution into ad hoc arbitration clauses. It appears that ICSID rules are more appropriate for large-scale
arbitration in important disputes often terminating the agreement, but too cumbersome and time consuming to achieve a
speedy settlement. For disputes described as "technical"
ICSID arbitration is inappropriate. Developing countries have
raised against rules such as the time limits issued by the ICC
the objection that they are not responsive to their needs."
There are efforts to induce the arbitration centers to respond
to those requests and to foster regional arbitration centers in
developing countries.9"
The 1976 UNCITRAL rules for incorporation in ad hoc
arbitration clauses are of particular interest for dispute settlement in transnational mineral contracts. These rules have been
recommended for US-USSR trade. 8 They appear to be most

useful for large-scale arbitation in investment contracts. Some
doubts, however, must be raised against article 33(II), where
the tribunal is requested to decide "in accordance with the
contract." Some modification, such as a clause requiring that
the tribunal "shall take into account the terms of contract"
may have been more appropriate to a long term investment
contract. 9 Perhaps a contractual stipulation to that effect in
the dispute settlement clause may be useful in making the
UNCITRAL rules appropriate not only for international commercial contracts, but also for long term investment agreements. The UNCITRAL rules also deal with the important
96. See the Note by the Secretariat on the decision by the Asian-African Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/127 and Add. 1
(1976/1977).
97. Id.
98. See Press Release of the American Arbitration Association (January 12, 1977).
99. See, e.g., Article 38 of the Arbitration Rules of the U.N. ECE of 1966, U.N.
Register of Texts E/73/V/3 at 106.
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practical issue of protraction of the proceedings by one party's
appointed arbitrator. One of the major obstacles against a
speedy completion of the arbitration proceedings is, in addition
to a delay by the obstructing party in its appointment of an
arbitrator, the noncooperation of an arbitrator already appointed. °0
E. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The weakness of arbitral awards relative to judicial decisions is often a great difficulty, along with the expenses and
time delays involved in enforcing the award. When the defendant is a state, an attempt to execute the award is confronted
with the objection of sovereign immunity. As the contracting
party from a developing country will most likely be the state,
some state agency, or state enterprise, sovereign immunity will
often become an issue. This occurs particularly when the new
government refuses to comply with the commitments of the
former government. Recently, the Nigerian cement cases have
triggered a lively discussion of these problems.' The United
Nations Convention of 1958 on Recognition and Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards may be of some use in overcoming such
obstacles. However, it allows for reservations of public policy
and does not deal expressly with sovereign immunity. Efforts
are underway to impove the effectiveness of this Convention in
light of the growing number of developing countries that have
acceded to it.102 The ICSID probably provides the most effective instruments for the enforcement of its awards.
The parties themselves have the potential to reduce the
obstacles against enforcement. They may stipulate that the
award may be entered as judgment in any jurisdiction, or they
may specify a particular jurisdiction, such as a member state
of the United Nations Convention. 3 The host state may waive
100. See Layton, supra note 66.
101. See National American Corp. v. Nigeria, 420 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 868; [1976] 3
All E.R. 437; 120 Sol. J. 554; LGE Frankfurt 2.12 (1975), in DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHArr
47 (1976). For recent developments in the area of sovereign immunity, see Delaume,
PublicDebt and Sovereign Immunity, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399 (1977). See also the three
articles on sovereign immunity, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399-460 (1977).
102. For the state of ratification and accession, see U.N. Doc. ACN/9/118 (1976).
103. See Layton, supra note 66, at 745. A 1974 petroleum Agreement between
Japan and Peru accordingly declares the courts of Tokyo competent to enforce arbitral
awards.
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its objection of sovereign immunity and declare that the dispute at issue is of a commercial nature. The effect of such
stipulations, however, is unclear. Lastly, a number of other
solutions are being developed to provide more security in enforcing contractual commitments. Investors and financing institutions increasingly insist that a trust account be held by a
trustee abroad (e.g., in New York) for the host country's central
bank in order to receive the proceeds from the sale of minerals.
Such trust accounts serve to improve the host state's foreign
currency position, but, by being potential objects for attachment, they give some additional protection to the investors'
security interests. Thus the account provides security for the
financing institutions and the TNE. Posting of a security or a
guarantee from an investment insurance agency or a home
state may also increase the likelihood of prompt compliance
with the award.
Increasingly performance bonds are posted by the TNE to
secure its compliance with its contractual minimum expenditure obligations, its production requirements, and the contractual program of work. Finally, the more an agreement and the
stipulated arbitration are responsive to developing countries'
particular problems, the less obstacles will be found to refusing
compliance.'"4
VI.

CONCLUSION:

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE REVISION OF

LONG TERM INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES

A dilemma arises in connection with arbitration provisions
in mineral investment contracts. Arbitration and technical
decisions may often be a useful instrument to settle interpretative and technical disputes in an amicable way which does not
obstruct the further implementation of the agreement. However, the other function of international arbitration, i.e., the
stablization of initially unequal contracts for an excessively
long period of time, has led host countries to question the advisability of such provisions. They feel international arbitration bodies serve primarily to police their demands for a change
in the rules of the game, thus unilaterally favoring TNEs.
The search for mutually acceptable solutions in this dilemma has led to a number of compromise positions. Perhaps
a separation of the clearly useful and acceptable mechanisms
104. Accordingly, further research is warranted on alternatives of contractual
drafting concerning dispute settlement and periodic revision or automatic readjustment of the contractual terms.
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to settle the "minor" disputes (technical, interpretative, and
gap-filling) from the specific solutions devised for "major" disputes of contract revision could take place. For major disputes
concerning a revision of contractual terms, a number of solutions already formulated in agreements but largely still in the
phase of discussion 5 should be explored in greater depth.
The United Nations and other international organizations
have recently called for principles to guide the revision of unequal terms in long term investment agreements.' A number
of major long term agreements, particularly in petroleum but
also in nonfuel natural resources, e.g., bauxite, copper, or rubber, have been revised to a considerable degree by a more or
less voluntary renegotiation.0 7 An analysis of the major legal
systems shows that adjustment of long term contracts is not as
unfamiliar as is often claimed in the criticism levied against
the unilateral revision of contractual terms by host countries.
Legal doctrines such as frustration and "imprevision" permit
some change in long-term contractual relationships once basic
circumstances have changed substantially. The concept of the
"Wegfall der Geschiftsgrundlage" (lapse of contractual basis)
in German law has been applied particularly to cases where
105. Cf. Smith and Wells, supra note 18, at 152; Z. MIKDASHI, THE INTERNATIONAL
152 (1976); M. MUGHRABY, PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY
OVER OnL RESOURCES 174 (1966). For the renegotiation of petroleum concessions during the energy crisis, see Penrose, The Development of Crisis, 1975 DAEDALUS 52, 53;
Johnson, A Legal Alternative to Instability in InternationalOil, 6 NAT. RES. J. 368
(1966). See also the various views expounded on the reliance upon such concepts as
"change of circumstances" to justify a revision of contractual terms cited in note 92
supra.
Analysis of about 200 investment agreements in the area of natural resources
demonstrates that from 1971 to 1977 the number of renegotiation clauses (as a periodic
review or as a most-favored countrz clause in favor of the host country) has increased
substantially. Also, other contractual provisions designed to adjust the contractual
regime, e.g., sliding taxes, relinquishment obligations, and adjustment of prices to
relect world market developments, have been put to increasing use.
106. In particular, see OPEC Resoltion XVI.90 (1968), reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1183 (1968). As for the United Nations, see the sources cited supra note 93.
107. The most glaring example has been in the petroleum industry where complete revisions of participation, state ownership, pricing structures, royalty expenses,
and tax rates have occurred, beginning slowly in the 1960s and achieving momentum
from 1972 to the present. A similar development has taken place in the bauxite industry in the period from 1973 to 1975 with the introduction of state majority ownership,
production levies, and other financial arrangements benefiting the host countries. Less
visible have been the large numbers of renegotiations of most long term concession
agreements in rubber, timber, and nonfuel minerals.
POLITICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
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basic changes occurred and where long term relationships
needed judicial adjustment. 08 In international law the rebus sic
stantibus doctrine may in exceptional circumstances allow for
the adjustment of international treaty obligations.
Of particular interest are legal rules permitting a clarification or even an adjustment of contractual terms by the court
in cases of exploitation of unequal bargaining power. This is
practiced in the German legal system, particularly to control
standard adhesion clauses.' In the agreements themselves
simple renegotiation clauses, most-favored clauses in favor of
the TNE or host country, and specific adjustment provisions
enhance the flexibility of the long term regime. A number of
other provisions, such as divestment, relinquishment, and sliding tax provisions, furthermore "dynamize" the contractual
terms to take account of the change of circumstances and the
change in the bargaining power among the parties. In addition
the final and comprehensive regime for the investment is increasingly no longer negotiated at the onset of prefeasibility
studies, where the uncertainty favors the TNE's position.
Often simple exploration contracts with some privileges concerning later exploitation are concluded with provision for negotiation of the final conditions after the feasibility study has
reduced uncertainty and risk to a considerable degree.
Such devices to reduce the unequal distribution of bargaining power, a source of later instability, and to insert flexibility into the contractual regime must be explored and developed. Not all of them favor the host country. If an acceptable
mechanism of "dynamization" can be found, taking due account of the national sovereignty objective of the host country
and the reliance of the TNE, mechanisms of third-party decisionmaking for deadlocked renegotiations might be discussed
and accepted by both parties. Such third-party decisions would
have to emanate from a forum which is not suspected of possessing an inherent bias in favor of one party. The negotiations
for the UN Law of the Sea Conference may point out the possi108.
109.
German
standard

See Geiger, supra
Sections 242 and
courts to control
adhesion clasuses

note 92.
315 III of the German Civil Code have been used by
the misuse of superior bargaining power and skill in
(Allgemeine Geschiiftsbedingungen).
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ble outlines of such institutional framework for transnational
legal issues concerning foreign investment. The present evolution of contractual practice and the slow and gradual development of international legal instruments to regulate the activities of TNEs, such as the Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations, '10 may bring about a universal set of principles
guiding transnational investment contracts. These guidelines
will not be the product of a particular set of capital-exporting
countries but rather the result of a universal process of bargaining and consensus-finding.
110. See sources cited note 84 supra.

Selected Legal Issues in the World
Population/Food Equation*
VED

P.

NANDA**

In an incisive commentary' on the World Population Plan
of Action (WPPA) adopted at the U.N. World Population Conference in August 1974,2 an official in the U.N. Population
Division 3 remarked: "A breakthrough has indeed taken place
and a momentum has been created and it is hoped that the
response of the international community, which the Plan of
Action requests, will be commensurate with the task."'
Although some observers have criticized the WPPA as ineffective, 5 it was nonetheless the first international attempt to
articulate a comprehensive global population policy.6 As such,
the opening section of this paper will briefly note the highlights
of the WPPA and will be followed by an equally brief look at
the subsequent developments on the national, regional, and
international population scene, especially the efforts made during the last three years towards the implementation of WPPA.
That discussion will set the stage for the inquiry into the role
of international law and institutions to cope with the problems
created by a global scenario of a growing disequilibrium in the
population and food equation. The concluding section of the
* This article is an adapted version of a paper presented at the Eighth World
Conference on World Law, Manila, The Phillippines, August 24, 1977. I gratefully
acknowledge the assistance of the Denver Public Library in making available the
pertinent U.N. documents and the Hughes Research Fund, which made possible the
research assistance of David Pansius and Robert Kell, third-year law students at the
University of Denver College of Law.
** Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver.
1. Tabbarah, PopulationPolicyIssues in InternationalInstruments: With Special
Reference to the World Population Plan of Action, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 419 (1974).
2. Report of the United Nations World Population Conference, 1974 (Bucharest,
19-30 Aug. 1974) 3-26, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.60/19 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The
Plan].
3. Chief, Population Policy Section of the Population Division at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.
4. Tabbarah, supra note 1, at 452.
5. See, e.g., remarks cited in 69 PRoc. Am. Soc'v INT'L L. 59 (1975).
6. For a discussion of the prior U.N. work in the field see Nanda, The Role of
International Law and Institutions Toward Developing a Global Plan of Action on
Population, 3 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1973).
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paper will offer a set of recommendations to national and international decisionmakers.
I.

THE WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION: SOME HIGHLIGHTS

A.

PopulationPolicies and Socio-Economic Development
The single most noteworthy feature of the WPPA is its
interweaving of the demographic trends, policies, and goals
with political and socio-economic development; population
goals are recognized as "integral parts" of social, economic,
and cultural development.7 The Plan of Action, which "must
be considered . . . as an instrument of the international community for the promotion of economic development, quality of
life, human rights and fundamental freedoms," 8 states as one
of its principles:
Population and development are interrelated: population
variables influence development variables and are also influenced by them; thus the formulation of a World Population Plan
of Action reflects the international community's awareness of the
importance of population trends for socio-economic development, and the socio-economic nature of the recommendations
contained in this Plan of Action reflects its awareness of the
crucial role that development plays in affecting population
trends.9

In one of the recommendations for action, the WPPA further recognizes the central place of economic and social development in the solution of population problems, and states that
the
implementation of the International Development Strategy for
the Second United Nations Development Decade, and the Declaration and the Programme of Action of the New International
Economic Order as adopted at the sixth special session of the
General Assembly should lead to a reduction in the widening gap
in levels of living between developed and developing countries
and would be conducive to a reduction in population growth rates
particularly in countries where such rates are high.'0

It is within this broader context of social and economic
development that six major population variables are identified
in the Plan of Action as constituting the Plan's population
7. The Plan, supra note 2, para. 14(a), at 7.
8. Id. para. 1, at 3.
9. Id. para. 14(c), at 7.
10. Id. para. 68, at 18.
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goals and policies-population growth;" morbidity and mortality;" reproduction, family formation, and the status of
women; 3 population distribution and internal migration;' international migration;"' and population structure. 6
The Plan of Action envisages influencing and affecting
these population variables indirectly by promoting socioeconomic measures and programs 7 and directly by family
planning. 8 Thus, countries wishing to affect fertility levels are
recommended to "give priority to implementing development
programmes and educational and health strategies which,
while contributing to economic growth and higher standards of
living, have a decisive impact upon demographic trends, including fertility."'" Development goals which "generally have
an effect on the socio-economic context of reproductive decisions that tends to moderate fertility levels" are enumerated:
the reduction of infant and child mortality; the full integration
of women into the development process especially by means of
their greater participation in educational, social, economic,
and political opportunities; the promotion of social justice, social mobility and social development; the promotion of wide
educational opportunities for the young; the elimination of
child labor and child abuse, and the establishment of social
security and old-age benefits; and the establishment of an appropriate lower limit for age at marriage. 0
The Plan of Action's emphasis on dealing with population
problems within the overall framework of political, social, and
economic development,2 ' thereby underscoring the close rela11. Id. at9.
12. Id. at 10-11.
13. Id. at 11-14.
14. Id. at 14-16.
15. Id. at 16-17.
16. Id. at 17-18.
17. Id. para. 15(c), at 8.
18. Id. at 11-14.
19. Id. para. 31, at 12. See also Res. XVI, entitled "Population policies," id. at
43-44, which recommends that "population development should be influenced through
educational systems, public health, vocational and technical training and child welfare
and that efforts should be made to obtain the participation of the community in the
solution of the problems that affect it .
Id. at 44.
20. Id. para. 32, at 12.
21. See, e.g., "Policies whose aim is to affect population trends must not be
considered substitutes for socio-economic development policies but as being integrated
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tionship between the size and structure of the population and
the population trends and economic and social development,"
calls for the integration of population measures and programs
"into comprehensive social and economic plans and programmes and this integration should be reflected" in the devel23
opment planning process within the countries.
Among other important features of the Plan of Action, four
will be briefly mentioned here: (1) family planning and the
status of women; (2) internal and international migration; (3)
promotion of knowledge and policies; and (4) recommendations for implementation. Finally, the prominent place of the
principle of national sovereignty in WPPA will be noted.
B. Family Planning and the Status of Women
Three principles articulate the approach adopted in the
Plan of Action: (1) the family as the basic unit of society should
be protected by appropriate legislation and policy;" (2) women
have the right to complete integration in the development process; thus, they should have an equal access to education and
equal participation in social, economic, cultural, and political
life;2" and (3) all
couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and
responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have
the information, education and means to do so; the responsibility
of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into
account the needs of their living and future children, and their
responsibilities towards the community."8

Thus, the promotion of the status of women and the expansion
of their roles in society is a major objective of the Plan of
Action.27

Recommendations for action include a periodic review of
national legislation "having direct bearing on the welfare of the
family and its members, including laws concerning age at marriage, inheritance, property rights, divorce, education, employwith those policies in order to facilitate the solution of certain problems facing both
developing and developed countries and to promote a more balanced and rational
development." Id. para 2, at 4.
22. See, e.g., id. para. 15(b), at 8.
23. Id. para. 95, at 23.

24. Id. para. 14(g), at 7.
25. Id. para. 14(h), at 7.
26. Id. para. 14(f), at 7.

27. Id. para. 15(e), at 9.
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ment and the rights of the child"; the adaptation of national
legislation "to the changing social and economic conditions
and with regard to the cultural setting";" and measures to
protect the social and legal rights and status of spouses and
children in the case of dissolution or termination of marriage,29
30
and in other settings.
The WPPA recommends that all countries:
(a) Respect and ensure, regardless of their over-all demographic goals, the right of persons to determine, in a free, informed and responsible manner, the number and spacing of their
children.
(b) Encourage appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and make available to persons who so desire advice and the means of achieving it.
(c) Ensure that family planning, medical and related social
services aim not only at the prevention of unwanted pregnancies
but also at the elimination of involuntary sterility and subfecundity in order that all couples may be permitted to achieve
their desired number of children, and that child adoption may be
facilitated.3 '

The emphasis in the Plan of Action upon the human rights
approach is evidenced by its invocation of the Proclamation of
the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran in
196832 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 33 and by
its first recommendation on the subject under which all countries, "regardless of their over-all demographic goals," are to
respect and ensure the right of persons to determine the num34
ber and spacing of their children .
C. Internal and InternationalMigration
The WPPA places the problems of internal and interna28. Id.para. 39(c), at 13.
29. Id. para. 39(e), at 13.
30. Id. paras. 40-43, at 14.

31. Id.para. 29(a)-(c), at 11.
32. Cited in id.para. 29, at 11. For the text of the Final Act of the Teheran
Conference see Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran
(22 April to 13 May 1968), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968). The Teheran Conference
urged the United Nations to "give close attention to the implications for the exercise
of human rights of the present rapid increase in world population." Id. at 14-15 (resolution adopted 12 May 1968).
33. Cited inThe Plan, supra note 2, para. 14(m), at 8.
34. Id. para. 29(a), at 11. See also id. para. 78(g), at 21. For a discussion on human
rights aspects of family planing, see Tabbarah, supra note 1, at 435-39; Nanda, supra
note 6, at 15-17.
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tional migration in the human rights context:3" governments
are urged not to infringe on the rights of freedom of movement
and residence within state borders.3 Bilateral and multilateral
consultations are urged to harmonize state policies on international migration.37 Recommendations are made to protect the
basic rights of migrant workers." Special provisions are made
to protect the cultural heritage of permanent immigrants 9 and
to explore the possibilities of granting them national civil
rights. 0 National and international policies are urged to avoid
the "brain drain" of skilled persons from developing to developed countries.4
D. Promotion of Knowledge and Policies
Detailed measures are outlined "to promote knowledge of
the relationships and problems involved, to assist in the development of population policies," 42 and to elicit popular support
to accomplish the objectives of the WPPA. These measures
include: demographic data collection and analysis; extensive
research on demographic and population-related socioeconomic and legal variables; training and education in fields
related to population and dissemination of population information; and development and evaluation of population policies.43
E. Recommendations for Implementation"
National governments and regional and international intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are given
guidelines for their actions to implement the WPPA. The
United Nations is to monitor population trends and policies
and periodically to review and appraise progress made towards
achieving the goals and recommendations of the WPPA.
F. The Prominence of the Principle of National Sovereignty
While the principle of national sovereignty is recognized as
35. The Plan, supra note 2, paras. 46(a), 52-53, 56, 62 (on internal), 50-52 (on
international), at 15-17.
36. Id. para. 46(a), at 15.
37. Id. para. 52, at 16.
38. Id. paras. 55-56, 62, at 16-17.
39. Id. para. 56, at 16.
40. Id. para. 60, at 17.
41. Id. para. 57, at 17.
42. Id. para. 71, at 19.
43. Id. at 19-23.
44. Id. at 24-26.
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the governing norm in the formulation of a nation's population
and population-related policies and programs of action, it is
nonetheless acknowledged that the
effect of national action or inaction in the fields of population
may, in certain circumstances, extend beyond national boundaries; such international implications are particularly evident with
regard to aspects of morbidity, population concentration and international migration, but may also apply to other aspects of
population concern."

However, the Plan of Action goes no further in reminding national governments of their international responsibility. For
while the WPPA specifically states that countries "which consider their birth-rates detrimental to their national purposes
are invited to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing policies that may lead to the attainment of such goals
by 1985,"1 this recommendation is not meant to "interfere
with the sovereignty of any Government to adopt or not to
adopt such quantitative goals."47 That the formulation and
implementation of population policies is the sovereign right of
each nation is the very first principle enunciated in the
WPPA 8 and is in line with the prior pronouncements of the
various United Nations bodies on the subject. 9 A dual principle recognizes the "diversity of conditions within and among
different countries"50 and, therefore, the variety of national
goals with regard to fertility.' These two principles-national
sovereignty and the recognition of diversity among nations-are instrumental in the WPPA's decision to consider
unacceptable any single global approach or set of norms to
population, hence the decision to set neither global population
growth targets nor any world family-size norm.
II.

DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

WPPA

The various United Nations bodies working in the field of
population responded to the Plan of Action by a "considerable
expansion of interest and work." 5 Since the WPPA placed pop45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. para. 99, at 24.
Id. para. 37, at 13.
Id.
Id. para. 14, at 6.
See Nanda, supra note 6, at 33-34.
The Plan, supra note 2, para. 14(i), at 7.
Id. para. 27, at 11.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.9/328, at 5 (1976).

84

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 7:77

ulation problems in a political and socio-economic developmental context, the U.N. Secretary-General reported in November 1976 that the U.N. work, "in such fields as human resources, food and natural resources, environment, health, education, employment, welfare, housing, human rights, political
stability and the status of women, is becoming more explicitly
relevant to the work in population. Conversely, the work in
population is becoming increasingly oriented towards these related fields. ''53 The nature of these activities has led the United
Nations to recognize the need for concerted United Nations
action to promote closer co-ordination. Specifically, the
Secretary-General reported on (1) the population program development, especially the work of the United Nations Secretariat and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities
(UNFPA);54 (2) population dynamics, especially the work of
the U.N. regional commissions in relating population and development and that of the U.N. Population Division in conducting demographic estimates and projections;"5 (3) work in
fertility and family planning, 5 especially the Population Division's activities in planning and conducting research on the
conditions and trends of global fertility and on ways to increase
the effectiveness of family planning programs and the activities
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the
World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations
International Development Organization (UNIDO); and (4)
work in collection and appraisal of population statistics,57 population policy, 58 and communication, education, and information,59 and training programs. 0
At the January 1977 meeting of the U.N. Population Commission, a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), reports were presented on the measures under53. Id. at
54. Id. at
55. Id.at
56. Id.at
57. Id. at
58. Id.at
59. Id.at
60. Id. at

6.
7.
8-12.
13-17.
18-19.
19-20.
20.
20-21.
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taken at the national, regional, and international levels to implement the WPPA.' In January 1976 the U.N. Secretariat
sent a questionnaire to member states on population policies
in the context of development and by November 1976, 107
answers had been received.2 Similarly, the Secretariat also
sought information from the 104 nongovernmental organizations in consultative status with ECOSOC and from 23 intergovernmental organizations on actions taken by them. 3 Many
organizations and states reported on positive action taken in
support of the Plan's implementation. 4
In its draft resolutions, the Population Commission called
for preparation of a manual for national planners65 and for continued studies towards possible establishment of a worldwide
computerized population information service (POPINS). 6 The
Commission considered it desirable to appoint a small ad hoc
group of experts to assist the Secretary-General in the review
and appraisal of the WPPA.6 7 The Commission's medium-term
plan for the years 1978-811s envisages the continuation and expansion of the Commission's activities in light of the WPPA.
Among nongovernmental organizations, many educational, scientific, and religious organizations have focused their
activities on nondemographic objectives of WPPA, 6 while others are concerned primarily with demographic objectives.70 The
activities of the latter cover a wide spectrum-international
scientific research in demography and coordination of national
research in demography, population and law, fertility research,
research in population geography, world fertility survey, statistical development, and the establishment of a coordinated
communications network to build up support for the implementation of WPPA.
61. U.N. Doc. E/CN.9/325 (1976).
62. Population Commission, Report on the 19th Session, 62 U.N. ECOSOC
(Supp. 4) 28, U.N. Doc. E/5913 (1977).
63. Id.at 12.
64. Id. at 9, 12-13.
65. Draft resolution III, id. at 3-4.
66. Draft resolution II, id. at 2-3.
67. Id. at 20-22.
68. Id. at 39-59.
69. U.N. Doc. E/CN.9/325, at 19-26 (1976).
70. Id. at 27-38.
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Actions by intergovernmental organizations 7 ' include
those by. the Council of Europe, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Organization of American States
(OAS), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).
The role of both customary and judge-made law as well as
national legislation in influencing population dynamics is
being increasingly appreciated by states and international governmental and nongovernmental groups interested in the formulation and implementation of population policies.72 However, a survey of recent development in laws affecting fertility
and population growth demonstrates that such laws, especially
in developing countries, are pronatalist and are often "inconsistent not only with the human rights recognized by the
United Nations, but with the governments' own population
policies."73 The author of the survey concludes that a worldwide increasing awareness of these inconsistencies is taking
place, that frequently inconsistent laws are modified when the
states become aware of the inconsistencies, and that from all
available evidence "domestic law changes will continue to increase at an ever more rapid rate until the human right of
family planning becomes a reality throughout the world.""
This indeed is an encouraging development which should be
welcomed even by those who oppose the use of family planning
as a direct means of controlling population growth rates. For
the human right of family planning is not inconsistent with the
statement that family planning alone is "not a solution to the
problems of development and of raising standards of living."75
I1.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A GROWING IMBALANCE BETWEEN
POPULATION AND

FOOD-A

SCENARIO

The preceding discussion highlights the Bucharest consensus. It also shows impressive developments since Bucharest to
implement the World Population Plan of Action. However, all
71. Id. at 39-47.
72. See Kellogg, Reform of Laws Affecting Population Growth: Recent
Developments, 10 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 1, 34-36 (1975).
73. Id. at 36.
74. Id.
75. Population Commission, Report, supra note 62, at 10.
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indications are that, notwithstanding the Bucharest consensus,
population growth rates will not appreciably decline in a large
number of countries, most of which happen to be developing
and many of which are already food deficient."
The world population was estimated approximately at 2
billion in 1930, at 2.5 billion in 1950, at 3 billion in 1960, and
at 4 billion in 1975. According to the current U.N. projections,
using the medium variant, it would rise to 6.25 billion by the
end of the century. If the constant variant (keeping constant
1970 fertility levels for all countries during 1970-2000) were
used, the projected figure in the year 2000 would be 7.15 billion,
while the low variant and high variant figures would be 5.84
billion and 6.64 billion respectively." Although there are some
recent indications that the fertility rate has begun to decline
in many third world countries" and the improvement in mortality rates is being maintained at a much slower rate than had
been expected,79 these trends are so recent that no definitive
conclusions can be drawn. Also, reportedly there has been a
slight rise in the overall fertility level in Africa."0
During the past decade the rate of population growth in
developing countries was 2.4 percent annually, compared with
1.0 percent for developed countries.8 ' Unless the developing
countries slow their population growth rates, there is likely to
remain a precarious food/population balance, for otherwise a
significant portion of the annual growth in their food production will be offset by the growth in population. Also, there is
no guarantee that food production will increase from 3% to
4% per year over the next twenty-five years, a prerequisite
to combat hunger."2 Recently the Declaration of Principles
adopted at the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat) noted that the human problems would be further aggravated as a result of the "[w]orld population growth
76. See Tables I & 11 infra. The statistics in this section are based on reports in
WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS AS ASSESSED IN 1973, U.N. Doc.
(1977) [hereinafter cited as WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS].
77. WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra note 76, at 14-15.

ST/ESA/SER.A/60

78. Population Commission, Report, supra note 62, at 7.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 8.
81. See U.N. Doc. E/CONF.65/3, at 30 (1974).
82. Newsreport, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and National Research Council, Aug. 1977, at 4.
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trends which indicate that numbers of mankind in the next
twenty-five years would double, thereby more than doubling
the need for food, shelter and all other requirements for life
and human dignity which are at the present inadequately met
. ,""'Thus, if food and population are not brought into

.

balance, the spectre of hunger and malnutrition will haunt
mankind, and WPPA's objective of making mankind's future
bright will be illusory."' International law and institutions do
offer the necessary framework to meet this challenge.
IV.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN
BALANCING THE POPULATION/FOOD EQUATION

Short Term Solution-the Food Component5
Although the problems of population growth present challenges which can only be met in a long term setting, the more
urgent and immediate problem of hunger can and must be
attacked on a short term basis. The main aspects of the hunger
problem are that (1) a significant percentage of the world's
population currently lives on a precarious balance between
subsistence and starvation; 6 and (2) the potential for disaster
A.

83. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.70/15, at 3 (1976) (emphasis deleted).
84. See The Plan, supra note 2, para. 14(a), at 7.
85. See generally Nanda, The World Food Crisis and the Role of Law in Com bating Hunger and Malnutrition, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 725 (1975).
86. Admittedly, the current grain outlook, at least on a short term basis, is quite
favorable when viewed in terms of total world production. U.S. Department of Agriculture, World Grain Stocks Forecast at Record in 1978, FOREIGN AGRICULTURE 12 (May

23, 1977). However, production increases have yet to occur in those nations that most
require them. As a result, if current projections prove true, developing nations will
become increasingly dependent on food imports from developed nations (see note 88
infra).
Cereal deficits in developing market economies 1969-1971
and 1985, as assessed at the World Food Conference
Major cereals
(millions of tons)
Wheat
1969-1971
1985

Rice
1969-1971

1985

Coarse grains
1969-1971
1989

Total
1969-1971

1995

Developing market
economy regions
Africa

-

2

-

Latin America

-

4

-13

Near East

-

6

-

Asia and Far East

-

a

Total

-20

3

1

-1
+

6

+ 3

- 2

-9

-19

-

-39

3

1

-

1

-17

-

+17

+ 4

+ 6

-

-14
-

-

-20

-

-13

-1O

-49

+ 7

-27

-16

-_5

+ 8

4

6

-21

Joint Report of the Secretariats of the United Nations, the International Labour
Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the
World Bank, Social and Institutional Reform as a Means of IncreasingDomestic Food
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inherent in this balance is magnified by two related economic
problems:
(a) the inability of the less developed countries (LDCs) to
advance economic growth in general,87 and food production in
particular,M and
Production and DistributingIt Equitably among the Population, ECOSOC 6, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.5/537 (1976).
Given such dependence on developed nation breadbaskets, a shortfall in production in a major producing area such as North America, when combined with the limited
purchasing power of the LDCs (see notes 89-91 infra) exposes these economically poorer
nations to a potential food disaster far greater than the famines of the 1972-1973. See
id. at 4-7.
87. With the exception of the OPEC nations, economic growth varies inversely
with the severity of a nation's poverty.
Percent Growth Per Capita GNP
19501960

19601970

19701974

Petroleum Exporters

3.1

3.2

8.3

Fast Growing Exporters of Manufacturers

3.3

5.0

4.6

1974 per capita GNP greater than $400

2.0

2.3

4.2

GNP between $400 and $200

2.0

2.3

2.5

Per capita GNP less than $200

1.3

1.4

-0.4

UNCTAD, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS 1976, at
339, U.N. Doc. TD/Stat. 6 [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD, HANDBOOK OF STATISTiCS].
88. At the gross level, food production in LDCs has grown at a rate approximately
equal to that of the developed nations.
Growth Rate of Total Food Production
19611970

19701975*

Developed market economics

2.6

2.2

Developing economics (total)
Latin America
West Asia
South & Southeast Asia
Africa

2.8
3.1
3.3
2.6
2.9

2.0
2.3
3.3
2.2
0.7

* 1975 data preliminary

UNCTAD, HANDBOOK

OF STATISTICS, supra note 87, at 376.
However, when food production is computed on a per capita basis, it becomes
evident that population growth has more than eliminated any growth in food production.

90

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 7:77

Growth Rate of Per Capita Food Production
19611970
Developed Market Economies

1.5

Developing Economies (total)
Latin America
West Asia
South & Southeast Asia
Africa
* 1975 data preliminary

0.2
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.4

19701975*
1.3
-0.4
-0.3
0.7
-0.3
-1.9

Id. at 377. See Burki & Goering, Food Problems of the Low-Income Countries, FI-

& DEv. 15 (June 1977).
As a result LDCs now export less food and must import more from the developed
nations.

NANCE

Percentage of World Food Imports coming from:
Developed
Market

Developing

1955

48.7

42.6

1965

56.7

34.0

1973

65.1

27.0

Percentage of World Food Exports going to:
Developed
Market

Developing

1955

72.6

18.9

1965

69.6

18.8

1973

71.6

17.8

Percentage of Developing Country food imports coming from:
Developed
Market

Developing

1955

54.1

41.4

1965

58.7

32.4

64.2

26.3

1973

Percentage of Developing Country food exports going to:
Developed
Market

Developing

1955

79.0

18.4

1965

71.7

17.9

1973

73.5

17.4

UNCTAD, IANDBOOK

OF STATISnCS, supra

note 87, at 80, 82, 88, 90.
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(b) the continued growth in the disparity of income between rich and poor nations"' which would, and has, limited the
ability of poor nations to purchase needed food supplies in time
of food shortage. 0
89. Besides the Table at note 87 supra, note also the declining share of LDC
participation in the world export market in general.
Percentage Share of World Exports
LDC
Non-OPEC

Major
Petroleum
Exporters

1950

24.3

6.2

1955

18.1

7.0

1960

14.7

6.6

1965

13.0

6.3

1968

11.8

6.2

1969

11.7

5.9

1970

11.4

5.5

1971

10.4

6.3

1972

10.3

6.0

1973

10.7

6.7

1974

10.3

14.9

1975

9.7

13.0

Id. at 37.
90. The income disparity between rich and poor, combined with the failure of
LDCs to maintain their share of the world export market has not only increased LDCs'
trade deficits in gross terms, but the percent of imports uncompensated by exports has
also risen.
Trade Balance (Exports minus Imports)
Non-OPEC, developing countries
(billions $)
Total

Percent of
imports

1950-1952

-

1.72

-

1954-1956

-

2.40

-12.4

1959-1961

-

4.55

-19.7

1964-1966

-

6.24

-20.3

1969

-

7.51

-19.0

1970

-

8.64

-19.5

9.5
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To forestall the inevitable disaster which will result from the
continued deterioration of the food/population equation, certain emergency measures are required. These measures must
go beyond mere loans-many countries already face severe
debt management problems." Direct infusions of real resources
are required in order to bolster LDCs' economies generally, and
food production in particular.
Several strategies are available which will be conveniently
categorized as intergovernmental, national, and nongQvernmental.
(1) International intergovernmental strategies: On the
international level the efforts of such U.N. organizations as the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Consultative
1971

-12.99

-26.4

1972

-11.24

-21.0

1973

-12.06

-16.5

1974

-30.24

-26.1

1975

-39.03

-31.7

Id. at 30. See IMF SuRvEY, Sept. 20, 1976, at 273-76.
91. The trade deficits cited in note 90 supra have yielded corresponding debt
burdens which in some instances threaten the very solvency of the nation.
Service Payments on Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt
Billions of dollars
1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

All Non-OPEC LDCs

4.7

5.0

5.9

8.0

10.6

Fast Growing Exporters

1.0

1.3

1.6

2.1

2.3

All Remaining LDCs

3.7

3.7

4.3

5.9

8.3

LDCs with less than $200
per capita GNP

1.0

1.0

1.2

1.3

1.6

UNCTAD,

supra note 87, at 272. See Third World Debt

HANDBOOK OF STATISTrCS,

(editorial), Wall St. J., June 7, 1977, at 20; Beim, Rescuing the LDCs, 55 FOREIGN
AFFmS 717 (1977); Payer, Third World Loans Might Make Our Banks Beggars, 20 Bus.
& Soc. R. 56 (1976)
Some recent commentaries have noted a temporary easing of the debt problem
among some countries. ECONOMIST, April 16, 1977, at 91. Cleveland & Brittain, Are the
LDCs in Over Their Heads?, 55 FOREIGN AFFRmS 732 (1977). However, this trend offers
no assurance that at the time.of the next shortfall in food production those LDCs
experiencing debt difficulties will have recovered to the extent that they will be able
to approach private lending sources for the additional funds required for major emergency food purchases.
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Group on Food Production and Investment, the World Food
Council, the International Fund for Agricultural Development,
and the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research all exhibit international concern for the food problem.
Some of these organizations have already generated significant
results.2 However, broader economic organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank can
also focus their concerns more, if not predominantly, on the
need for food production. For example, IMF which is generally
more concerned with balance of payments problems than with
economic development can nonetheless help to forestall a food
emergency by establishing special credit which can be used by
LDCs who, for whatever reason, are forced to import substantial quantities of food. This "food facility" would arise from the
same policy objective, the desire to protect exporters of primary products, which spawned the Compensatory Financing
Facility. 3 Possibly funds for the food facility can be supplied
out of the new emergency-oriented "Witteveen Fund."94 However, the strict IMF economic supervision which results from
using such extraordinary financing facilities95 should not be
imposed on food facility uses. Often IMF economic policies are
contrary to those of recipient nations and can impose a deterrent to IMF borrowing. Whereas in the normal case, such
restrictions may well be justified so that IMF can ensure that
efforts are taken to redress economic imbalances, the same
rationales do not apply in the case of a food emergency. A food
92. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Kriesberg, World Food Conference: Two

Years Later, FOREIGN AGRICULTURE 12 (Mar. 7, 1977); U.N. Monthly Chronicle 37 (July
1977); International Co-operation and Co-ordination within the United Nations System: Annual Report of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination for 1975-1976,
Part 2, ECOSOC, 29-34, U.N. Doc. E/5803/Add. 1 (May 12, 1976).
93. The Compensatory Financing Facility is designed to compensate exporters of
primary products who experience shortfalls in exports. In the case of disasters or major
emergencies financing under this facility can be increased. IMF SURVEY, SUPPLEMENT
ON THE FUND

3 (Fall 1976).

94. In the case of the Compensatory Financing Facility credits are granted only
if the IMF is satisfied that "the member will cooperate with the Fund in an effort to
find appropriate solutions for the balance of payments difficulties." Id.
95. See C. PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE IMF AND THE THIRD WORLD (1974).
96. The "Witteveen" Supplementary Financing Facility was created through contributions of richer nations, including OPEC nations. The facility is designed to meet
severe balance of payments problems. Credits are received only with accompanying
severe IMF supervision. IMF SURVEY, August 15, 1977, at 257; ECONOMIST, August 13,
1977, at 67.
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shortage, unlike a general export shortfall, does not derive so
much from improper local monetary policies as it does from a
broad imbalance of food production resources and reserves.
The proper response to nations who must use the food facility
is, rather, intensified food development in these shortfall countries by international and national development agencies.
Efforts at developing local food production offer the best
prevention against food emergencies. Fortunately IMF's sister
organization, the World Bank, has expressly adopted a purposeful policy of increasing such local production of food.97 The
percentage of World Bank funds spent on agriculture is expected to rise from 11% in the mid-sixties to 34.5% by the late
seventies."
(2) National strategies: On the national level, individual
developed nations can offer direct aid, either money or technical expertise, to LDCs to help their food efforts.9 9 Specifically,
the Arab countries which have recently formed their own MiniIMF1e° may wish to concentrate on more agricultural projects,
such as the $550 million project to develop agriculture in the
Sudan."'
(3) Nongovernmental strategies: Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, individual businesses can play a predominant role in stimulating food production. With agriculture in
LDCs often plagued by underinvestment, the potential for
money profit as well as social profit is great. 02 Business leaders
97. Burki & Goering, supra note 91.
98. Id. at 44.
99. As an example of an initial step in this direction see, e.g., Foreign Assistance
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 8(a), 88 Stat. 1796 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §2182a
(Supp. IV 1974)).
100. See ECONOMIST, April 23, 1977, at 92.
101. Wall St. J., May 17, 1977, at 10.
102. For example, consider the marginal productivity of fertilizer in less developed
nations as compared with their more industrialized partners.
Comparison for the period 1953 to 1973

Increase in grain production
(millions of tons)
Increase in fertilizer consumption
(millions of tons)
Apparent response ratio
(tons of grain produced per
ton of fertilizer applied)

Developed

Developing

344.0

252.0

44.1

7.8

15.96

15.8
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must strive to develop food technologies that are suited for the
target region. Too often the North American style of mass food
production is inappropriate for undercapitalized and underdeveloped nations.' 3 Individual nations can aid this process by
creating incentives for business to develop technologies suited
for these less developed regions.' 4 Expanded cooperative ventures between international intergovernmental organizations
and the private sector offer great promise.' 5
In conclusion, the first step which must be taken is a recognition by everyone-international organizations, nation states,
and private businesses-that the food problem is everyone's
responsiblity. Considerations of national interest which often
dictate restricted and protectionist national policies must be
abandoned in a comprehensive effort to direct agricultural capital to those nations with the greatest need. ' °1
US. Policy and World Food Needs: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on International
Organizations and Movements and on Foreign Economic Policy of the Comm. on
ForeignAffairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1974). Fortunately fertilizer capacity in LDCs
has increased markedly in recent years. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Kayser, Some

Fertilizer Importers May Be Future Exporters,

FOREIGN AGRICULTURE

15 (April 25,

1977).
103. The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. E/5000/Rev.1, ST/ESA/6 (1974); Massignon,
Rural Development in the Third World: A vital need and challenge to Aid Programmes, 67 OECD OBsERvFR 35, 37 (Dec. 1973); 1. Palmer, SCIENCE AND AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION (UNRISD Report No. 72-8, 1972).
104. Unfortunately to date many changes in the U.S. tax laws, for example, have
discouraged participation in overseas ventures. New measures increasing the taxes on
U.S. employees working abroad are particularly onerous. Tax Reform Act of 1976, §
1011, amending I.R.C. §§ 36, 911. See Wall St. J., July 27, 1977, at 1. Least understandable, however, is the repeal of special tax advantages for investments in less
developed nations. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 1022, amending I.R.C. § 1248(d)(3). The
rationale for repealing the provision was that the Congress doubted that the provision
provided any real incentives to invest in LDCs. Committee on Taxation, General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 230 (1976). However,
rather than draft a new more effective provision, Congress eliminated the tax incentive
entirely.
105. Private co-financing of development projects with the World Bank has provided a means to prompt private lending where absent the public participation, the
risk would be too great for the private lender alone. Hornstein, Cofinancing of Bank
and IDA Projects, FINANCE & DEV. 40 (June 1977).
106. For example, back during the food crises of the early 70's the United States
restricted fertilizer exports so that domestic farmers would have first crack at this
scarce input. Grant, Food, Fertilizerand the Global Politics of Resource Scarcity, 420
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLmCAL & SOC. SCI. 11, 20 (1975). U.S. trade and aid policies
exhibit a lack of visionary focus which would ensure an equitable worldwide distribution of food. Restrictive export policies can keep valuable grains at home when they
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B.

Long Term Solution-the Population Component
As noted earlier, the World Population Plan of Action
(WPPA) did acknowledge that national action or inaction in
the fields of population had international implications, 7 but
offered no guidelines to balance national sovereignty and international responsibility. It also failed to explore the nature of
any action the international community would be authorized
to take to prevent and deter the adverse effects of national
action or inaction transcending national boundaries.
It is submitted that, notwithstanding the acceptance of
national sovereignty as the basic tenent of the contemporary
international system, there are substantial reasons why national population problems must not be considered to fall
within the reserved domain of a state under Article 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter which enshrines this concept.'"" The
subject of population has now become a matter of international concern, because of the expectations created by the
flow of events within the United Nations over the past decade.
A few examples follow.
The U.N. record demonstrates that a substantial segment
of the U.N. membership has either gone on record at the deliberations of the various U.N. bodies and regional commissions
in favor of concerted international regional and national action
to lower fertility rates or has undertaken unilateral or bilateral
measures to do so.
U.N. Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, and his predecessor, U Thant, repeatedly expressed concern over the international nature of the problems arising out of rapid population
growth. To illustrate, seven years ago, U Thant said: "World
attention has now been focused on the realities of the demographic situation and it remains for the United Nations, the
specialized agencies and other international bodies to exert the
are most needed abroad. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hathway, The Relationship
Between Trade and Food Security, FOREIGN AGRICULTURE 10 (June 6, 1977). Similarly
the Public Law 480 food aid programs operate only after domestic requirements have
been satisfied. GAO Report to Congress, Comptroller General of the United States,
The Overseas Food Donation Program-ItsConstraintsand Problems 244, 264 (Apr.
21, 1975).
107. The Plan, supra note 2, para. 99, at 7.
108. The author has drawn upon his earlier work, note 6 supra.
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leadership required."''
tember 20, 1972:

9

Similarly Kurt Waldheim said on Sep-

Population, development and environment make up an important element in the construction of a new economic and social
order which, along with the maintenance of peace, constitutes the
principal challenge of our generation. The United Nations is
again taking the leadership . .

.

0

Appeals for slowing population growth have been made by
various U.N. organs and bodies, including the World Bank"'
and WHO,"' and a number of U.N. organizations have under3
taken programs to assist national family planning efforts."
Additionally, since pressures of population in a state or
region may not only lead to discontent, aggressive behavior,
and alienation,"' but are also likely to cause political instability, social unrest, and internal disorders," 5 they might endanger international peace and security either by involving or affecting neighboring states or by involving outside powers, especially major powers, in internal conflict. Pressures of population are likely to encroach upon the right of the individual by
restricting his or her freedom by the likely imposition of
stricter regulations, and by impeding the attainment of the
quality of life as enunciated in the U.N. Human Rights Program, especially in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights."'
It is evident from the past experience that Article 2(7) is
to be interpreted in a contextual setting. For example, its interpretation at the United Nations has varied over time on the
109. 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 124, U.N. Doc. A/8001 (1970).
110. 16/17 POPULATION NEWSL-rrER 41 (Summer 1972).
111. U.N. Doc. E/CN.9/328, at 13, 15 (1976).

112. Id. at 14, 15.
113. Id. at 13-17; Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, Population Policies and Programmes, 2 The Population
Debate: Dimensions and Perspectives, Papers at the World Population Conference,
Bucharest, 1974, at 583, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/57/Add.1 (1975).
114. L. LEVI & L. ANDERSSON, PSYCHOSOCIAL STRESS: POPULATION, ENVIRONMENT
AND QUALITY OF LIFE xii (1975).
115. See, e.g., S. HARTLEY, POPULATION: QUANTITY VS. QuAuTY 275-87 (1972);

Choucri, Political Implications of Population Dynamics: A Critical Assessment, 2 The
Population Debate: Dimensions and Perspectives, Papers at the World Population
Conference, Bucharest, 1974, at 606, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/57/Add. 1 (1975).
116. For the text of the covenant see 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966).
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issues of human rights, especially apartheid and colonialism.
While in the early discussions at the United Nations on these
questions there was strong support among the membership to
deny the organization a right to intervene, thus treating the
matter as one of domestic jurisdiction, a marked shift seems to
have occurred, especially during the 1970s. Hence, these
human rights issues are no longer considered to fall under the
umbrella of Article 2(7) and have been transformed into matters of international concern. A similar situation seems to be
emerging regarding the subject of population.
It is realized that the relabeling of population issues as
essentially a matter of "international concern" instead of
"national concern" offers no guarantee that national and international responses will be accordingly affected. Prior U.N. experience provides ample teaching that the collective sanctioning process is likely to be inadequate and ineffective. For example, South Africa has flouted all U.N. resolutions and declarations on apartheid, and sanctions against South Africa and
Rhodesia have had little, if any, impact on those countries. The
focus here, however, is not on compelling compliance through
sanctions but on reaching certain goals through the treatment
of population as a problem of international concern. These
goals include the enhancement of a worldwide awareness of
the gravity of the problem; further refinement of the WPPA
and further improvement and strengthening of means of implementation; and the development of national population policies and programs.
The U.N. system seems to offer the best prospect for dealing with the global issues of population. However, in order to
be effective, the U.N. machinery responsible for handling these
issues will have to be strengthened, and the United Nations
and its specialized agencies will have to expand their capability
and activities in their respective fields so as to relate them to
population and family planning. The need is obvious for adequate funding and the pooling of all available international
resources in the population field. Extensive technical and financial assistance to the needy states will be required. The following proposed institutional changes are illustrative of the
changes needed to effectuate further improvement and
strengthening of the existing machinery:
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1. The establishment of a global population agency,
headed by a U.N. High Commissioner on Population.
2. The proposed population agency should be closely related to the U.N. environmental program.
3. The proposed agency should coordinate all current
U.N. efforts of demographic and family planning research and
assistance, with primary emphasis on:
a. initiating and promoting practical research on
population, especially focusing on the needs of the developing
countries and coordinating its activities with the U.N. development efforts and other efforts in dealing with resources, especially food, and environmental problems;
b. providing training to personnel with the U.N. system and personnel selected from those engaged in national
population programs on various aspects related to the population field, such as health, development of human resources,
and urban and rural development planning;
c. acting as an advisor to the various U.N. regional
and national agencies in formulating population policies, programs, projects and strategies; and
d. acting as a clearing house for all U.N. related population activities.
4. The proposed agency should establish a set of priorities in research and action programs and should benefit from
the prior work of the Population Commission in this regard.
5. The population agency should organize periodic world
population conferences on the pattern of the earlier world conferences and should encourage the holding of regional conferences.
6. Regional and national population agencies should be
established to effectuate the global population strategy.
7. A U.N. World Population Institute should be established.
This proposal opts for incentives instead of coercion and
enforcement machinery..In problem situations, such as the refusal of a state or a number of states to become a part of this
global venture, or the continued upward spiral of population
growth in a state or a number of states in one or more regions
despite the encouragement and active assistance of global and
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regional institutions, the High Commissioner on Population
could be required to bring the matter to the attention of the
U.N. General Assembly, the specialized agencies, and the regional and national entities established to deal with the problem.
Among other measures which could be taken to effectuate
the compliance of a recalcitrant state, the World Bank, WHO,
and donor countries could use their aid programs as leverage
to bring about changes in recipients' population policies. An
initial step would be to direct the recipients' attention to the
need for identifying national population growth and national
population goals in the context of national economic and social
development goals, followed by the offer of appropriate technical and financial assistance to the existing national programs
to slow down the rate of population growth and for the development of new such programs. Admittedly, it is not too farfetched
to argue that if persuasion and encouragement, accompanied
by widespread dissemination of information and active assistance were to prove futile, it might become necessary to consider
the use of enforcement and coercive measures. After all, some
states have already experimented with curbing by involuntary
methods the traditional unrestricted freedom to procreate on
the premise that parenthood is no longer a right but a privilege
and that if voluntary means do not succeed, there is no alternative but to resort to coercive measures. At this stage, however,
any discussion of the nature of such measures in the international arena is at best highly speculative.
V.

CONCLUSION

It seems imperative that global food and population policies be implemented by concerted national, regional, and international action. To effectuate implementation, the existing
institutions need to be further strengthened and improved.
Additionally, the existing institutions and mechanisms need to
be supplemented by the creation of new ones to deal with specific situations.
Ideally, the entire global ecosystem should be managed as
a unit. The implementation of global food and population policies and plans of action are necessary first steps to reach that
ideal and indeed appear essential to our quest for survival.
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TABLE 1 WORLD POPULATION GROWTH ACCORDING TO FOUR VARIANTS OF

PROJECTIONS, 1950-2000
Medium
variant
Year or
period
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

Low
variant

Constant
variant

Population
(millions)

..................
..................
..................
..................
..................
. . .. .. .. . ... .. I . ..
.. .. .. .. .. . .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. . ... . ..
.. .. .. .. .. . .. .. ..
..................
..................

1950-1955 ..............
1955-1960 ..............
1960-1965 ..............
1965-1970 ..............
1970-1975 ..............
1975-1980 ..............
1980-1985 ..............
1985-1990 ..............
1990-1995 ..............
1995-2000 ..............

High
variant

2 501
2 722
2 986
3 288
3 610
3 968
4 374
4 817
5 280
5 763
6 254

3 610
3 981
4 414
4 907
5 445
6 024
6 638

3
3
4
4
5
5
5

610
949
316
697
089
473
840

3 610
3 980
4 428
4 959
5579
6 302
7 153

verage annual rate of growth
(percentage)
1.69
1.85
1.93
1.87
1.89
1.95
1.95
2.06
1.93
2.12
1.84
2.08
1.75
2.02
1.64
1.94

Note: Population figures for 1950, 1955, 1960 and 1965 were estimated
retrospectively.
Source: World Population Prospects as assessed in 1973, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/SER.A/60, at 14 (1977).
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NOTE
THE ANTITRUST LEGALITY OF
TERRITORIAL ALLOCATIONS BETWEEN
A U.S. PARENT CORPORATION AND
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY
ENTERPRISES
DAVID

K.

PANSIUS*

Laws developed to address the common and ordinary business situation frequently fail to serve the economic realities of
new or different circumstances. A case in point is our body of
antitrust laws well-tuned toward limiting the powers of large
corporations to restrict competition among themselves, but illsuited to meet the needs of small enterprises attempting to
break into industries dominated by such giants.'
This discrimination against small businesses arises from
the per se rules of antitrust liability. The purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition. Based on this premise the
customary test of legality for a given restraint is whether under
the circumstances it unreasonably impacts on competition.2
This rule of reason test, however, can require sophisticated
economic judgments. In order, thus, to avoid such unpleasantly complex economic issues the courts developed per se
antitrust rules. Rather than examine in detail the economic
impact of all restraints, the courts designated certain restraints
*

B.A., 1971, M.A., 1973, University of North Carolina; J.D. candidate, 1978,

University of Denver.
1. See Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975); Note, TerritorialRestrictions and Per Se Rules-A Reevaluation of the Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L. REv. 616 (1970)(arguing that
territorial restrictions should be permitted where the effect is to increase competition
in the marketplace). But see Louis, Vertical DistributionalRestraints under Schwinn
and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of the Per Se Approach, 75 MICH.
L. REv. 275, 286-87 (1976); Note, InternationalJoint Ventures and Section One of
the Sherman Act: Per Se as the Meaningful Standard, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 689 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as InternationalJoint Ventures].
2. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
3. "The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic
problems." United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
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as having such a "pernicious effect on competiton [that they]
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal . . . ."I Consequently, once a per se practice has been
so identified, the court need no longer analyze the competitive
effects of the restraint in order to determine if such a practice
should be permitted; per se restraints are conclusively illegal.5
Although the per se rules ease the analytical burden on the
judiciary,' the practical effect can be to deny small enterprises
the use of certain "anticompetitive" devices, which can greatly
aid their efforts to enter new markets thereby increasing competition in the industry.'
Perhaps the grossest and most inequitable example of the
harmful effect of United States per se rules on small enterprises
is their impact on less developed countries (LDCs) seeking
technology and investment from the United States. 8 For example, developing nations offer low labor costs and in some instances proximity to foreign markets that would aid U.S. manufacturers seeking to enhance their share of the U.S. or world
market.' However, most developing nations also require, or at
least strongly encourage, that enterprises established by for4. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
5. The strict per se rules of modem antitrust law establish a conclusive presumption that a particular kind of action has improper anticompetitive effects, and this presumption governs regardless of whether the
particular conduct has been proved to have those consequences.
Moraine Products v. I.C.I. America, Inc. 538 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 941 (1976).
Consequently, "for the purposes of determining the existence of a per se antitrust
violation, market analysis and questions of evil or laudatory motive are irrelevant."
In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1976).
6. In fact the simplifying features of the rule isits principal appeal:
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of
restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the
benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in
an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See Jacobi v. Bache & Co.,
Inc., 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
7. See note 1 supra. See also Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixingand Market Divison, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Note, HorizontalTerritorial
Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 457 (1971).
8. Friedmann, Antitrust Law and Joint InternationalBusiness Ventures in Economically Underdeveloped Countries, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 780 (1960).
9. See Rose, Why the Multinational Tide is Ebbing, FORTUNE, Aug. 1977, at 112.
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eign technology be controlled by local interests.'" Consequently, a U.S. firm seeking to establish a manufacturing
branch in a less developed nation generally must face the prospect that its investment, although yielding short term profits,
may also create a potential competitor." A partial solution is
for the parent and its offspring to agree not to compete by
allocating sales territories between each other. Unfortunately,
despite the apparent reasonableness of this territorial market
allocation, the scheme would violate the per se rules of U.S.
antitrust liability," if the restraint substantially affects the
foreign commerce of the United States. 3
This article examines the legality of territorial market allocations between a U.S. parent and partially owned subsidraries
in LDCs. The primary thesis is that, although all market allocations were illegal per se in the past, a logical extrapolation
of the recent Supreme Court Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc. '" decision to the international arena would permit territorial market allocations restricting the exports of
newly created LDC businesses where the effect of the restraint
is to enable these new enterprises to be formed in the first
place. Although Continental TV only stands for the limited
10. See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 8, at 781, 786; MacDonald, Recent Legislation in Nigeria and Ghana Affecting ForeignPrivate Direct Investment, 6 INT'L L. 548
(1972); Ness, Brazil: Local Equity Participationin Multinational Enterprises, 6 L.
& POL. INT'L Bus. 1017 (1974); Zamora, Andean Common Market-Regulation of
Foreign Investments: Blueprint for the Future?, 10 INT'L L. 153 (1976).
11. Goekjian, Legal Problems of Transferring Technology to the Third World, 25
AM. J. COMP. L. 565, 568 (1977).
12. See the discussion of illegal market restraints in Joelson & Griffin,
Multinational Joint Ventures and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 487
(1975); InternationalJoint Ventures, supra note 1. See also note 18 infra.
13. Because of the jurisdictional requirement that an international market restraint have a substantial impact on the foreign commerce of the United States, the
narrow issue for review is the legality of the market division insofar as it affects imports
into and exports from the United States. Timberline Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945); Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdictionof the Antitrust Laws, 43 ABA
ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (1974). A market division between foreign companies which does
not include the United States would lack sufficient impact on U.S. commerce to
warrant jurisdiction. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976); MEMORANDUM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING ANTITRUST AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, [1977] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,129, at 55,209-10 (1972);
Fugate, InternationalDistribution Agreements, 43 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 540, 542
(1974).
14. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
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rule that a franchisor can allocate territories among his franchisees, the rationale of the opinion supports this international
exception to the rule against territorial restraints.
In order to focus the analysis the following hypothetical
fact situation is posited: Alpha Company manufactures and
exports machine tools from the United States. Alpha has 20%
of the United States domestic market, 30% of the U.S. export
market, and 10% of the world export market. Because of increasing labor and material costs, Alpha wishes to establish
Betas, related companies in LDCs that would manufacture and
export machine tools under the Alpha brand name. Alpha
would maintain some equity interest in each new company,
would receive fees for management services provided to each
company, but as required by local law would not control either
the management or the voting stock of any of the newly created
Betas. To protect itself from the competition of its Betas, and
to protect the Betas from competition between themselves,
Alpha proposes an allocation of markets between Alpha and
its progeny, limiting the sales of each to a specific geographic
market. Disregarding the effect of patent laws'5 and other
laws relating to industrial property rights,'" would such a
scheme survive an attack based on a violation of the Sherman
Act?' 7
THE TIMKEN PRECEDENT

If the Alpha/Beta agreement involved domestic commerce
alone, there would be little doubt that the agreement would not
survive the per se rule against territorial market allocations.'
Does the same conclusive presumption of illegality apply to
international commerce as well? Some have argued that it
should not." Whereas the anticompetitive effects of domestic
15. See note 139 infra.
16. See notes 131 & 139 infra.
17. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
... 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
18. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
19. Among those arguing for such a distinction are Carlston, Antitrust Policy
Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 713, 717-21 (1955); Friedmann, supra note 8, at 789-90;
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST

LAWS 77-83 (1955).
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market allocations are known and predictable, the challenges
of competing in international markets may present unique
demands on enterprises requiring market divisions in order
that these enterprises might successfully compete. Since market allocations could have a net procompetitive impact when
utilized in international commerce, per se rules of conclusive
illegality are inappropriate to judge these restraints of foreign
trade. Unfortunately, however, no court has yet to adopt the
thesis that foreign commerce requires a relaxation of domestic
per se rules.'" The rule appears to be that all market divisions,
including international market divisions, are conclusively illegal. 2 Presumably, the Alpha/Beta agreement as structured
above is therefore illegal as well.
The Continental TV decision, however, may permit a contrary result-at least as applies to the Alpha/Beta model.
Continental TV creates two possible avenues by which the
Alpha/Beta allocations can avoid the per se ban and survive
antitrust attack. First, the rationale of the opinion supports the
broad hypothesis that the per se rule against domestic market
allocations is inappropriate when considering international
commerce. Second, and perhaps more useful, Continental TV's
limited exception to the per se territorial rule, when considered
along with other precedent, may itself be broad enough to exempt the Alpha/Beta agreement from per se analysis. Once the
rule of reason test is applied, presumably the procompetitive
impact of the agreement will justify the market allocations. 2
Before addressing these escapes, however, one must first
inspect the per se prison. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
20. InternationalJoint Ventures, supra note 1, at 706-07.
21. Essentially the argument is that a per se restraint such as market allocation
is irrefutably anticompetitive; therefore, the setting in which it is employed is irrelevant. Id. at 713-28.
When judging the propriety of efforts to cartelize an industry, the argument
against relaxing antitrust rules in international commerce is persuasive. However,
when judging restraints employed to gain a foothold in the market, the same per se
standards should not be applied. An international market, particularly one dominated
by a cartel outside of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction, poses far greater barriers to entry than
exist domestically. Restraints designed to facilitate entry into new markets therefore
should be permitted. The existing per se rules, however, permit no distinction between
territorial restraints aimed at creating a cartel and restraints aimed at competing with
that cartel.
22. See text accompanying notes 50-52 infra and note 21 supra.
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States 3 perhaps best exhibits the general rule that the per se
territorial allocation ban applies equally to international commerce. 4 In Timken, British, French, and American Timken,
through a combination of market allocations and price controls, effectively divided the world market. Although the Court
found "an aggregation of trade restraints, 2' 5 the principal purpose of these restraints was to effect a division of territories
between the three competitors." The Court held this division
to be plainly illegal.Y In so ruling the Court rejected the notion
that antitrust standards are different in foreign commerce, at
least when industry leaders are involved:
[Tihe provisions in the Sherman Act against restraints of foreign trade are based on the assumption, and reflect the policy,
that export and import trade in commodities is both possible and
desirable. Those provisions of the Act are wholly inconsistent
with appellant's argument that American business must be left
free to participate in internationalcartels, that free commerce in
goods must be sacrificed in order to foster export of American
dollars for investment in foreign factories which sell abroad."8
23. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
24. Among the first indications that the antitrust rules were to be applied to
foreign and domestic commerce with equal vigor was the Second Circuit's discussion
of import restraints in United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1945). In finding
a violation of the Sherman Act the court made but two inquiries: (1) Were there
sufficient effects on U.S. commerce to invoke jurisdiction, and (2) did the restraints
violate U.S. antitrust laws? At no time did the court indicate that more flexible
standards were to be applied because the alleged violation was international in character. Id. at 443, 444. See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 182,
185-86 (1973).
25. 341 U.S. at 598.
26. Id. at 596.
27. Id. at 598.
United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), presaged
the Timken holding. General Electric also involved an exchange of licenses designed
to maintain a territorial market division in the incandescent lamp industry. First having labelled the agreements as elements of a cartel arrangement, the court found the
market allocations to be "entirely unreasonable insofar as the interest of the public is
concerned," and therefore illegal. Id. at 847.
28. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
The New York district court in United States v. National Lead, 63 F. Supp. 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1945), had faced a similar defense and had reached the identical result. In
National Lead the court concluded that defendants, through territorial and crosslicensing agreements, conspired to monopolize titanium. As a defense to liability defendants argued that "American producers cannot do business successfully in a cartelized world except on cartel terms; and that, to abstain from such business, would
amount to a greater restraint on trade than is involved in joining the cartel .... "
Id. at 526. The court dismissed the argument, stating that such an immunity from the
antitrust laws could only be granted by statute. Id. Defendants' scheme "[clovering
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Timken's rejection of the international cartel is evident; the
specific rule to be derived from Timken is not, however. De-

spite the Court's vigorous censure of territorial schemes designed to cartelize international commerce, the Court in
Timken stopped short of explicitly condemning all international territorial allocations as illegal per se. 9 The omission of
the words "per se" leave open the possibility that Timken, even
today, can be limited to its facts. Specifically, it could be
argued that the Court's reference to international cartels limited Timken to those instances where the miscreants dominated the relevant world market.30 Absent such market dominance, market allocations may not necessarily be illegal as
being designed "to avoid all competition among themselves or
'3
with others." '

Admittedly the better view construes Timken's cartel language as unnecessary judicial hyperbole. 31 Subsequent Su-

preme Court decisions have cited Timken as standing for the
rule that territorial market allocations are illegal per se. 33 Indeed, United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries specifian entire industry, and embracing a division of the world into exclusive territories"
was unlawful as an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 527. See also id. at 531, where
many of the same arguments are repeated and the court reaches the same conclusion.
29. Although not expressly stating that all territorial market allocations in international commerce are per se illegal, the district court did state that Timken's cartel
agreements were illegal per se. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F.
Supp. 284, 308-9 (N.D. Ohio 1949). See InternationalJoint Ventures, supra note 1, at
705-06 (arguing that the Supreme Court focused on the illegality of the aggregation of
trade restraints in Timken, whereas the district court was more prone to adopt a
stricter per se approach).
30. Friedmann, supra note 8. Cf. R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
SociETz 289-90 (1970) (arguing that absent an unlawful purpose Timken restraints may
be permissible, i.e., when they are designed in overall impact to promote competition).
The district court indeed did find that, given the percentage of the market of the
conspirators, "[clommand of such volume of business spells out the dominant position of defendant, British Timken and French Timken, both in the tapered and antifriction bearing industry." 83 F. Supp. at 289.
31. 341 U.S. at 597-98; see R. FALK, supra note 30.
32. See W. FUGATE, supra note 24, at 175-86; InternationalJoint Ventures, supra
note 1, at 711-12 (both arguing that Timken stands for the rule that territorial restraints are equally illegal when employed in international commerce as when they are
employed in domestic commerce).
33. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Co., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968); White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253,259 (1963); United States v. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 387 n.10 (1956).
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cally rejected the notion that dominance must be shown in
order to strike an international territorial allocation. 4 Nonetheless, the extent to which Timken applies to noncartel international market allocations has yet to be fully tested. To date,
Timken rules have been enforced only against major enterprises with substantial shares of the world market.
Although factually distinguishable from Timken, United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. "5 exhibits the judiciary's concern with cartels more than with the specific restraint
of international market allocation. The government charged
3M and a number of other domestic producers with restraint
of the export trade in coated abrasives. As the government
complained, the companies accomplished this result by establishing joint venture companies to manufacture and distribute
abrasives in those areas that in the past had been the export
markets in which the companies competed." The court held
37
that this scheme violated the Sherman Act.
34. United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
addressed the legality of joint venture arrangements between DuPont and ICI which
the partners established in territories not already assigned to one or the other via a
patent license. The court found that these agreements represented a conspiracy to
divide markets. "In the face of this finding, the law is crystal clear: a conspiracy to
divide territories, which affects American commerce, violates the Sherman Act." Id.
at 592. Drawing no distinction between foreign and domestic commerce, the court
reasoned that the market allocation of defendants was no different legally from price
fixing. Consequently the court reached the further conclusion that the defendant's
liability was not barred by the government's failure to allege market dominance by the
defendants:
There is no intimation in any decision that elimination of competition is
to be given a more favorable judicial consideration when achieved by the
route of territorial division rather than by way of price fixing, or that
proof of industry domination is required in one case though not required
in the other.
Id. at 593.
Despite this strong language, even Imperial Chemical can be viewed as barring
only market allocations by cartels. Even though the court disdained an examination
of market dominance, there is little question that such dominance did in fact exist.
Thus in considering the proper remedial order a later court stated:
Although no charge has been made of monopolization and no evidence presented to sustain such a charge, we find that the principal
defendants are potent factors in the fields in which they have engaged.
105 F. Supp. 215, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Moreover, the court made careful note that the
agreements at issue were not between newly formed enterprises but rather between
existing competitiors. There was no doubt that the overall impact and design of the
allocation was to restrain competition. 100 F. Supp. at 557.
35. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
36. Id. at 952-54.
37. Id. at 962-64.
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Because of worrisome dicta, 3 some commentators view 3M
for the extreme proposition that virtually all foreign joint venture arrangements between U.S. companies are illegal." In fact
3M, like Timken, was only aimed at curtailing international
cartel arrangements. 0 Three factual prerequisites for the 3M
holding stand out. First, the joint venture was between existing, competing domestic enterprises;4' second, these cooperating firms dominated the U.S. export market in coated abrasives-4/5ths to be exact; and, finally, the court found that it
was profitable for the firms to export independently to these
overseas markets.43 Although the joint ventures in 3M lacked
the explicit territorial restrictions employed in Timken and
proposed in the Alpha/Beta agreement, the practical territorial
impact was virtually the same." On the other hand, the
Alpha/Beta allocation contains none of the cartel/monopoly
overtones which the 3M court found objectionable, and therefore remains distinguishable from both 3M and Timken.
Scholarly analysis of foreign territorial arrangements not
only tends to confirm the hypothesis that the Timken rule has
been applied only against monopolies, 5 but singles out 3M as
the most restrictive of the foreign joint venture cases." To re38. It may very well be that even though there is an economic or
political barrier which entirely precludes American exports to a foreign
country, a combination of dominant American manufacturers to establish joint factories for the sole purpose of serving the internal commerce
of that country is a per se violation of this other clause of the Sherman
Act. The intimate association of the principal American producers in
day-to-day manufacturing operations, their exchange of patent licenses
and industrial know-how, and their common experience in marketing and
fixing prices may inevitably reduce their zeal for competition inter sese
in the American market.
Id. at 963. Significantly, the court seems to be more concerned with domestic competition than with the potential restraint on foreign commerce.
39. Note, Joint Ventures Abroad and Per Se Antitrust Violations, 1 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 95, 107-9 (1970).
40. See Joelson & Griffin, supra note 12, at 512; InternationalJoint Ventures,
supra note 1, at 709-10 (both explaining the factual determinations required before the
3M per se analysis could be applied. See also R. FALK, supra note 30, at 291-95.
41. 92 F. Supp. at 952, 953, 963.
42. Id. at 961.
43. Id. at 962, 963.
44. That is, the primary purpose of the entire scheme was to eliminate competition in exports. Id. at 961.
45. Friedmann, supra note 8, at 782-84. See also W. FUGATE, supra note 24, at 15861; InternationalJoint Ventures, supra note 1, at 704.
46. Friedmann, supra note 8, at 786-87; Joelson & Griffin, supra note 12, at 510-
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peat, the better view is that Timken did indeed bar territorial
allocations between international competitors regardless of
their share of the market. However, only Imperial Chemical
has explicitly ruled to that effect,47 and no court has yet to
apply the Timken rule in a case which did not in fact involve
a cartel arrangement." The Justice Department itself has implicitly followed the noncartel exception to Timken by limiting
11;

InternationalJoint Ventures, supra note 1, at 709-11.
47. See the discussion of Imperial Chemicals at note 34 supra.
48. United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), illustrates the
courts' continuing failure to close the noncartel loophole. Although the Bayer court
noted that a division of world markets was a per se restraint on U.S. commerce, thereby
invoking the jurisdiction of the antitrust laws, id. at 70, the court neglected to make
the same statement with respect to the illegality of the agreement itself. Rather, the
court noted that at the time at issue Bayer and its co-conspirator, I.B. Farben (then
Leverkusen), were "majors" in the world market. "Indeed, no issue [was] raised by
the defendant on this score." Id. at 68. The court noted that the agreements amounted
to the "usual form of international cartel arrangement." Id. at 69, quoting General
Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., Inc., 188 Misc. 929, 930, 64 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494
(1946). Consequently in determining liability the court concluded:
The allocation of the world markets of the defined pharmaceutical products amongst Bayer, I.G. Farben and Bayer Products Limited is so all
pervasive as to constitute a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act
Id. at 70 (emphasis added). Although undoubtedly the court noted the pervasiveness
of the arrangment in order to distinguish the conspirators use of trademark licenses,
arguably the pervasiveness requirement could apply to the presence or absence of
market dominance as well. Other cases barring territorial allocations in situations
where the conspirators dominated the relevant market include: United States v.
United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); United States v.
General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
See also Foundry Services Inc. v. The Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953), which held that Timken
did not apply to an ordinary exclusive license of a secret process. In validating the
accompanying territorial limitation the court noted:
It is not shown or even claimed that this license agreement was used
either alone or in combination with related agreements to achieve a monopoly in the business of fluxes generally or in any other industry.
Id. at 860-61. Of course Foundry Services can be distinguished from the pure territorial
allocation being examined here in the context of the Alpha/Beta agreement in that
Foundary Services involved a trade secret. See note 139 infra and the discussion of
DuPont at text accompanying notes 136-39 infra. See also United States v. Holophane
Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), which judged a
worldwide market allocation to be illegal according to the following rule of reason test:
The evidence establishes that the restrictive agreements were designed
to eliminate competition between the parties and with outsiders in all
markets of the world, and were neither measurable by, limited to, nor
subordinate to the reasonable necessities of the sale.
Id. at 119. See generally E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
PRIMER 74-78 (1974).
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their prosecutorial efforts to monopolistic situations, agreements between dominant parties where the territorial restraint
has no rationale beyond limiting competition between the parties.4" Consequently, the Timken territorial holding remains
readily subject to judicial redefinition.
49. For example, in assessing the validity of territorial restraints imposed on
foreign licenses of know-how, the Department will examine the general availability of
the know-how and the market dominance of the contracting parties:
Territorial restrictions would not be permissible if unreasonable in light
of the know-how involved or part of a larger illegal plan to cartelize the
market ....
Thus . . . the restrictions could be upheld if the know-how being
transferred is of substantial value, the territorial restrictions are limited
to a reasonable period and the agreement is not part of a larger plan to
divide markets between dominant firms.
MEMORANDUM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 55,209.
Similarly, recent consent decrees and their accompanying competitive impact
statements filed by the Justice Department exhibit the same concern for attacking
territorial restrictions that lack a competitive rationale. In United States v. Norman
M. Morris Corp., 41 Fed. Reg. 5365 (1976), the Department attacked an agreement
restricting import and resale of Omega and Tissot Swiss watches. The Department
noted that in 1972 55% of all watches purchased in the U.S. were manufactured in
Switzerland and that a substantial number of these were the above-named brands. The
Department further noted that Switzerland is the world's largest exporter of watches.
In United States v. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 41 Fed. Reg. 32617 (1976), the
Department attacked a network of exclusive licensing agreements which in effect prohibited exports from America to Britain of English language books and vice versa. The
vehicle used to enforce this restraint was the Publishers Association, "a British organization whose membership includes virtually all major United Kingdom publishing
houses.
... Id. In effect, the licensing requirements of the Association restrained
virtually all traffic in English books between the two countries.
Finally, and perhaps most directly on point, United States v. Foote Mineral Co.,
40 Fed. Reg. 59,358 (1975), outlawed a worldwide territorial allocation of lithium
products. The agreement was between Foote, which produced lithium in its raw state,
and Metallgesellschaft, who purchased its materials from Foote and absent the market
allocation would have competed with Foote in the sale of lithium products. In banning
the territorial division, the Department noted that Foote was one of only five enterprises worldwide which recovers lithium in its natural state and that Foote accounted
for 45% of U.S. natural state production.
Significantly, the Department did not disturb an agreement which in effect prevented Foote from underselling Metall in Europe. The Department commented that
given the long term supply contracts involved. Metall required such protection in
order to retain incentive to compete with Foote in other markets. Otherwise Foote
could undercut Metall in its home territory in response to any competition by Metall
in other geographic areas.
Department officials themselves have further noted their own focus on cartels of
dominant parties. See Address by Donald I. Baker, Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice, New York State Bar Ass'n, Antitrust Law Section Annual Meeting, Jan. 24,
1973, quoted in InternationalJoint Ventures, supra note 1, at 704.
To conclude this discussion one caveat must be expressed. Although the Justice
Department may tacitly recognize a noncartel exception, that "authority" is of little
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As alluded to above, the rationale for a noncartel international exception to the territorial rule derives from the potential procompetitive impact of allocations between small international businesses. For example, although restraining competition between themselves, the Alpha/Beta allocation permits
the creation of the new Beta enterprises, thereby permitting
the group to compete more effectively in more world markets.'"
Without the help of Alpha, native LDC investors would lack
the technological and financial resources necessary to launch
such enterprises as the Betas. The "restraint" permits the creation of new businesses that otherwise would not be financially
feasible. The procompetitive impact of the market allocation
almost certainly satisfies the demands of the rule of reason.5'
Consequently, by employing a noncartel exception to relieve
international market allocations between small enterprises
from the per se impact of Timken, arrangements such as the
Alpha/Beta agreement can escape antitrust liability by satisfy52
ing the less stringent rule of reason requirement.
The importance to the Alpha/Beta agreement of creating
such a noncartel exception to the Timken rule becomes more
evident when one considers that host country laws typically
preclude the use of the principal "end around" to the Timken
territorial rule: practical market division through corporate
integration. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires a conspiracy
between competitors.13 Thus, an enterprise can avoid Timken
through internal expansion, so that the "competitors" with
which one plans to divide territories will in fact be but parts of
one single corporate entity. Absent such unity an enterprise
will be potentially liable for antitrust violations. Thus,
use if the courts do not recognize the exception as well. If the courts stick to an absolute
per se approach, a contracting party will be able to use the antitrust illegality of the
agreement as a defense to an action on the contract. See the discussion of Continental
TV at text accompanying notes 93-94 infra. Even if one avoids this problem through
arbitration and/or choice-of-law clauses, there is the additional prospect of suits by
"injured" consumers, state attorneys general representing those consumers, or even
suits on behalf of foreign consumers. See Caplan, Parens PatriaeAntitrust Suits by
Foreign Nations, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 705 (1976).
50. See generally text accompanying notes 140-42. 144 infra.
51. See text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
52. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (possibly representing
the original statement of the rule of reason test).
53. See note 17 supra.
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the central message of the Sherman Act is that a business entity
must find new customers and higher profits through internal expansion-that is, by competing successfully rather than by arranging treaties with its competitors.5 '

In other words, a corporation cannot illegally conspire with
itself; 51 therefore, completely integrated parts of one enterprise
can "divide" territories with other integrated parts of the same
enterprise.
However, host country local control laws prevalent in
LDCs prevent an international company from meeting this single business entity test, at least as the term has been interpreted by the courts to date. Unfortunately for LDC enterprises, the courts narrowly construe what represents an integrated business entity for the purposes of "exemption" from
the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has stated "that even
commonly owned firms must compete against each other, if
they hold themselves out as distinct entities."5 In Timken the
Court imposed liability despite the fact that American Timken
owned thirty and fifty percent of British and French Timken
respectively. 7 Quite plausibly Timken presented no
"conspiracy" in restraint of trade. The Court, however, determined that the three Timkens were separate entities and therefore subject to liability for allocating territories. "The fact that
there is common ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust
laws.""8
The apparent harshness of Timken's approach to intracorporate conspiracy is somewhat diminished by the district
court's earlier determination that American Timken and British and French Timken were in fact two independent enterprises. 59 Nonetheless, a number of subsequent decisions have
eschewed the district court's concern for practical independence in favor of a more formalisitc separate incorporation test
of conspiracy. 0 Thus, citing Timken, the Supreme Court in
54. United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975).
55. Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1969).

56. 422 U.S. at 116.
57.
58.
59.
60.
Martin

83 F, Supp. at 292, 294.
341 U.S. at 598.
83 F. Supp. at 292.
Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ga. 1976);
B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 1976).
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Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. instructed.: "[Slince respondents Midas and International
availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through
separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not
save them from the obligations that the law imposes on sepa'6
rate entities." 1
Regardless of one's approach, the intracorporate conspiracy issue poses a number of controversies: Can commonly
owned but noncompeting enterprises be held liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act for conspiring to restrain trade? The
general rule appears to be that they can.62 Although unincorporated divisions of an enterprise cannot conspire, 3 what about
wholly owned subsidiaries? The general response is that wholly
owned subsidiaries can indeed illegally conspire with each
other. "4
The problem for LDC enterprises is evident. If wholly
owned subsidiaries can illegally conspire to restrain trade, how
can locally owned and/or locally controlled LDC enterprises
hope to claim that their territorial allocations with their U.S.
parent do not represent a conspiracy between competitors.
Even under a test which examines the restraint in terms of
See also Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)
(finding the separate incorporation test particularly applicable where the enterprises
hold themselves out as competitors). But see Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 1977). For summaries of many of the cases
dealing with intracorporate conspiracies, see Annot., 20 A.L.R. Fed. 682 (1974).
61. 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968).
62. Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equipment Corp., 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.
1976); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1110 (1975); T.V. Signal Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 462
F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1972); Tamaron Distributing Corp. v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 137 (7th
Cir. 1969); Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
See Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 376 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Pa. 1974), order
vacated, 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975). But see Ark. Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron
Corp., 461 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972); Call Carl Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568
(D. Md. 1975).
63. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors Ltd., 416 F.2d
71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062. See Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger,
Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969).
64. Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975); Battle v.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110
(1975); Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1973);
Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 1976). But
see also In re REA Express, Inc., Private Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation, 412 F.
Supp. 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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practical independence," or under the Justice Department's
criteria which invokes strictest scrutiny only where ownership
by the parent is less than fifty percent, 6 an Alpha/Beta
enterprise will not escape antitrust liability under the "one
corporation" rule. For per se restraints to be permissible, the
U.S. antitrust laws require integrated expansion by the parent;
the laws of the host nation require local ownership. The incompatability of the two requirements necessarily subjects
LDC enterprises to antitrust restrictions which in more developed nations can be generally avoided through integration.
Given the general policy in favor of investment in the poorer
nations, 7 one would expect an opposite result.
65. One practical approach is to determine if in reality there are two distinct
functional corporate entities.
[Alt least where the corporations are horizontally related, separate incorporation may not defeat the need for substance to prevail over form
when only a single business unit exists. Separate incorporation, like the
lack of intraenterprise competition, is not dispositive of the question, but
only one factor in the calculus.
Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 625-26 (9th Cir.
1977), citing Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977).
Taking a similar approach, another line of cases appears to examine the corporate
relationship together with the particular restraint in order to determine if liability
should be imposed. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). See Coleman
Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding Chrysler liable for
a conspiracy with its factory-owned dealerships to the detriment of independent dealers-almost a monopolization claim); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d
39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975) (holding that insurance company
could not utilize a tying arrangement with its wholly owned funeral home subsidiary);
Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. New House, 319 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that
it was permissible for a newspaper to grant free advertising to a commonly owned radio
station as the practical impact was only a redistribution of corporate profits). See also
Note, Intra-EnterpriseConspiracy Under Section I of the Sherman Act: A Suggested
Standard, 75 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1977).
66. "The Department of Justice has consistently accepted the view stated in the
1955 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws: a parent corporation may allocate territories or set prices for the subsidiaries
that it fully controls." DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS, reprinted in [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799 at E-1
(Feb. 1, 1977). Normally, majority equity control represents the test for avoiding an
illegal conspiracy. However, the Department notes that "the same reasoning may
apply to a minority position where the U.S. firm maintains effective working control."
Moreover, the Department also intimates that some nonmajority, noncontrolled subsidiaries may nonetheless allocate territories; at no point in the example did the Department adopt a per se rule. Significantly, the example used to express these standards assumed that the parent was a multinational who was a worldwide leader in its
field. Id. See note 49 supra.
67. See, e.g., the discussion of economic rights in Starr, InternationalProtection
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SCHWINN, ToPCO AND THE DEFENSE OF PROCOMPETITIVE IMPACT

The -Supreme Court's apparent willingness in Continental
TV to carve exceptions to the per se rule against territorial
restraints thus acquires an added significance for businesses in
the general relationship of Alpha and Beta as described above.
Continental TV seems to offer an opportunity to avoid the
single corporate entity paradox by permitting Betas to employ
their very poverty and local laws as a defense to an antitrust
action attacking territorial agreements with their parent. If
Betas can be created only by permitting territorial divisions,
presumably the net procompetitive impact of those divisions
deserves some form of immunity from per se, conclusive illegality.
However, Schwinn,65 and later Topco, 6 previously had
barred the use of such a reasonability defense when territorial
market allocations were involved. Schwinn accomplished the
first broad rejection of the procompetitive impact defense. Although a number of restraints were involved in the franchising
system set up by Schwinn to market its bicycles,"0 for our purposes the principal restraint prevented distributors from selling
bicycles to retailers outside of their designated territories.
Schwinn argued that this restraint was required in order for it
to survive the competition posed by giant mass retailers such
as Sears." The Court agreed to some extent, allowing Schwinn
to retain some of the features of its franchise system." However, such arguments of competitive reasonableness were not
even considered in relation to Schwinn's territorial restraints.
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with
whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted
with dominion over it."s
In distinguishing an earlier line of cases the Court did note
that exceptions to the per se rule may apply to a new business
of Human Rights and the United Nations Covenants, 1967 Wisc. L. REv.863, as well
as the policy considerations expressed in Nanda, Selected Legal Issues in the World
Population/FoodEquation, published in this issue.
68. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
69. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
70. 388 U.S. at 370-71; 237 F. Supp. at 326-27.
71. 388 U.S. at 368-69, 376-77.
72. Id. at 379-80.
73. Id. at 379.
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or a failing company.74 However, attempting to maintain one's
market position does not have such a corresponding exception.
The promotion of self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of
reason to immunize otherwise illegal conduct. It is only if the
conduct is not unlawful in its impact in the marketplace or if the
self-interest coincides with the statutory concern with the preservation and promotion of competition that protection is
achieved.75

Thus, the most that can be said for Schwinn is that it left the
door open for some additional exceptions to the per se rule
where a net procompetitive impact clearly results.
Topco closed this door. Topco was an association of small
and medium size regional supermarket chains that served as a
purchasing agent for its members.76 The members created the
association to permit them to buy items in large quantities,
and to foster the development of private label brands which
these smaller chains could then use to meet the private label
competition of the giants." The Justice Department attacked
the association's territorial restriction, which prevented member firms from selling Topco-controlled brands outside their
designated marketing territory. 8
In some respects the motive of the Topco territorial arrangement was less reasonable than Schwinn in that it flowed
horizontally from competing member retailers, rather than
having been imposed upon the retailers vertically by a concerned manufacturer.79 On the other hand, more clearly than
Schwinn, the net economic effect of the Topco territorial arrangement was to promote rather than restrict competition."o
74. Id. at 374.
75. Id. at 375. For a discussion of the international implications of Schwinn, now
mooted by the Continental TV decision, see E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, supra note 48,
at 95-97. See also United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1969)(applying Schwinn to a British company selling in bulk within the United
States).
76. 405 U.S. at 598.
77. Id. at 598, 599 n.3.
78. Id. at 601.

79. A horizontal market allocation is an agreement between competitors at the
same level of the distribution chain. Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams
& Co.-East, 377 F. Supp. 418, 424-25 (C.D. Cal. 1974), modified, 542 F.2d 1053 (9th
Cir. 1976). However, as demonstrated in text accompanying notes 118-21 infra, defining a horizontal agreement and proving a horizontal agreement are two completely
different tasks.
80. See Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 533 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975),
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The territorial restraints strengthened the Topco Association;
and the stronger the association the greater the ability of Topco
members to compete with the large national chains. As the
district court determined,
[w]hatever anti-competitive effect these practices may have on
competition in the sale of Topco private label brands is far outweighed by the increased ability of Topco members to compete
both with the national chains and other supermarkets operating
in their respective territories."

Based on a rule of reason analysis, the Topco territorial allocation would have been permissible. 2
The Supreme Court, however, determined that it was error
to apply the rule of reason test; horizontal territorial restrictions require the per se rule of illegality.8 3 In so holding the
Court refused to consider whether the net impact of the restraint was really procompetitive.
The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult
economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful
sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy
against promotion of competition in another sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules.8"

Once per se analysis is invoked, the alleged procompetitive
impact of the restraint becomes irrelevant.8 s
The practical harshness of the Topco holding was subsequently tempered by the court's ruling that Topco would be
permitted to retain areas of primary responsibility." However,
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2966 (1977).
81. 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1970), quoted in 405 U.S. 596, 605-6 (1972).
82. The Topco licensing provisions are not inherently unreasonable
and have no substantial adverse effect on competition in the relevant
market. They are ancillary and subordinate to the . . . legitimate, procompetitive purpose of the Topco cooperative, reasonable and in the
public interest.
319 F. Supp. at 1038.
83. 405 U.S. at 608.
84. Id. at 609-10. But see id. at 624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
85. "In applying these rigid rules, the Court has consistently rejected the notion
that naked restraints of trade are to be tolerated because . . . they are allegedly
developed to increase competition." Id. at 610. But see Chief Justice Burger dissent
for the argument that precedent required no such rigid rule. Id. at 613.
86. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 93,797 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Areas of primary responsibility normally invoke price/profit penalties against
those who sell outside their areas. If the penalty is too great, the court will declare it
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Topco nonetheless clearly indicates that procompetitive impact is not a defense to a charge of territorial market allocation.
As a result Topco eliminated the principal argument justifying
the Alpha/Beta territorial restraint: that the restraint aids
market entry by competitively disadvantaged LDC investors,
and thereby promotes competition.
THE CONTINENTIAL TV EXCEPTIONS

Domestically, the impact of Schwinn and Topco led to
some complaints87 and more than a little subterfuge.m For franchise operations the principal avoidance technique was the use
of exclusive dealership arrangements, which are considered
legal under the antitrust laws.89 By strategically locating excluto be an illegal market allocation. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco
Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
87. For example in Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975), the Federal Trade Commission attacked Coors' practice
of restricting the territories of its distributors. Coors maintained that the restrictions
were required to maintain quality since Coors beer uniquely requires that it be refrigerated until sold to the consumer. The court reluctantly rejected Coors' argument:
Although we are compelled to follow the Schwinn per se rule rendering
Coors' territorial restrictions on resale illegal per se, we believe that the
per se rule should yield to situations where a unique product requires
territorial restrictions to remain in business . . . . Perhaps the Supreme
Court may see the wisdom of grafting an exception to the perse rule when
a product is unique and where the manufacturer can justify its territorial
restraints under the rule of reason.
Id. at 1187.
88. For example, one manufacturer expressly contracted with its distributor that
the manufacturer retain title to its product (Green Stamps) in the hope of coming
within the maintenance of title exception to Schwinn. Finding that the risk of loss had
passed to the distributor, the mere contracting to retain title did not exempt the resale
restrictions from the Schwinn rule. Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
522 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1975).
Other manufacturers assigned territories without expressly limiting sales to those
territories. In such instances the court will look to see if the manufacturer enforced a
territorial restriction. See, e.g., Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Reed Brothers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976); Hobart Brothers v. Malcolm T. Gilliland,
Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); Fontana Aviation, Inc.
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971)
(finding such active enforcement); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 810
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v.
Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Janel Sales
Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968)
(failing to find the requisite amount of enforcement by the manufacturer).
89. See, e.g., Universal Brands, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 546 F.2d 30 (5th Cir.
1977); Williams v. Independent News Co., Inc., 485 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1973); Akron
Tire Supply Co. v. Gebr. Hofmann KG, 390 F. Supp. 1395 (N.D. Ohio 1975). But see
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sive dealers, by limiting the number of dealers, and by requiring dealers to sell only from designated locations one can in
practice achieve a territorial allocation. The success of such a
scheme depends upon the manufacturer's ability to control the
number and location of its exclusive dealers in a given area.
Thus, the validity of such schemes came to turn on whether
franchise applications are denied because of independent business judgment or the urging of existing nearby dealerships. The
latter was of course illegal," while the former apparently was
not.9 '
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc."2 examined
just such a scheme. Sylvania had adopted an exclusive franchising arrangement with its retailers in an effort to boost its
sales from the dismal one to two percent of the market to which
Sylvania had fallen. An essential element of the plan was the
conscious limitation of the number of retail outlets in a given
area in the hope that by so limiting competition Sylvania could
attract an aggressive group of retailers. "[Slylvania retained
sole discretion to increase the number of retailers in an area in
light of the success or failure of existing retailers in developing
their market."" Licensed retailers could sell only from designated locations.
In a dispute between Sylvania and a former franchisee,
Continental TV, the latter raised the illegality of the franchise
plan under the Sherman Act as a counterclaim to Sylvania's
action to recover goods in Continental's possession.9 4 Continental claimed that the franchise plan was an illegal territorial
allocation. Sylvania denied that any such market division had
occurred.
Justice Powell's opinion cut through the exclusive dealership subterfuge and labelled the locational restraint as funcalso Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 471 n.6 (8th Cir. 1976)
(indicating that a perpetual exclusive dealership may be illegal).
90. Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
91. Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975); Kaiser v.
General Motors Corp., 396 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 530 F.2d
964 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Sheldon Pontiac v. Pontiac Motor Division, 418 F. Supp.
1024 (D.N.J. 1976).
92. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
93. Id. at 2552.
94. Id. at 2552-53.
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tionally identical to the territorial allocation held to be illegal
in Schwinn.9 5 However, rather than holding for Continental TV
based on the Schwinn rule, the Court reexamined and rejected
the Schwinn per se approach to territorial restraints. The specific reason for the reversal derives from the Court's decision
to endorse franchising arrangements in general;9" the Schwinn
court had viewed franchising with intense suspicion. 7 The
Court determined that many vertical territorial restraints can
be on balance procompetitive. Since "[p]er se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is
manifestly anti-competitive,''9 this finding warranted rejection of Schwinn's per se bar to vertical territorial restraints.
The Court's determination with regard to the possible procompetitive impact of such vertical restraints rests on the
Court's analysis of the distinction between interbrand and intrabrand competition. "Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic product
. . . . In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition
between the distributors-wholesale or retail-of the product
of a particular manufacturer."9 9 An examination of the competitive impact of a territorial allocation must weigh the restraint's effect on both types of competition. 00 Consequently,
although territorial restrictions imposed on retailers by a manufacturer will dull intrabrand competition, if these restrictions
also assist that small manufacturer to penetrate a market, interbrand competition, and competition in general, may be increased. Often smaller businesses can not grow to the status of
a viable competitor without the efficiencies offered by vertical
95. Id. at 2556.
96. Id. at 2556-62, 2561 n.26, 2560 n.22. See text accompanying notes 122-125
infra.
97. The Court in Schwinn noted that to permit territorial restrictions once title
had passed "would sanction franchising and confinement of distribution as the ordinary instead of the unusual method" of retailing products. 388 U.S. at 379.
98. 97 S. Ct. at 2558.
99. Id. at 2559 n.19.
100. In fact the Court criticized the Schwinn opinion for failing to examine both
aspects of competition: "Significantly, the Court in Schwinn did not distinguish
among the challenged restrictions on the basis of their individual potential for intrabrand harm or interbrand benefit." Id. at 2559. An excellent analysis of the potential
varying impacts of vertical restraints on both interbrand and intrabrand competition
can be found at Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 941 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1975).
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territorial allocations.' 0' It is the restraint's "potential for a
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition"''0 2 which renders inappropriate the per se rule's conclusive presumption of illegality.' 3
A NONCARTEL EXCEPTION FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE?
To assess the impact of Continental TV on the Alpha/Beta
international agreement initially requires an examination of
the broader rationale behind the opinion. The Continental TV
Court relied on the analysis of White Motor Co. v. United
States' 4 for authority to repudiate the Schwinn per se doctrine.'0 White Motor had refused to apply per se rules to vertical territorial restraints.
We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of
these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have
such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming
virtue" and therefore should be classified as per se violations of
the Sherman Act.'1

Presumably the same analysis can justify additional exceptions
to the per se rules.'0 7
Specifically, if faced with the opportunity, perhaps the
current Court would now draw a distinction between domestic
and international commerce when applying the per se rules. As
noted earlier, to date the courts have failed to verbalize separate rules for international trade. However, as also noted earlier, the courts have yet to face a fact situation that would
101. Id. at 2561. The Court went on to note that eliminating the per se rule may
also benefit small franchisees where the manufacturer is an established entity.
We also note that per se rules in this area may work to the ultimate
detriment of the small businessmen who operate as franchisees. To the
extent that a per se rule prevents a firm from using the franchise system
to achieve efficiencies that it perceives as important to its successful
operation, the rule creates an incentive for vertical integration into the
distribution system, thereby eliminating to that extent the role of independent businessmen.
Id. at 2561 n.26.
102. Id. at 2559.
103. "Certainly, there has been no showing in this case, either generally or with
respect to Sylvania's agreements, that vertical restrictions have or are likely to have a
'pernicious effect on competition' or that they 'lack any redeeming virtue."' Id. at 2562.
104. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
105. 97 S. Ct. at 2558.
106. 372 U.S. at 263. See note 103 supra; 97 S. Ct. at 2558.
107. See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 613-24 (1972).
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require that such a distinction be made; all of the previous
opinions have dealt with cartel-like situations. Arguably these
early opinions did not articulate a per se rule at all beyond the
statement that monopoly practices are presumptively illegal.
As with the domestic application of the Sherman Act, its
international application is designed to promote competition.'"'
As was stated in White Motor'0 and repeated in Continental
TV, a given restraint becomes illegal per se only when its
known impact on competition is so pernicious that it warrants
the conclusive presumption of illegality that a per se rule entails." ' Surely the financial, technical, and marketing resources required to penetrate international markets may require territorial restraints in some instances; the business judgment underlying the Alpha/Beta agreement aptly illustrated
this."' Allocations between industry leaders may well be illegal
per se as their anticompetitive effects are known. But absent
such market dominance, a per se bar to international territorial
restraints is not appropriate. In fact the Court's view of tying
arrangements provides authority for such a dominance distinction."
Moreover, the courts have at times carved limited exceptions to per se rules where the peculiar circumstances of a
particular enterprise or industry warrant such an exception.,
108. "[Tlhe major premise of the Sherman Act is that the suppression of competition in international trade is in and of itself a public injury .
United States v.
National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
109. In White Motor the Justice Department attacked White Motor's franchise
system which limited the customers and territories to which each dealer would be
permitted to sell. White Motor responded that these restraints were entirely reasonable
under the circumstances. White Motor was a small truck company competing against
the automotive giants. In order to survive the competition of the larger manufacturers,
White Motor had to insure that its dealers would actively promote its truck within the
territories assigned to each dealer. The only way to insure such intensive customer
development is to grant each dealer an exclusive territory. Based on these facts the
Court refused to grant summary judgment for the United States.
110. See text accompanying notes 104-107 supra.
111. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
112. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 861
(1977); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
113. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970) (resale restraint needed to insure safe use of the product); Mackey v. National
Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)(football business has unique features of
a joint venture which relieve it of the full impact of the per se rules). But see Copper
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The problems of starting a new business where success or failure is in the balance may permit the use of restraints that
would otherwise be illegal per se."4 In particular, the demands
of attempting to penetrate a new international market in the
face of substantial competition can justify even horizontal territorial restraints between existing competitors, particularly
when one's foreign competitors are attempting to create a cartel among themselves." 5 Aggregating these exceptions, and
considering further the greater probability that the international context will create situations invoking such exceptions,
a retreat from the per se approach to international territorial
restraints seems appropriate under the policies expressed in
White Motor and Continental TV.
THE "FRANCHISING"

EXCEPTION OF CONTINENTAL

TV

Practical business decisions, however, cannot rest on an as
yet unarticulated international noncartel exception. Fortunately, there is sufficient language in Continental TV itself to
permit the specific market division proposed for the
Alpha/Beta group. The trick lies in having the Alpha/Beta restraint construed as a permissible franchising arrangement
under the rules expressed in Continental TV. Although the
language of the Court's opinion focuses predominantly on the
distinction between horizontal and vertical territorial restraints, the decision's broader practical impact was to judge
territorial franchising arrangements by the rule of reason,
rather than to condemn such practices as per se illegal. The
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975)(holding that efforts to
maintain quality do not warrant an exception to the per se rule against territorial
restraints).
114. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
a/I'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)(tying arrangement between sales and service permitted
during initial stages of business to establish community television antennas). Note the
new business and failing company exceptions of Schwinn and see text accompanying
notes 74-75 supra, although at least one court has intimated that such exceptions may
not be applicable when considering horizontal territorial restrictions. Sulmeyer v. Coca
Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 846 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
115. United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 34
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), permitted two U.S. airlines to divide routes in an effort to penetrate
the South American market. The impact of this decision is diminished, however, by
the fact that the later creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board provided an administrative mechanism for accomplishing the same result. In fact the Supreme Court reversed
the above decision on the grounds that the issues were within the primary jurisdiction
of the C.A.B. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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decision creates a new exception for territorial restraints employed by a functionally unified enterprise."' Although the
vertical/horizontal distinction constitutes a substantial factor
in judging functional unity, that distinction alone is not determinative of the test of illegality to be applied to the restraint.
Consequently, although the Alpha/Beta allocation appears to
be horizontal in nature," 7 that fact does not in itself prevent
the scheme from coming within the Continental TV exception.
Admittedly, at least where independent retailers are involved, Continental TV expressly8 preserves the per se bar to
horizontal territorial allocations:"
There may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal restrictions originating in agreements
among the retailers. There is no doubt that restrictions in the
latter category would be illegal per se [citations omitted], but
we do not regard the problems of proof as sufficiently great to
justify a per se rule."'

Nonetheless, the Court's reservations concerning proof problems expressed in this statement exhibit the Court's concern
over employing the horizontal/vertical distinction as the determinative fact in territorial market allocation analysis. The
Court's statement implicitly recognizes that in the final analysis all territorial market restraints are horizontal: they all allocate territories between competitors at the same level of the
distribution chain. Consequently, if one admits that vertical
territorial franchising arrangements can be permissible, then
horizontal, territorial franchising arrangements must be potentially permissible as well. Since both schemes have the same
final "horizontal" competitive impact, then so must both
schemes be judged by the same antitrust test.
116. The Court rejected the Schwinn rule because it may unduly impede the
growth and success of franchise operations-and thereby impede an enterprise's ability
to compete in the broader interbrand market. 97 S. Ct. at 2560-61.
117. Admittedly the Alpha/Beta agreement allocates territories horizontally on
the manufacturing level, However, since these manufacturers all employ technology
built by Alpha and since Alpha retains a financial interest in the proper exploitation
of this technology, the agreement retains vertical elements. See note 128 infra.
118. This is further supported by the fact that Continental TV relies heavily on
White Motor, which had noted also in dictum that horizontal territorial limitations
"are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition." 372 U.S.
at 263. But see United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 613, 615 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) where the Chief Justice argues that this dicta of White Motor is not precedent.
119. 97 S. Ct. at 2562 n.28.
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The practical impossibility of proving a horizontal restraint within a legitimate franchising arrangement confirms
the hypothesis that the vertical/horizontal distinction alone
can not conclusively determine whether the rule of reason or
per se rules will judge the territorial allocation in question.
Even prior to Continental TV the circuit courts' consideration
of the vertical/horizontal factual issue hardly inspired confidence. 20 This factual determination becomes virtually impossible now that Schwinn has been overruled. Assuming that rule
of reason requirements are met, a new manufacturer can now
establish explicit territories at the outset of a franchising venture, rendering unnecessary any conspiracy between franchisee
retailers. Similarly, established businesses no longer need employ the charade of denying franchise applications in order to
maintain an illicit territorial market allocation; they can now
explicitly allocate territories among their retailers. How will it
be possible to show that this new business structure was
prompted by a conspiracy of the retailers and not by the inde2
pendent business judgment of the manufacturer? '
Whereas the superficial horizontal/vertical distinction
makes no logical or practical sense, a test addressing the functional unity of the enterprise does. The governing factual issue
becomes the intrabrand nature of the restraint, not the horizontal nature of the restraint. As Continental TV so carefully
pointed out, only the clear anticompetitive impact of a given
type of restraint invokes per se rules.'2 Since territorial allocations between franchisees will have the same effect on competition regardless of whether the franchisor or the franchisee first
conceived the restraint, the vertical/horizontal distinction
serves no meaningful function. The intrabrand test, however,
draws a meaningful economic distinction and therefore can
serve to differentiate rule of reason from per se restraints. Although noting the vertical character of Sylvania's restraint, the
basic rationale behind Continental TV's rejection of Schwinn
was the differing economic impact of interbrand and intra120. See cases cited in notes 90 & 91 supra. Specifically, compare Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976) with Salco Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Sheldon Pontiac v. Pontiac Motor
Div., 418 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1976).
121. See discussion of exclusive franchising in Louis, supra note 1, at 286-87.
122. See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
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brand territorial allocations.113 A restraint limited to intrabrand competition can nonetheless enhance interbrand compe24
tition and thereby generate a a net procompetitive impact.
Presumably a territorial restraint of an interbrand nature could
not generate such beneficial results and therefore would still be
illegal per se. Since only the intrabrand distinction corresponds
to a similar distinction in competitive impact, the intrabrand
distinction must afford the test for determining the applicability of rule of reason analysis.' 5
By ignoring the vertical/horizontal issue and focusing instead on the intrabrand/interbrand issue, the Continental TV
opinion obtains a certain degree of logical coherence. As noted
above, it would be absurd in practice to attempt to enforce a
total ban against horizontal allocations among franchisees.
However, the Court's statement that horizontal restraints between retailers continue to be illegal per se makes sense if
viewed as a statement that existing competitors cannot use the
creation of a brand name as a conduit to validate an otherwise
impermissible horizontal market allocation. 2 1 Similarly, the
Court's statement that the intrabrand rule applies only to
products from a particularmanufacturer merely reiterates the
Court's desire to prevent combinations between existing competitors, but permit allocations among elements of a functionally unified business enterprise. 27 Therefore, as long as a business employs market allocations only as part of a functionally
integrated expansion effort by that business, rule of reason
analysis will judge that restraint.
123. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
124. 97 S. Ct. at 2560.
125. "[An antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any
objective benchmarks." Id. at 2560 n.21. Note also that the intrabrand distinction will
be relatively easy to apply to actual factual controversies.
126. This would essentially cover the scheme employed by Topco. See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra.
An interesting issue is whether the specific plan struck down in Topco would now
be condemned by the Continental TV Court as well. Although Continental TV cited
Topco with approval, 97 S. Ct. at 2562 n.27 & n.28, the policies expressed in
Continental TV are quite similar to Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Topco and would
seemingly call the Topco decision into question. 405 U.S. at 613. In fact a basic premise
of Topco was the Court's inability to weigh "destruction of competition in one sector
of the economy against promotion of competition in another sector." See text at note
82 supra. Since Continental TV's intrabrand rule expressly assumes that courts can
make such judgment, the basic rationale of Topco has apparently been eliminated.
127. See text accompanying notes 122-125 supra.
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EXCEPTION

Whereas the Alpha/Beta agreement could meet a vertical
restraint exception only through strained construction of the
agreement,'28 the functionally integrated intrabrand exception
can be met easily by structuring the agreement according to
the intrabrand requirement of Continental TV. Three basic
integrative features are required:
(1) The contracting parties must all service the
same brandname;
(2) the contracting parties must have been
created to profitably exploit that brandname; and
(3) the originator of the brand-and of the
restraint-must retain a financial interest in the success of the other contracting parties.
By following these rules an enterprise would restrict the territorial allocation to use by a functionally unified business entity
that would in turn fall within the economic rationale of
Continental TV's intrabrand exception. The restraint will be
designed to promote competition, not foreclose competition,
and therefore warrants rule of reason analysis. These rules deserve a more extensive explanation.
First, the most obvious requirement is that Alpha and the
Betas manufacture under the same trademark or trade name.
Without creating a single "brand" it will be impossible for the
Alpha/Beta group to fall within the intrabrand exception. The
restraint would then have to be justified under one of the ex-

29
traordinary exceptions to the per se rules noted above.
Second, the Betas must be new enterprises. As Topco
aptly illustrates, and as Continental TV implies, the creation
of a brand name by existing competitors to enforce territorial
arrangements remains illegal per se.130 As an example, international cartel cases such as United States v. Bayer have specifically held that trademark licensing cannot be used as a subterfuge for worldwide territorial allocations among existing

competitors.

3

128. The maintenance of an equity interest by Alpha in the Betas may qualify the
restraint as vertical in the view of some, as theoretically the equity interest may deter
any deleterious impact on output from the actual operation of the restraint. Bork,
supra note 7, at 424-25. See note 117 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 113-115 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra and notes 126-127 supra.
131. United States v. Bayer Co., Inc., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See
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However, creation of new "competitors" preserves the
character of the enterprise as the expansion of a single business. In fact some courts have held that one who receives necessary licensed technology from an alleged conspirator,' 3 or one
who is permitted to do business at the suffrance of an alleged
conspirator,'" is not in fact a competitor of that conspirator
between the two would invoke Shersuch that an agreement
34
liability.'
Act
man
Although the validity of such a relaxed definition of competitor is suspect,'3 5 the policy behind the view is not. United
States v. DuPont'3 provides an illustration. Among the issues
in this famous cellophane case was whether the origin of DuPont's dominating position in cellophane had developed lawfully. A French company, La Cellophane, licensed DuPont to
manufacture cellophane in the United States. Incident to this
contract the parties agreed to the territories in which each
would be permitted to sell the product. The district court held
that such territorial restraints were not illegal:
It is not the purpose of the Sherman Act or the common law of
restraints of trade to discourage establishment of a new business
in a new territory. Trade secrets have always been considered in
the nature of a property right. Among the ancillary restraints
which are considered reasonable, both under common law and
Farbefabriken Bayer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1961), aff'd on
other grounds, 307 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929 (1963). See also

United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
132. Foundry Services, Inc. v. The Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953).

133. Evans v. S.S. Kresge, 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976).
134. See also San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp.
966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1974): Members of the National Hockey League are not competitors
for the purposes of the antitrust laws. "[T]he organizational scheme of the National
Hockey League, by which all its members are bound, imposes no restraint upon trade
or commerce in this relevant market [professional hockey games in the United States
and Canada], but rather makes possible a segment of commercial activity which could
hardly exist without it."
135. For example, in discussing restraints between a parent and an independently
owned offspring, the Supreme Court noted:
We may also assume, though the question is a new one, that a business
entity generally cannot justify restraining trade between itself and an
independently owned entity merely on the ground that it helped launch
that entity, by providing expert advice or seed capital.
United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 117 (1975).
136. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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the Sherman Act, are those which limit territory in which the
contracting parties may use the trade secret. 37

In terms of its specific holding DuPont is not precedent for the
Alpha/Beta agreement. First, DuPont involved the transfer of
a trade secret, a property right; this essay assumes that the
technology transferred to the Betas will not be of such a character to warrant treatment as a property right, trade secret, or
patent. 13 1 Secondly, given the limits which the courts have
placed on the scope and extent of trade secret rights, the continued vitality of the DuPont holding itself is questionable.'39
Nonetheless, the policy behind DuPont remains appropriate for defining the intrabrand exception. The DuPont court
focused on the fact that although DuPont and La Cellophane
may have been potential competitors, they were not in fact
competitors at the time of the agreement. Therefore, rather
than viewing the agreement as an anticompetitive restraint,
the court applauded "the creation of the American cellophane
industry."' 4 0 The agreement was a joint venture, the purpose of
which "was the development and exploitation of a new business to function in American markets."'' Consequently, by
creating competitors rather than organizing existing competitors, one attains the aura of expansion of a single enterprise,
at least in practical effect. This distinction between creating
new competitors and regulating old competitors creates a legit137. 118 F. Supp. at 219.
138. Much technology sought by developing countries is not of a nature that would
customarily receive U.S. property right protection. See Goekjian, supra note 11.
139. A patent can support a territorial restraint in foreign commerce. Dunlop Co.,
Ltd. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917
(1974); Brownell V. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954); United
States v. L.D. Caulk Co., 126 F. Supp. 693 (D. Del. 1954); American Optical Co. v.
New Jersey Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601 (D. Mass. 1944). This rule is presumably
limited by the domestic rule that the restraint can only extend to the licensee, not his
customers. See Hensley Equipment Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir.
1967); American Industrial Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enterprises, Inc., [1973-2]
Trade Cases (CCH) 74,619 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
However, these permissible restraints derive from the monopoly power expressly
granted by statute. A trade secret, lacking that statutory grant, cannot generally be
used to enforce restraints of trade. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Hohn D. Park & Sons C..,
220 U.S. 373, 400-02 (1911). See United States v. Hughes Tool Co., [1958] Trade
Cases (CCH) 69,001 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where in a consent decree defendant agreed
not to restrain the imports of persons to whom it had licensed trade secrets.
140. Id. at 220.
141. Id.
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imate integrated interest, distinguishing the enterprise from an
illegal per se Topco restraint.'
Third, the final requirement to forestall antitrust liability
is an equity interest by Alpha in each of the Betas. Preferably,
this interest should be to the fullest extent permitted by
local law. The Continental TV rule applies to products of a
"particular manufacturer." By integrating to the fullest extent
possible, an enterpise not only enhances its character as a functionally unified business, but also forestalls arguments that the
overseas expansion unreasonably absorbs enterprises that
would otherwise be potential, if not actual, competitors.'
142. See Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). In Kestenbaum the court refused to judge by a per
se rule efforts by a brewer, Falstaff, to establish a price ceiling on the sale of its
distributorships:
Under the particular facts of the case sub judice, where the price fixer
must extend the very distribution-rights privilege which gave Kestenbaum's busines its value, any restraint legitimately imposed to safeguard
that privilege does not have such a deleterious impact as to create illegality as a matter of law. Rather, this type of situation necessitates an
inquiry into the business purpose and reasonableness of the restraint
employed, and must be measured under the rule of reason standard.
Id. at 696. The combination of the fact that the rights sold were created by Falstaff,
with the legitimate self interest of Falstaff in insuring the success of its franchisees,
precluded the per se rule normally applied in price fixing cases:
It logically follows that Falstaff has a right to restrict the sales price of
one of its distributorship franchises to the reasonable value of that franchise in order to insure that the purchaser will have a chance to realize a
reasonable return on his investment. Falstaff clearly has a strong interest
in the financial vitality of a new franchisee. If the purchaser of a franchise
makes a bad bargain when he buys, then he cannot give the distributorship the solid, concerned management which it must have to be successful for him and to enhance Falstaff's image and relative position in the
market.
Id. Admittedly the Falstaff restraint lacks the clear horizontal implications of the
Alpha/Beta allocation; in practical effect the price ceiling benefitted only Falstaff.
However, the case nonetheless stands for the willingness of the courts to refrain from
per se rules when the restraints are imposed by a parental enterprise seeking to insure
the success of the entire multienterprise operation. See discussion of Citizens and
Southern Nat 'l Bank at text accompanying notes 145-157 infra;Worthen Bank & Trust
Co. v. National Bankamericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 918 (1974). See also Akron Tire Supply Co. v. Gebr. Hofmann KG, 390 F. Supp.
1395, 1402 (N.D. Ohio 1974), which stated that the old Schwinn rule applied only to
territorial restraints which limited competition between distributors; territorial restraints limiting competition between a manufacturer and its distributors are judged
by the rule of reason.
143. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), established
the modern rule that joint ventures may violate the merger provison, section 7 of the
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As Timken aptly illustrates, even a substantial equity interest is not in itself sufficient to certify an enterprise as unified
to the extent necessary to avoid antitrust liability. However,
when practical or legal considerations prevent expansion by
means of a fully integrated company, a lesser standard of unity
should be required. Continental TV implies as much; when
justifying its rejection of Schwinn, the Court expressly noted
that per se analysis may well bar the entry of smaller enterprises, which would not be able to avoid the rule against market allocations by integrating to the extent required by
Schwinn.44
Perhaps more directly on point, however, is the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank.4 C & S National Bank had tried to avoid a state
law which prohibited branch banking. The law limited to five
percent ownership of a bank's stock by a bank holding company. In response C & S established a number of "five percent
banks," in which C & S owned five percent of the stock, and
C & S officers, shareholders, and friends owned substantial
portions of the rest. At the time these banks were established
Clayton Act, when the impact of the joint venture arrangement unduly diminishes
potential competition in an industry. Thus, even when one or both of the joint venturers would not in fact have entered the market by themselves, if the enterprises serving
the market thought that either or both might enter the market, that threat of potential
entry will exert a procompetitive impact on the marketplace. If the procompetitive
impact of one new competitor cannot outweigh the anticompetitive impact of the
elimination of two potential competitors, then the joint venture may violate the Clayton Act. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
Applying the same analysis to the Alpha/Beta scheme, Alpha must maintain a
substantial equity interest in each of their Betas in order to avoid a potential competition attack. If Alpha maintains only a token equity interest in each of the Betas, then
each new Beta, or more specifically the investment capital that formed the Beta,
represented a potential competitor of Alpha and the other member of the industry.
Since the Alpha/Beta market allocation eliminates this competition-at least as concerns Alpha-Penn-Olin reasoning may apply to strike down the restraint and the
joint venture. (Note that one does not already have to be a member of the industry in
order for the potential competition rule to apply, see FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S., 568 (1967)).
On the other hand, by maintaining a major equity interest, Alpha can argue that
without its investment capital and without its technology the Betas not only could not
have entered the market, but could not have been expected to enter the market.
Therefore the Alpha/Beta agreement eliminates no significant potential competition.
144. "Capital requirements and administrative expenses may prevent smaller
firms from using the exception" to Schwinn where the manufacturer retains title. 97
S. Ct. at 2561.
145. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
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it was understood that they would be acquired by C & S as soon
as the law permitted."' When the law was indeed changed, C
& S sought to acquire its de facto branches. The Justice Department challenged the acquisition under section 7 of the
Clayton Act, and further alleged that the ongoing cooperative
relationship between C & S and its de facto branches violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act, claiming in part a conspiracy to
fix interest rates and prices, as well as an unreasonable amount
of cooperation embodied in the bank's service agreements." 7
Although the Supreme Court was aided by the district
court's determination that the alleged price restraints had in
fact not occurred, 4 8 the Court's ruling upholding the C & S de
facto branch service agreements implied that even price fixing
liability would not have been imposed on the conspirators due
to the unusual legal constraints under which C & S had to
operate. In judging the unreasonable cooperation claim, the
Court noted that the banks in question would not have been
created but for the impetus of C & S' efforts." 9 As the Court
recognized, this fact does not normally immunize restraints
between possible competitors from antitrust liability. 50
But these general principles do not dispose of the present case.
C & S was absolutely restrained by state law from reaching the
suburban market through the preferred process of internal expansion. De facto branching was the closest available substitute.",'

Construing Georgia's banking law as a horizontal territorial
market division, per se illegal if done by private parties, the
Court found the cooperation between C & S and its branches
to be entirely reasonable: "To characterize these relationships
as an unreasonable restraint of trade is to forget that their
whole purpose and effect was to defeat a restraint of trade.","
Citizens & Southern is distinguishable from the
Alpha/Beta restraint. The services agreement which the abovecited language addressed was already sanctioned in part by the
banking laws;' 53 the Court was not considering the validity of
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 91-93.
Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 112-15.
Id. at 111.
See note 135 supra; id. at 117.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 114-15.
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an alleged per se restraint of trade.' 4 However, once again the
policy behind the Citizens & Southern decision would permit
the territorial restaints sought to be employed by the
Alpha/Beta group. The Court noted that the C & S de facto
branching program was procompetitive; it created new outlets
in the suburbs thereby increasing consumer choice. Similarly,
the Alpha/Beta enterprise is designed to create new manufacturing units toward a procompetitive end. Although the Betas
would not compete between themselves, the restraint would
generally enhance the group's ability to compete in a greater
number of foreign markets. Additionally, one must consider
the broader policy incentives of distributing profits and industrial capacity to competitively underprivileged countries.
Because of the ultimate procompetitive impact, unified
expansion within the confines of legally imposed equity limits
apparently justifies market restraints normally permitted only
in fully integrated enterprises. When the government suggested
that C & S could have developed less restrictive agreements
with its de facto branches, the Court responded in part that it
would be unrealistic to expect C & S to create new branches
that would fully compete with itself.'55 Thus, when local law
made internal expansion impossible, it was not only proper to
create de facto outlets, but permissible as well to limit their
competitive impact on the de facto parent. If this indeed is the
general rule to be derived from Citizens & Southern National
Bank, then the Alpha/Beta territorial restrictions would apparently be sanctioned as reasonable restraints designed to immunize a parent from the competition of its offspring. Admittedly,
sponsorship alone creates no antitrust immunity; "otherwise
the technique of sponsorship followed by restraint might displace internal growth as the normal and legitimate technique
of business expansion, with unknowable consequences. ' 5'
However, when local law prevents such internal growth, presumably even territorial restraints limiting competition with
the parent become valid. Thus the Alpha/Beta restraint also
becomes valid where Alpha integrates to the fullest extent permitted by local law.' 7
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 116.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 117.
Citizens and Southern potentially broadens the impact of the following state-
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Even assuming that the Citizens & Southern rule cannot
by itself legitimize a per se restraint such as a territorial allocation, the analysis of Citizens & Southern supports a characterization of the Alpha/Beta scheme as a functionally integrated
enterprise within the Continental TV intrabrand exception. As
noted above, Continental TV defines intrabrand competition
in terms of the product of a particular manufacturer. Given the
Court's analysis of the practical realities behind Citizens and
Southern's de facto branching program, the Alpha/Beta program of expansion could also be viewed as the expansion of one
basic enterprise that would qualify for lenient intrabrand treatment. One might even argue that Continental TV's endorsement of franchising limits the Citizens & Southern dictum barring sponsorship followed by restraint, at least where the agreement would pose no potential competition problems.'
Finally, although perhaps not required, one further step
should be taken by the Alpha/Beta group to insure immunity
from the per se territorial rule: The territorial allocation agreement should run only for a term of years, preferably no longer
than the useful life of the original manufacturing facility to be
established by Alpha for the Betas. One of the principal arguments for per se rules is that even though a given restriction
may be currently reasonable in its impact, there is nothing to
ment in 3M:
With part of the defendants' argument there can be no legitimate quarrel.
It is axiomatic that if over a sufficiently long period American enterprises,
as a result of political or economic barriers, cannot export directly or
indirectly from the United States to a particular foreign country at a
profit, then any private action taken to secure or interfere solely with
business in that area, whatever else it may do, does not restrain foreign
commerce in that area in violation of the Sherman Act. For the very
hypothesis is that there is not and could not be any American foreign
commerce in that area which could be restrained or monopolized.
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. Mass. 1950).
This statement in 3M permits only restraints that are specifically designed to avoid
foreign government prohibitions. Presumably, at least in the case of equity restriction,
Citizens and Southern would also permit restraints ancillary to compliance with those
restrictions. Theoretically, in certain circumstances, territorial market allocations
would constitute such a reasonable ancillary restraint.
158. In other words, expansion thru sponsorship and restraint would be permissible as long as the new businesses were not potential competitors. The arrangement
would increase production in an industry without eliminating any existing competition, real or potential. In fact future courts may wish to employ potential competition
analysis as a means of judging the reasonability of intrabrand restraints. See note 143
supra.
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prevent unreasonable use of that restriction in the future." 9 By
restricting the duration of the restraint this rationale for imposing per se analysis on the Alpha/Beta restraint is undermined.
Certainly the time limitation will also aid justification of the
restraint based on a rule of reason test.
CONCLUSION

The Continental TV decision, by heralding a reexamination of the per se rules concerning territorial restraints, provides a mechanism whereby the discriminatory impact of the
per se rules against LDC enterprises can be redressed. Arguably the rationale of Continental TV alone precludes per se
analysis in the international arena in noncartel situations.
However, even absent such a broad reading, LDC enterprises
can now possibly escape the per se bar to territorial allocations
by structuring the enterprise as a functionally integrated unit
using intrabrand restraints. Although a territorial restraint
which concerns only intrabrand competition does not in itself
escape per se analysis, one can avoid being characterized as a
Topco horizontal association by "conspiring" only with newly
created enterprises. One further meets the "particular manufacturer" requirement of Continental TV by integrating into a
single entity to the maximum extent permitted by local law.
Consequently, by following these suggestions, and by further
limiting the duration of the territorial restraint, a U.S. firm
can expand into LDCs thru the form of an Alpha/Beta agreement with reasonably confident expectations that one has
complied with the demands of the antitrust laws.
159. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
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transformation. Contributors include Wilbert E. Moore, Theodore W. Schultz, Simon Kuznets, and Gustav Ranis.
RYBCZYNSKI, T.M. (editor), THE ECONOMICS OF THE OIL
CRISIS; Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 101 Fifth Avenue,
New York, NY 10003 (1976); $24.00; ISBN 0-8419-0235-6, LC
75-34147; xxxvi, 202 pp.; footnotes, bibliography, tables,
charts, appendices, index, index of persons, list of abbreviations. Foreword by Sir Frank McFadzean.
The ability of any country or group of countries to control
the supply of raw materials essential to any other country
raises numerous economic issues. This study, which consists of
nine related articles, addresses such economic issues as transfer
payments, balance of payments, surpluses or deficits, and the
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influence on the activities of the international community in
terms of social and developmental policies and the protection
of human rights. This.work offers a general assessment of the
ILO's objectives and accomplishments. Its scope is not confined to the influence of the ILO's international standards but
extends as well to the procedures for enforcing those standards
and to the outlook for the future.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CENTER, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;

International Legal Center, 866

United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 (1977); LC 77-

1977

BOOK NOTES

79100; ii, 275 pp.; footnotes, annexes, graphs, tables, list of
participating personnel. General observations by John B. Howard, President, International Legal Center.
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The purpose of this monograph is to determine the reasons
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period. The author utilizes information gathered by recent U.S.
congressional investigations of the international petroleum
industry. Weisberg's contribution to the literature lies in his
development of a bargaining model which he believes is more
appropriate than the prevailing economic and political models
to explain price increases and a methodology which could be
applied to other issues in international economic diplomacy.
InternationalTribunals
FOCSANEANU, L., LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR DE JUSTICE
DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPiENNES EN MATIiRE DE CONCURRENCE;

Editions Techniques et Economiques, 3 rue Soufflot, Paris 5 e,
Fr. (1977); 197 pp.; index, tables, bibliography. Preface by
Daniel Vignes.
Since 1975 when articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic Community Treaty concerning improper competitive
practices came into force, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities has handed down more than forty-nine judgments interpreting these articles. Editions Techniques et Economiques has compiled a series of ten articles which Dr. Focsaneanu published on the subject in the Common Market Review
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analytical methods rather than chronology, this compilation
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Court's jurisprudence on competition rules.
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The evolution of U.S. and Filippino relations is traced in
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reader a better understanding of the current diplomatic impasse between the Marcos and Carter administrations.
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The Office of Technology Assessment, created in 1972 as
an advisory arm of Congress, has prepared a comprehensive
overview and in-depth analysis of policy options regarding international nuclear proliferation. This book is neither a study
of nuclear power nor a comparison with alternative energy
sources, but a well-researched informative guide for decisionmakers concerned with a most complex issue: proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
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